The Problem is Deterrence, Not Drones

Since multiple Russian drones crossed into Poland last month, European leaders have expedited the idea of a “drone wall” and rushed to discuss the need to invest in countering drones. But when it comes to European defense, Russian attack drones are not the true problem. The problem is an erosion of the pillars of nuclear and conventional deterrence.

Yes, Europe and the United States should be working with Ukraine and investing in research and development to improve what are currently a host of inadequate options for countering uncrewed aerial systems (UAS, aka “drones”). But instead of focusing on defending against drones from the east, Europe should invest in its ability to strike back at Russia and take steps to demonstrate a willingness to use these capabilities.

The issue is not that Russia is now attacking Europe for the first time. This has been occurring at least since the 2007 cyber-attacks against Estonia. And it isn’t that Russia now has access to a technology that allows it to attack all of Europe from the air. That’s been true since the 1950s. And it’s not that this is the first time Russia has violated NATO airspace. That occurred even before Russia invaded Ukraine, to include a NATO nation shooting down a Russian airplane. So, what is the issue?

It boils down to the nature of deterrence and the current geopolitical environment. Deterrence works either by denial (i.e., demonstrating to your enemy through your capabilities that they will not be capable of achieving their objective) or by punishment (i.e., they may be able to hit you, but you will hit back so hard that it won’t make their initial strike worth the punishment).

Since 1949, the premise of NATO has been grounded in deterrence by punishment, that is the implicit threat of NATO’s Article 5 that if anyone (but let’s be honest, it meant the Soviet Union) attacked a NATO nation, the U.S. military, backed by the U.S. nuclear arsenal, would make them really regret doing so. This has been augmented over time through varying levels of conventional forces meant to also provide a measure of deterrence by denial in order to reduce reliance on—and thereby, ideally, the possibility of—nuclear escalation. Conventional denial with a backstop of nuclear punishment by the United States and, to a lesser but still important extent, the United Kingdom and France.

While the Trump administration has made repeated statements that it will remain in NATO and continue to provide a backstop of nuclear punishment in support of Article 5, some in Russia and in Europe have begun to question the reliability of U.S. nuclear deterrence. Regardless of whether this is true, belief and perception are the reality when it comes to deterrence. Thus, the most important and unanswerable question is whether Moscow believes the United States remains committed to NATO Article 5. And the fact that this is even a question at all indicates an erosion of deterrence.

Though it may be desirable to maintain capabilities that allow for solely defensive responses to Russian aggression for political reasons, Europe needs to stop thinking that it can continue to focus on defense alone. While Europe should not actively seek to escalate a conflict, the reality right now is that no technology exists anywhere in the world to create a cost-effective “drone wall.” This is especially true when you are looking at a country that is at war (Russia) attacking countries that still think they are at peace (Europe) and will therefore have more stringent restrictions on their counter-UAS rules of engagement.

Europe and the United States absolutely should be working together to invest in the development of more cost-effective methods to counter UAS. But as the saying goes, the best defense is a good offense. This is precisely the rationale behind Ukraine’s desire to acquire Tomahawk cruise missiles from the United States. The Tomahawk would help Ukraine defend itself against Russian air attacks by enabling the Ukrainian Armed Forces to damage the archer instead of trying to shoot down the arrows. And when it comes to dealing with an aggressor state that is actively working to assess your military capabilities and your political will to use them, as Russia currently is doing to Europe, the capabilities are useless as a deterrent if the enemy doesn’t believe you will use them.

Russia would hesitate to fly its planes in NATO airspace if it believed those planes would get shot out of the sky. It would think twice about launching Shaheds at NATO if it believed every factory used to manufacture a Shahed would get wiped out.

Europe should continue to spend money on rapidly recapitalizing its conventional forces to ensure it can hit back at Russia. Some nations are already doing this through their investments in long-range cruise strike capabilities. By investing in military capabilities that would allow it to strike Russia, Europe likely would bolster the nuclear deterrence pillar as well. This is because investing in these capabilities would demonstrate that European nations are meeting their NATO Article 3 requirement to provide for their own national defense, thereby strengthening the transatlantic relationship.

If Europe focuses on its willingness and ability to punch back at Russia, it won’t have to worry that much about Russian planes and drones crossing borders to attack it. But that’s not to say that Europe shouldn’t worry about drones at all. It just means that Europe is worrying about the wrong thing if it’s focused on a “wall” that faces east. Instead, Europe should be bolstering its ability to counter the use of drones by covert actors (think Ukrainian Security Forces’ Operation Spiderweb but aimed at energy facilities) or violent non-state actors (like using a “dragon drone” to drop thermite on a crowd of people, leading to terror and panic).

Drones are a problem. Russia is a problem. But the real problem is that if NATO nations allow themselves to be distracted by a few drones flying from the east, they risk missing the bigger picture when it comes to both Russia and drones.

Ann Marie Dailey is a Policy Researcher at RAND, a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, and an officer in the U.S. Army Reserves. She formerly served as the Senior Advisor for International Security Affairs and the Senior Advisor on Russia Strategy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The views in this article are her own and do not represent the official position of RAND, the Atlantic Council, or the U.S. Army Reserves.