We Cannot Fix Force Design

Defense Analyst Steven Yeadon recently wrote an insightful essay suggesting modifications to the Marine Corps Force Design (FD) concept In a Marine Corps University Press article titled "Recommendations for Improving the U.S. Marine Corps’ Force Design.”

Mr. Yeadon points out some of the major challenges faced by FD. The vulnerability of small, missile-armed Marine Corps Stand-in-Forces (SIF) armed with anti-ship missiles along the First Island Chain of the South China Sea against the impressive Chinese Reconnaissance-Strike complex is accurately described except for the fact that none of the host nations in the region has signed up for the project.

Mr. Yeadon also notes that the problem with the LSM program is that it is non-existent. The initial bids came in so over-budget that the Navy went back to square one of the acquisition processes. At best, the first LSM will likely not be launched for five years and at full operational capability for ten. That is optimistic as the LSM is far down in Navy priorities. Yeadon's solution is to further modify the specifications to make the LSM more affordable and hurry up production. This ignores the Navy's abysmal shipbuilding capabilities. FD was originally designed to be operational by 2030—achieving it by 2030 is now in the realm of science fiction.

Third, and most critical, is the question of actual usefulness of FD to the nation in a conflict with China. Independent war games done by CSIS would indicate that its impact would be minimal as opposed to the risk faced by the Marine Corps SIFs.

Mr. Yeadon's suggestion to the vulnerability of the SIFs is to hurry up the delivery of Tomahawk anti-ship missiles to the Corps. He is correct that the Tomahawks would allow the Marines to operate from bases outside of the nations in the immediate First Island Chain. Okinawa and Gaum predominate here. But the question then arises, why the Marines? Other services already have Tomahawks in the region making the Corps' contribution redundant.

Basing SIFs on Okinawa and Guam would seem to make the LSM unnecessary but Mr. Yeadon has some innovative additional ideas for their use such as becoming "lily pads" for VSTOL F-35 Joint Strike Fighters armed with anti-ship missiles. That is innovative but virtually any ship with enough deck space (including merchants pressed into service in a pinch) would make the LSM redundant as well.

As to the overall value-added of FD to the Indo-Pacific Command in a war with China, the CSIS games conclusions remain valid. Perhaps that is why PACOM's head, Admiral Samuel Papas, ignored FD in his recent article on Indo-Pacific strategy. If it comes on line at all, FD will not help him on his watch nor likely that of his successor.

Yeadon also has some interesting thoughts on Amphibious shipping, but these are clouded with his agreement with former Marine Corps commandant, General David Berger, that large-scale amphibious operations are obsolete.

Early Ukrainian success in using land based anti-ship missiles against Russian ships appeared to validate Berger's conclusion, but later events in Ukraine and in Yemen demonstrated that rapid technological innovation may have rendered Berger's view obsolete as well. Large, over-the-horizon amphibious operations are still feasible. Anti-ship missiles, even hypersonic ones, and drones can be countered. Berger's false assumption allowed him to reduce the long-standing Navy-Marine Corps agreement of 38 large amphibious ships down to 31 in order to afford the LSM. 

Due to Navy maintenance issues, the Navy can no longer keep three amphibious ready groups on station in the world's most likely crisis regions 24/7. Yeadon hopes his fixes will keep 31 ships reasonably ready, but that assumes the Corps will only do small scale raids. Without 38, the Marines are becoming a bizarre mix of the Royal Marine Commandos and US Army Coastal artillery.

Yet again, a redundant dead end.

Mr. Yeadon does have some other good ideas but the problem is too bad to fix. The Pentagon and DOGE, or some combination thereof, should put Force Design out of it misery. There are several other viable options to return the Marine Corps its status as the nation's force-in-readiness. The Corps needs to be directed to explore them—for its own good.

Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps Colonel who was Chief of Staff of the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab. He served as a Special Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of Defense