America's Endgame

What Would “Victory” Look Like for the United States in Ukraine?

If the U.S. and its allies are in some manner “at war,” it is worth identifying a desirable end state, a series of victory conditions analogous to those in a traditional kinetic conflict. Given America's interest in an independent Ukraine and the dangers of a Russian-dominated Black Sea, anything short of the territorial status quo ante will be a Russian victory. However, considering America's aversion to military intervention, the most desirable end state will be one in which Russia is bloodied, humbled, and still faces a strategic threat to its gains in Ukraine.

For the United States, the Ukraine question gains its relevance from power-political considerations. Ukraine is a large, populous country with a long Black Sea coastline. Putin's decision for war had multiple drivers, including chauvinistic post-imperial nationalism, religious messianism, domestic pressure, poor intelligence, and fear of NATO. But it also stemmed from a concrete military concern, specifically Russia's desire to secure the Black Sea, and its link to the Eastern Mediterranean. Crimea was a crucial acquisition in 2014. But until February, it was isolated and running low on water. By smashing a hole from Donbas to Crimea, Putin could ensure the Russian navy’s resupply, and allow it to project power more effectively against NATO’s vulnerable Black Sea or Mediterranean members. 

Moreover, if Putin can take Odesa, a more ambitious goal, Russia then holds the entire northern Black Sea. A vulnerable Georgia would be a logical next target. Finishing the job against Tbilisi would give Russia control up to Turkey's coastline, leaving only Romania and Bulgaria as Black Sea rivals. This could have been Putin's objective from the war's start. He has now shifted decisively to this objective, reducing the pace and intensity of northern operations, and focusing on Mariupol, the final city he must hold to take Ukraine’s Azov Sea coastal road, running from Rostov-on-Don to Melitopol, and onward to Crimea, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia.

Regardless of the extent of conquest, Russian territorial gains must be limited or stopped. Otherwise, it is likely that after a pause of between nine months and two years, Russia can be expected to deploy in force again. With control of the Black Sea's coastline, it will probe Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, or Turkey; it will increase its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, Syria, and Libya; and slew its power on NATO southeastern and southern flanks to squeeze the Atlantic Alliance in another hybrid-conventional crisis.

Thus America’s strategic requirement holds: Russian domination of the Black Sea cannot be tolerated.

Zelenskyy’s 16 March address to Congress likely forced Mr. Biden's hand, prompting his announcement of additional military aid. Nevertheless, the Biden administration's broader policy is reasonable, albeit profoundly cautious. Delivering anti-tank and mobile anti-air missiles and UCAVs will slow Russia's advance. Mr. Biden's rejection of Poland's MiG-29 offer was a misstep born of fear. Is there an important difference between attacking Russian forces with American Javelins, Stingers, or Switchblade drones and Polish-supplied combatant aircraft?

Perhaps this realization will persuade the U.S. administration to take a different course on Slovakia’s S-300 offer to Ukraine. Air defenses take lives only when attacked: Russia’s combat jets target maternity hospitals and theaters where innocents hide. Regardless, continuous military aid, alongside the economic consequences that the West’s de facto embargo will inflict on Russia, will slow Russian operational advances. 

With sufficient resupply to Ukraine, Russia can count on ten to twelve weeks at minimum to crack Mariupol, solidify control of Donbas, and then begin to swing west against Zaporizhzhia-Dnipro or Odesa. More operational advances create longer logistical lines, which allow Western-equipped Ukrainian light infantry to harass them. Moreover, artillery does not take cities – urban combat will be necessary in Putin's targeted locations, raising the cost in Russian lives. The more stress the Russian military experiences, and the more damage the Russian economy takes, the more likely Russia is to accept a negotiated settlement.

The issue, however, is that Russia could have gained this proposed settlement without war. NATO continuously signaled that it was not willing to accept Ukraine – it would have taken Zelensky several months to talk the Ukrainian people around to reality, but he would have succeeded. The Donetsk and the Luhansk People’s Republics and Crimean recognition would have taken longer publicly, but if Russia withdrew its forces from Donbas and along the Ukrainian border and accepted some sort of European monitoring, Zelensky could have persuaded Ukrainians to acquiesce. In return, Russia could have conceded Ukraine's EU affiliation, giving the Ukrainian people what they want most, access to the European economic order and a chance to live and work as Westerners, like their Polish and Baltic neighbors.

Putin’s decision for invasion shows that he held more expansive goals than Ukrainian neutrality. Enough American and allied pressure, in support of stout Ukrainian resistance, can force a shift in objectives. But the Biden administration ought to see that pursuing this policy will take months, and perhaps longer. Russian-signed ceasefires are worthless, as the historical record in Donbas demonstrates. 

It is entirely conceivable that Russia, having taken Donbas and the Azov Sea coastline, could sign a ceasefire and continue limited combat operations elsewhere. Similarly, Russia will face an insurgency in the occupied regions. Its brutality against Mariupol, Kharkiv, and elsewhere will not evince hospitality from the locals of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts. The U.S. should, therefore, settle in for the long haul and accept that it is locked in a multi-month, perhaps multi-year, strategic competition with a nuclear-armed great power. More specifically, with two great powers, the Zhongnanhai and Kremlin each get a say.

Seth Cropsey is founder and president of Yorktown Institute. He served as a naval officer and as deputy Undersecretary of the Navy and is the author of Mayday and Seablindness.