Elbridge Colby's Vision: Blocking China

Elbridge Colby’s senate confirmation hearing in early March holds more important implications for U.S. partners than most observers in Canberra, Wellington or Suva realise. As President Donald Trump’s nominee for under secretary of defence for policy—the Pentagon’s chief strategist—Colby gave testimony that is a window into the administration’s approach to China and what that means for allies and partners across Oceania.

The vision he laid out before the Senate Armed Services Committee was neither the primacy-obsessed neoconservatism of the Bush era nor the strategic restraint and belt-tightening advocated by U.S. progressives and libertarians. Instead, Colby argued for ‘prioritised engagement’—a strategy that recognises the limits of U.S. power while refusing to abandon core commitments.

This ranking is important for Australia and Pacific island nations.

Colby’s testimony also flashed warning signs for allies hoping Washington would shoulder the burden of regional security. His insistence that ‘we have a one-war military and change’ reflects a hard-nosed pragmatism—a stance that reinforces calls for allies to increase defence spending. These demands may prove challenging even for Australia, which has already committed to defence spending increases, provides key regional intelligence and offers the U.S. military access to Australian ports and airfields. They are probably more challenging for smaller Pacific Island countries or other regional partners with limited resources.

Colby expressed reservations about AUKUS, despite describing Australia as ‘perhaps our closest ally in the world’ that has ‘been with us even in our less advisable wars’. His concern was that the arrangement could potentially reduce the U.S.’s submarine availability during a crucial period.

This concern reflects a common Trump administration line that support for alliance commitments must not come at the expense of the U.S.’s ability to deter China. This tension between alliance building and direct deterrence capability is not new. Colby has consistently emphasised re-assessment and re-organisation of alliances around the paramount goal of preventing Chinese hegemony.

Such an America First position creates both challenges and opportunities for Australia. The challenge lies in potential timeline slippage for submarine delivery; the opportunity comes from Colby’s desire to ‘do everything we can to make this work’ by revitalising the U.S.’s industrial base to produce more submarines for the U.S. and its allies. Australian defence planners understand this dual message from Washington, but Australian taxpayers also deserve an explanation from their government.

For Pacific island states caught between Washington and Beijing, Colby’s approach suggests more direct U.S. engagement. When questioned about regional coalitions, he expressed scepticism of a ‘NATO-like alliance’ in the Indo-Pacific, preferring more tailored bilateral relationships. This points to a strategy of supporting critical nodes in the U.S.’s defensive perimeter, rather than building expansive regional architectures. Colby argued in his book that the U.S. should cultivate and strengthen capabilities among a ‘deny China’ coalition rather than pursue diffuse multilateral frameworks.

The issue underpinning Colby’s testimony is the mismatch between the U.S.’s global commitments and its current military capabilities. He repeatedly invoked the Lippmann gap—a disparity between strategic ends and available means.

Colby presents prioritisation not as a choice but as a necessity, recognising that the U.S. industrial base has atrophied while China’s has bloomed. Noting that China has ‘a shipbuilding capacity over 230 times that of the United States’, he underscored a U.S. industrial deficit that must be addressed.

If confirmed, Colby would seek tailored deterrence approaches for specific contingencies rather than general regional dominance. He would also want better stewardship of U.S. resources and stronger allied defence capabilities. He understands the industrial limitations and recognises that resources—including decisionmakers’ and strategists’ time and attention spans—directed toward one theatre necessarily come at the expense of another.

With Colby at the Pentagon’s strategic wheel, allies should expect more U.S. demands. Australia, with its resources and strategic location, will face increased pressure to accelerate its defence buildup and repeated asks from the U.S. to step into the breach. Pacific island states will need to navigate even more carefully between economic enticements and competing security guarantees that may come with more explicit conditions than in the past.

Greg Brown is a senior analyst at ASPI USA.

This article appeared originally at The Strategist (ASPI).