What U.S. Wants From U.K. on Security After Brexit – And Why This Puts Britain in a Tricky Position

Even before Boris Johnson became prime minister, the Trump administration has been on a charm offensive towards the U.K. and him in particular. When Britain’s Johnson met U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton on August 12 in London, they discussed the U.K.-U.S. trading relationship, including a proposed post-Brexit free trade agreement, alongside the critical security interests that the two nations have in common.

On July 4, the Iranian oil tanker Grace 1 was detained by British Royal Marines off the coast of Gibraltar on suspicion of violating EU sanctions by taking oil to Syria. On July 19, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards then seized the British-flagged ship the Stena Impero.

Read more: Iran: what the law of the sea says about detaining foreign ships in transit

In May 2018, the Trump administration announced that the U.S. would pull out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which sets limits on Iran’s nuclear programme to ensure that it cannot produce nuclear weapons. Until recently, the U.K. remained committed, along with the EU, to the JCPOA. However, Bolton’s visit to the U.K. was, in part, aimed at trying to persuade the U.K. to rethink that commitment to the nuclear deal as well as to substantiate Johnson’s recent decision to join the U.S. naval mission Operation Sentinel to protect oil tankers in the Gulf.

In one of his last acts as British foreign secretary, Jeremy Hunt indicated that the U.K. should pursue a European-led maritime security force in the Gulf. However, this was subsequently rejected by Johnson in favour of cooperation with the Americans.

To date, the Europeans, as well other U.S. allies, remain uncommitted to joining the new task force despite recent overtures from both the U.S. and the U.K.. The U.K. now finds itself in a difficult position between not wanting to completely renounce its commitment to the JCPOA and its post-Brexit security interests with the EU, while also looking for partners that will actually deliver on its requirement to bulk-up protection of shipping in the straits.

As expected in the current politically polarised U.K. context, there are varying attitudes and opinions on how the U.K. should navigate this challenge. There are those who argue that both the U.K. and the EU (and even the U.S.) are all in weaker international positions and this is just one example that exposes that reality.

Some analysts have argued that Britain’s weakness and preoccupation with Brexit, Europe’s lack of strategic foresight and defense capabilities, and a transatlantic relationship struggling to find common ground are all exposing frailties in the wider U.S.-U.K. relationship. Others have proposed a two-track approach for the U.K. to boost the Royal Navy and move towards the U.S. position on Iran – and the JCPOA in particular.

What’s clear is that the U.K. will still have to invest in its own naval capabilities if it wants to safeguard shipping in the Gulf whether independently or through multilateral missions. In July, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo warned the U.K. that the responsibility falls to the U.K. to take care of its ships.

So what is the U.K.’s capacity to do this? Currently, the Royal Navy has fewer than 80 ships and is at about half of the capacity it was during the Falklands War. This is partly because the Royal Navy pursued a strategy of replacing capacity with high-end capability; the U.S. Navy has taken a similar path, though it started from a much stronger position. However, for the U.K., this has led to a need to strike a balance between those capacities necessary to win wars and to preserve peace. Protecting routine maritime shipping very much falls into the latter category.

The U.K. approach is purposefully designed to plug into U.S. operational capacity in times of crisis management operations or great power conflicts. The force is set up to support a carrier strike-group and not to patrol global shipping routes.

It remains to be seen whether Johnson will be open to investing the required capital to grow the Royal Navy substantially. He certainly seems ready to work more closely with the Americans in the Gulf. However, the long-term shape of the U.K.-EU security partnership as well as U.K. bilateral cooperation with the larger European military powers will reveal itself in time.

This will only be determined by the circumstances and attitudes surrounding Brexit and the ability to repair the current fractures in the wider transatlantic relationship – and not just on what particular maritime task force the U.K. decides to contribute.

Simon J. Smith, Associate Professor of Security and International Relations, Staffordshire University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.