Who Will Lead This Navy in War?

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   In thinking about who to select as the Navy's next generation of senior leadership, the Nation should be fully engaged, particularly with the increasing potential of war at sea against a peer competitor.  The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral John M. Richardson, who wrote an article for Proceedings Magazine in June 2016 entitled, “Read, Write, Fight,” understands this.  So too does Admiral Scott H. Swift, former Commander, Pacific Fleet, who suggested a way to better prepare for a fight in his March 2018 Proceedings piece, “Fleet Problems Offer Opportunities.” Given the possibility of high-end warfare facing the nation now for the first time since the end of the Cold War, picking the right leaders will be key. The question is:  Is the right leadership being picked today?  Is there a different, better way to consider who will lead the Navy in war?

Since 1974, every Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has come to the office with the following credentials:  command of a carrier strike group (CSG); command of a fleet, and; an operational, four-star command, either Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), Atlantic Fleet/U.S. Fleet Forces Command (LANTFLT/FFC) or Naval Forces, Europe (NAVEUR).  The one exception to this formula is that submariners do not command CSGs: Instead, they command submarine groups at the one-star level. 

In the last 44 years, there have been only three anomalies:  Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda, the 25th CNO never commanded a fleet.  Then, in 1996, Admiral Jay L. Johnson, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO) who had been scheduled to command Naval Forces, Europe, instead became the 26th CNO when Admiral Boorda took his own life.  The current CNO, Admiral Richardson, is the third anomaly in that he has neither commanded a fleet nor had an operational four-star command.  

Not surprisingly, there are considered reasons in this successive, operational flag, command rule:  First, the Navy exists to support the operational element of the fleet - the so-called, “pointy end of the stick.”  It is believed that the leader of an organization whose mission is to “conduct prompt and sustained combat operations at sea,” should be a person who is closely acquainted with firing shots in anger, from ensign to four stars.  Second, perhaps of even greater import, the CNO sits in the “tank,” with the other Joint Chiefs.  It is imperative that he or she knows the score out in the various combatant commands, and this requires genuine joint expertise attained at a high level.  This sort of experience comes in places such as the forward fleets, and especially to those who command PACFLT, NAVEUR, or FFC.   

This is not to say that the formula works perfectly.  By the turn of the century, Surface Warfare Officers dominated a majority of significant leadership positions in the Navy, and held the office of the CNO, without pause, between 2000 and 2011.  It was also this generation of leaders which presided over the diminution of the entire surface community.   Still, this may all say more about either the struggle against increasing budget restrictions or a misplaced spirit of selflessness on the part of these CNOs than it does about a faulty selection approach.  Nor is this to say that those who were anomalous did not perform admirably as CNO.  That is for others to decide, in time.

Either way, the questions are these:  How does an officer arrive at the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in the first place?  What are the implications which arise when there are sustained and dramatic perturbations at the flag-level?  And finally, what does (or should) the future hold in preparing the Navy to face a new era of potential conflict at sea?

 

A Process Defined

Sustained superior performance is essential, but beyond that, a careful choreography occurs in every community beginning at first command if not before. Selection to flag is seldom, if ever, accidental or unanticipated.  This management becomes even more meticulous once flag officers are selected. At that point, there is a determination made as to who will be groomed for the three and four-star levels, and who will serve in other, still important flag positions.  To effectively regulate this complex daisy-chain, a detailed, long-term, name-to-job interaction occurs between all of the warfare communities and the Navy’s (and ultimately government’s) top leadership.

There are really only a few, key, operational flag positions available, and they are earmarked for those bound for the top.  This is important as the timing and positioning associated with getting the right officers through those wickets is not a matter of chance.   Here is one example:  In the surface community, presume that eight officers make flag each year.   Of these eight, only four will go on to command a CSG.   Of those four, only two will deploy.   These deployers are those who have been selected for upward movement, and this is easily observed in a historical review of those who rose higher.  Likewise, while there are any number of important three-star commands, they are in not all equal regarding carrying an officer to the office of the CNO.

Moreover, it is necessary to mention the one outlier in this job pecking order; Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP). A remarkable number of four-star admirals, some of whom achieved senior operational command, have passed through the CNP’s office, including Admirals Leon A. Edney, Ronald J. Zlatoper, John C. Harvey, Mark E. Ferguson III, and former CNOs Jeremy Boorda and James D. Watkins. Evidently, excelling in this position imparts a unique cachet, though it is neither joint nor operational.

The point here is that delicate timing and positioning are required to marshal those deemed to be most deserving to the top.   Though off and on-ramps may be built into the process to allow for surprises and opportunities, the whole process is quite fragile.   In recent years, this fragility has been demonstrated through two events; The “Fat Leonard” scandal, and the aftermath of the two warship collisions in Seventh Fleet.   

 

Gutting the Operational Side in the Pacific

As every sailor knows, there are two sides to any chain-of-command - operational and administrative.  The administrative side of the equation is responsible for the manning, training and equipping of units provided to the operational side of the chain.   The operational side employs these “all-up rounds” in carrying out the nation’s business at sea.

Following the collisions in Seventh Fleet in the summer of 2017, justice was meted out on behalf of the Navy, through the agency of a Consolidated Disposition Authority (CDA), Admiral James F. Caldwell Jr, Chief of Naval Reactors, appointed by the CNO, Admiral Richardson.   Ultimately in this effort, the entire operational chain-of-command in the Pacific, from the ships’ officers of the deck, to CIC watch officers, to the command master chiefs, to the executive officers, to the commanding officers, and then up through their destroyer squadron commander, task force commander, fleet commander and all the way to the Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, was implicated and then either actually or effectively fired.  It was a scorched earth approach never before seen in the Navy, and it appeared to be aimed at not only justice but at sending a message to the American people.  

Though the punishment handed out to Commander, Naval Surface Forces (CNSF), Vice Admiral Thomas Rowden may seem to have been appropriate, particularly in view of the fact that he was the responsible administrative agent charged to provide fully ready ships to the operational commanders, the fact is that he was only a small part of the responsible administrative chain-of-command.  Actually, CNSF relied on a universe of other administrative commands to carry out its mission effectively.   For example, the Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP) was responsible for providing schools and personnel (both of which were in demonstrated to be in short supply), and the Office of the CNO was responsible for the provision of funding. U.S. Fleet Forces Command was the “parent” command of CNSF, just as Pacific Fleet was the parent of Seventh Fleet.  So, while it may have been desirable, for whatever reason, to create a firewall between the operational commands and those administrative commands responsible for providing the necessary wherewithal to the fleet, it also meant that significant responsibility was evaded by nearly half the chain-of-command, top-to-bottom.

 

The Long Reach of Fat Leonard

A crisis was created when Admiral Scott H. Swift, then Commander, Pacific Fleet, was implicated in the Seventh Fleet collisions.  Admiral Swift had long been expected to become the next Commander, Indo-Pacific Command, and his removal from the field meant that the Navy was in danger of losing control of its most historic and treasured combatant command to the Air Force.  The solution hit upon was to send Admiral Phil Davidson, Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces, to command the U.S. Pacific Command. Not only was Admiral Davidson one of the few viable candidates with sufficient credential and seniority, but he was arriving fresh from completion of the Comprehensive Review (CR) of the collisions, and was unsullied by that disaster. Though that may have been good news regarding saving Pacific Command for the Navy, Admiral Davidson’s last and only tour in the Pacific was a single one as a commander, serving as a staff officer at Pacific Fleet headquarters.   Whether a conscious part of the decision or not, his lack of Pacific-experience meant that he was beyond the potential taint of Fat Leonard.

Numerically speaking, only a few flag officers have been caught in the Fat Leonard scandal.  Nevertheless, there have been many more who were frozen in place while the investigation continued.   This “freezing” caused some of these officers to miss their planned wickets, resulting in an extraordinary upset in the carefully mapped-out flag progression.   As for the collision aftermath, it is impossible to know the exact impacts of those events on the “daisy-chain.”  Certainly, the loss of ADM Swift and the shifting of ADM Davidson are significant.

Regardless, all of this begs the question of who may be the next CNO? Watchers had long considered Admiral Davidson to be a leading candidate for the position, and his shift to INDO/PACOM has stirred debate regarding who might be a viable relief for Admiral Richardson.

Based on the historical template, the next CNO likely will be one of the following:

  • Commander, U.S Pacific Fleet: Admiral John G. Aquilino
  • Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces: Admiral Christopher W. Grady
  • Commander, U.S Naval Forces, Europe: Admiral James G. Foggo III
  • Vice Chief of Naval Operations: Admiral William F. Moran

Each of these officers has all of the historical credentials of operational command and joint experience at the highest level, with the exception of Admiral Moran.  However, Admiral Moran merits inclusion in that he would not be the first former Chief of Naval Personnel to become the CNO, though he has not had either fleet nor four-star operational command. Moreover, the current CNO, Admiral Richardson likewise arrived at the job with credentials other than the classic operational command/joint ones which have been common.  In other words, a new template may have been set.

        

Reset the Grid for War

If the Nation is moving from a “Profound Peace” into a period of “Great-Power Competition,” then every effort must be bent to ensure that America is fully preparing to meet what may well be an existential challenge. If, as suggested by Captain Dale Rielage, in his May, 2018, USNI General Prize-winning essay, “How We Lost the Great Pacific War,” the United States were to be defeated in a conflict with China – a conflict which would most certainly be primarily a fight at sea – the United States would, for the first time since World War II lose primary control of the sea lines of communication, in the vital Pacific. China would assume dominance of at least Asia and become a prime hegemon all the way to the Arabian Gulf.

In thinking about who the Nation selects for our Navy's senior leader, it is understood that he or she must be fully and unselfishly engaged in preparing the Fleet for war at sea against peer competitors.   What are the characteristics and experiences of peace-time Navy leaders (beyond the aforementioned operational positions)? Are these characteristics the same as those which might be sought leading into a major conflict? History suggests that they are different. One needs only consider the last, great war-at-sea. Many of the Navy’s leaders at the start of World War II were cast aside in favor of those who could bring fire to the enemy. For many of those officers, including Admirals Earnest King, Chester Nimitz, and William Halsey, it is fair to say that they might never have arrived at flag rank based were they measured against today’s standards.  To win that war no one cared who was charming or polished or politically astute or properly connected.  The question had nothing to do with who had attained a “zero-defects” record. It had everything to do with who could and would defeat the enemy. 

More recently, there have been other “reaches” undertaken to identify the right person for the job.  In 1955, President Dwight D. Eisenhower reached deep to select Admiral Arleigh Burke as the 15th CNO. At the time of his appointment, Burke was still a rear admiral (two-star).  He was promoted two grades and over the heads of many flags of far greater seniority.  In 1970, President Richard M. Nixon selected Admiral Elmo Zumwalt as the 19th CNO for very specific reasons and aims, despite his lack of “traditional” credentials. 

Today, more than ever, modern war is a “come-as-you-are” affair. There will be no slow, years-long buildup allowed. Economies and modern weapon systems suggest that a real fight will ramp up to criticality almost immediately and that wide-spread, cannot-be-quickly-replaced/repaired damage will be done to the fleets in a matter of months, if not weeks. In other words, what the Navy has, regarding leadership and wherewithal, on day one, is the best that it may have throughout the conflict.  The point is this:  The right leadership needs to be found and selected, now.

 

Prove Your Readiness

Cast a wide net, and seek leaders who are determined to resist the self-interested pressures of outside agencies, prioritizing lethality in the Navy above whatever else may be prized. Who in today’s ranks is best equipped to lead the Navy in waging a high-end war?

An answer may lie in Admiral Swift’s March 2018 piece, “Fleet Problems Offer Opportunities.” Deeper opportunities may be offered to the Navy in this Fleet Problem concept.     If, as he suggests in his piece, the new Fleet Problem is designed to do more than check a box, before the deployment of carrier strike groups…if Pacific Fleet is determined to truly test leadership in simulations which approach the real world…if officers will be challenged to do more than just go through the motions…if failure is an option, is this not a chance to really put officers, at a variety of levels, to the real test? 

And this test need not only apply to strike group commanders, and their respective warfare commanders.   A variety of officers, all at different places in their careers, can be tested in this crucible.  Is there any reason that an upward-bound submariner could not take command of the Maritime Operations Center (MOC) for the duration of the game?   Stand up an exercise Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC). Stand up an exercise Joint Forces Command.   Is there any reason for an officer under consideration for fleet command could not play fleet commander during the game? 

Admiral Swift offers a key point in all of this:  “We have to guard against the natural byproduct of this training reality, which is an aversion to the risk of failure that is associated with learning at the leading edge of knowledge. We had to convey to the operational leaders that failure during the Fleet Problem was not just tolerated but expected. Without pushing our operational art to the point of failure, learning would be subdued and subtle, not stark and compelling. High-velocity learning happens at the leading edge of knowledge, not at its core, and certainly not at its trailing edge.”

Learning yes, but also testing.   Officers at every level can be regularly assigned to the game, and throughout their careers, to test whether they possess skills beyond administrative?  The Navy needs lions for leadership in war.   The Navy also needs able administrators.  Certainly, there are officers in the ranks who are both.

The Navy regularly pulls officers out of their employment to serve in a wide variety of boards.   Is there any reason to think that this proposal would not be infinitely more valuable to the service, both in developing the entire officer corps for real, war-time thinking at the operational and strategic level?  Let officers merit their promotion beyond unit-level by demonstrating the skill necessary to fully grasp that which is imperative in fighting a war…and that which is chaff.

The next CNO has, in all likelihood already been selected.  The process of selection and vetting in long and complex and it is unrealistic to think that ADM Richardson approaches the end of his tenure without a relief already having been selected. The question is, and should be, this:  Is the next CNO equipped to lead in war-time?


Captain Kevin Eyer (U.S. Navy, Ret.) served in seven cruisers, commanding three Aegis cruisers: USS Thomas S. Gates (CG-51), Shiloh (CG-67), and Chancellorsville (CG-62).



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