Integrating Air and Missile Defense in Regional Conflicts

As adversaries make advances in both missile technology and tactics, air and missile defense has emerged as a critical aspect of modern regional warfare. Recent conflicts in Ukraine and Israel highlight the growing complexity of missile threats and offer valuable lessons for designing effective defenses against evolving technological innovations and operational challenges.

So, what’s driving the critical need for action in the Missile Defense domain? There are several factors:

The war in Ukraine highlighted the operational and strategic importance of Integrating Air and Missile Defense (IAMD). Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, neither it nor Ukraine have managed to achieve decisive air superiority. Thus, air and ballistic attacks have become the preferred method for both sides to strike at long range.

Ukraine's efforts to counter Russian missile threats have become a crucial aspect of its overall defense strategy. Ukraine has relied on a mix of indigenous systems and international support to counter Russia’s extensive arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles. High-end Western systems like Patriot, NASAMS, and SAMP/T significantly enhanced Ukraine's interception capabilities.

Key successes include Integration, as Ukraine has effectively linked diverse systems into a cohesive network, leveraging advanced Western radars alongside older Soviet-era systems; Innovation, including creative tactics like combining acoustic sensors with Artificial Intelligence to improve tracking accuracy for low-altitude threats, and mobility, such as decentralized defense units that have increased survivability.

On the other hand, Ukraine continues to face limitations in its ability to defend the entire nation. The first limitation is scarcity, with Kyiv lacking a broad array of advanced IAMD systems – something that means coverage is far from comprehensive across its vast territory. Another is saturation attacks, as Russian simultaneous missile launches and swarms overwhelm defense systems and operators. A third challenge is the Russian advanced threat weapons, since Ukraine does not have the technological ability to defend against Russia’s Oreshnik (an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile with multiple warheads/submunitions). Finally, there is the economic burden of operating and maintaining sophisticated missile defense systems, along with the high costs of interceptors strain national resources.

Ukraine’s resilience stems in part from NATO support (intelligence sharing, training, and advanced equipment) and dynamic integration of resources. Uniquely, Ukrainian innovation in tactics and “re-tooling” western systems to fit their fight has created a surprisingly durable air and missile defense architecture; however, Russian attacks continue to take a toll on Ukrainian infrastructure and population. Russia’s weapons production capacity has increased significantly, while Ukraine remains inadequately armed to match the volume of threat attacks.

Ukraine’s experience offers a blueprint for enhancing the effectiveness of missile defense in future regional conflicts: invest in integration, resilience, sustainability, and innovation.

In 2024, Israel faced escalating threats from rockets, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. Most notably, two large scale attacks from Iran (in April and again October) marked a major escalation in their long-standing conflict. These attacks represented the largest missile attacks ever attempted in a regional conflict. Israel's defense systems, augmented by partner forces, demonstrated remarkable adaptability and effectiveness in countering these threats.

The first attack occurred in April, when Iran fired 120 ballistic missiles and 200 cruise missiles (including attack UAVs) targeting Israeli military sites. Despite the scale of the assault, Israel and coalition air forces intercepted 99% of the incoming projectiles with a layered defense architecture, resulting in minimal damage and injuries. The second attack took place in October, when Iran launched approximately 180 ballistic missiles at Israeli airbases and the headquarters of the Mossad intelligence service. While this strike was more effective at saturating Israel's defenses, it caused limited damage and few casualties due to successful interceptions by Israeli and allied forces.

Both attacks highlighted Iran's growing missile capabilities, but also the capabilities of robust Israeli and partner defenses. In turn, Israel’s remarkable effectiveness countering Iran’s missile attacks can be attributed to four key factors.

The first was warning. Iran’s explicit threats, combined with intelligence from multiple sources, facilitated Israel’s defense architecture preparations, as well as those of partner nations arriving/organizing in support of Israel.

The second was coalition support. The United States provided fighter aircraft, Aegis destroyers, THAAD systems, and intelligence sharing. The UK deployed fighter jets, France “mobilized military resources,” Jordan operated defenses over its airspace, and Gulf states contributed radar tracking data.

The third was layered defenses. The defense of Israel employed a multi-layered architecture combining forward fighter aircraft to intercept cruise missiles, the Arrow 3 and Aegis for mid- course ballistic missile intercepts, and David's Sling/Arrow 2/THAAD for terminal defenses.

Fourth, Israel boasted a strong final layer. Israel’s robust IAMD training, military readiness, and national preparedness ensured that its final intercept opportunities were highly successful.

Nevertheless, the 2024 attacks highlighted several challenges for Israeli defenses. Saturation attacks exposed vulnerabilities, as high volumes of precision-targeted missiles showed the potential of overwhelming even advanced defenses. Low-flying cruise missiles remain difficult to detect without forward radar tracking from partners. And finally, resupply challenges for interceptors highlight the need for sustained inventory management.

The Iran-Israel conflict underscores the offense-defense adaptability imbalance favoring attackers who can modify tactics faster than defenders can respond. Iran’s October attack reflected their lessons from the April attack while Israel’s defenses had no significant ability to adapt to any potential new strategy. The lesson: IAMD must be ready to counter a broad spectrum of offensive attack strategies…which demands a significant investment well ahead of the next conflict.

Israel’s successes highlight the importance of early warning systems, coalition support, layered defenses, and readiness for diverse attack strategies…all lessons for the next IAMD fight.

The Ukraine and Israel conflicts reveal critical gaps in current missile defense capabilities. Namely, that:

Notably, Russia and Iran are not the only adversaries that have “gone to school” on the Ukraine and Israel conflicts. We can certainly expect China to expand its robust and sophisticated missile arsenal, as well as adjust operational plans to avoid the strengths and exploit recognized weaknesses in U.S./coalition IAMD. North Korea, too, having witnessed the wars in Ukraine and Israel, is already advancing its cruise and ballistic missile capabilities, focusing on survivability, precision, and strategic deterrence.

For America and its allies, meanwhile, the recent conflicts offer valuable insights into improving future missile defense strategies across multiple domains.

For the regional fight, a comprehensive missile defense architecture requires: Broad new Area Defenses capable of protecting large regions (i.e., 30 NATO nations in Europe); Advanced layered defenses enabling a “Shoot-Assess-Shoot” operational strategy; New defense capabilities against MIRVs/submunitions from single ballistic missiles; Increased inventories to counter cruise missile swarms and large waves of ballistic missiles; Long-range dynamic interceptors to engage hypersonic threats in the glide/cruise phase; Mobile systems to improve adaptability, and; Expanded technological development, with priority placed on low-cost interceptors for massed attacks, directed energy weapons (lasers and microwaves for rapid-response defenses), and FOBS defenses.

Effective IAMD requires advanced sensor systems capable of detecting, tracking, identifying, and discriminating missile threats. Key capabilities needed for the regional fight include:

The robust sensor and shooter architecture outlined above requires a transformation of the current C2 architecture. The regional IAMD architecture of the future should be designed to achieve “Right Sensor enabling Best Shooter” operations. Key attributes for C2 include a Common Operational Picture (COP), so the broad network of remote sensors, dispersed shooters, higher headquarters, and adjacent commands are all sharing the same awareness before and during a fight; an automated battle management system to enhance reaction times, optimize architecture performance, and enable efficient command decision-making when facing high-volume attacks; a dedicated cadre of IAMD professionals with an established career path, to ensure commanders have the right support expertise to manage complex IAMD plans and operations, and; regular challenging exercises and planning/preparedness efforts to refine operational procedures and improve coordination among allied forces.

Beyond diplomatic means to deter launches, proactive military measures can prevent missile threats from launching. Offensive operations can target deployed missile systems, garrisons, or supply lines and reduce incoming attacks. In most cases, these “attack operations” will not be initiated until after the conflict begins. Thus, the IAMD architecture must be prepared to absorb initial missile attack waves before friendly offensive operations can eliminate/suppress future attacks. Further, clandestine activities such as cyber operations, special forces missions, and supply chain interdiction can disrupt adversary capabilities preemptively. Both offensive operations and pre-conflict clandestine activities must be enabled by a robust, dedicated intelligence network focused on missile threats globally.

IAMD systems are not perfect, and some threat missiles will impact their targets. To mitigate the consequences when intercepts fail, key passive defense measures include hardening critical infrastructure, like command centers, to ensure operational continuity, and deploying effective civilian warning systems modeled after Israel’s network to save lives during attacks.

The United States is currently focused on defending its homeland with the new Golden Dome construct. Initial indications imply space-based sensors and space-based interceptors will be part of the solution. Missile defenses for regional conflicts will likely be able to leverage multiple capabilities/aspects emerging in Golden Dome to include sensors, effectors, and C2.

The lessons learned to date from Ukraine and Israel highlight the evolving nature of missile threats and underscore the need for a multi-faceted approach to regional missile defense. By integrating advanced sensors, layered shooters, efficient next-generation command and control systems, proactive missile defeat capabilities, focused intelligence, and robust passive defenses, the United States and partner nations can enhance resilience against potential attacks from advancing missile threats.

Preparedness derives from a clear-eyed recognition of the threat and the commitment to properly resource measures that defeat and mitigate that threat. Global missile threats are not standing still, so continuous innovation and adaptation will be key to maintaining a credible and effective missile defense posture for future conflicts.

Major General (retired) Harold "Punch" Moulton is a recognized expert in the mission of Integrated Air and Missile Defense. His career in the U.S. Air Force included over 20 years of air and missile defense positions from the tactical to the strategic and culminated as the Director of Operations for U.S. European Command. For more than a decade, he has focused on consulting and facilitation for the Integrated Air and Missile Defense mission supporting planning, exercises, and wargames in U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. Northern Command, North American Defense Command, the Missile Defense Agency, and NATO.

the article was first published in AFPC's Defense Dossier