If it was ever safe to assume that wars would be quick and decisive, it is increasingly difficult to do so. In Ukraine, Iran and Gaza, attacking forces have struggled to achieve decisive outcomes, despite substantial technological advantages.

If this emerging pattern reflects more than the unique circumstances of particular conflicts, its implications extend well beyond military operations. National-security planners and foreign policy practitioners may need to reconsider whether great military superiority alone can still be expected to produce rapid political decision.

This week, the Pentagon announced plans to establish a new four-star Autonomous Warfare Command to bring greater focus, authority, and resources to drones, robotics, and autonomous systems that are rapidly changing the character of warfare. 

It is a significant step, and one that has a familiar ring to it. 

In the spring of 1940, the French military discovered that its multi-billion-franc investment in the Maginot Line was entirely useless. The concrete fortresses and heavy artillery were formidable, but the planning rested on an outdated premise. The German army saw no tactical need to assault the fortification; it simply went through the Ardennes and around it.

Before the first arrow flew at Agincourt on October 25, 1415, the English had prepared not just to fight, but to make the battlefield work for them.

War Secretary Pete Hegseth recently announced an aggressive and necessary plan to fundamentally reshape the senior leadership of the United States military. In a forceful move to eliminate redundant force structure, initiated by a May 2025 memorandum and operationalized during his recent address at Quantico, he directed a twenty percent reduction in the number of four-star generals and a ten percent cut to all flag officers across the military branches. This mandate signaled a clear intent to flatten top-heavy military organizations, cut through bureaucratic bloat, and push decision-making power down to the warfighters who actually need it. Yet, in a glaring and inexplicable contradiction to this very mandate, the newly signed Department of War memorandum initiating Project Agincourt establishes the Autonomous Warfare Command, a brand new four-star functional combatant command slated for activation by October 1, 2027. This move represents a massive misstep. It preaches organizational efficiency while simultaneously birthing an enormous new bureaucracy that will ultimately slow down the very technological adaptation it seeks to accelerate.

Understanding why a centralized Autonomous Warfare Command is a mistake requires first examining the fundamental division of military labor. By doctrine, combatant commands exist strictly to employ military force in specific geographic theaters or defined global regimes. Conversely, the individual military branches exist under Title 10 of the United States Code to organize, train, and equip those forces. Standing up a new combatant command to solve a technological acquisition and fielding problem directly confounds operational command with developmental responsibility. While geographic combatant commands manage traditional military operations within defined regional borders, the military utilizes functional combatant commands for capabilities that genuinely transcend specific physical domains and require a unified global approach. United States Special Operations Command is the premier example. Authorized under Title 10 of the United States Code, this command does more than just organize and train forces; it is explicitly chartered to bypass geographic boundaries and directly execute highly sensitive global missions, such as countering violent extremist networks or weapons of mass destruction, when directed by the President. This centralized structure works because these unique operations demand a globally synchronized effort. Similarly, United States Cyber Command operates across the singular, universal domain of information networks. In the cyber domain, a centralized four-star headquarters makes operational sense because offensive digital capabilities carry immense strategic risk and require high-level authorization to deploy.