Potential for Russia Escalating War Continues

The potential of wider conflict between Russia and the West, or the opening of a new front in Ukraine—with troops possibly coming south from Belarus in a second attempt to take Kyiv—has been gaining speculation for a while now. Such guesses, including a rumored new and full mobilization after Russia’s State Duma elections on September 18–20, do not necessarily augur a new massive conflict in Europe (see EDM, June 23). Escalation seems all but a foregone conclusion in Russia’s war against Ukraine, but how the war may escalate remains debatable.

Putin has set his sights on ending NATO’s influence in Europe. One of Moscow’s public demands to avert war in 2021 was that NATO members not deploy troops to Eastern Europe (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 17, 2021). As goals evolve during war, so too has this demand. Putin allegedly set a goal in 2025 of achieving “the collapse of NATO and the European Union from within” by the end of 2026, with one possible way of doing so through Moldova (Meduza, August 14). Russia trained forces in Serbia to interfere in the September 2025 elections in Moldova and hoped to use the country as a springboard for further hybrid attacks against the West (see EDM, September 25, 2025). Reportedly, Orthodox priests were also given money to buy the votes of pensioners in favor of the pro-Moscow candidate (Center for Countering Disinformation, September 1, 2025). Moldovan President Maia Sandu’s victory and the country’s continued path toward integration with the European Union can be attributed, in part, to the Moldovan security forces, which prevented Kremlin operatives from acting freely. The threat of new hybrid attacks in Europe, however, is still serious.

This is an example of Russia’s use of hybrid attacks as a form of escalation. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has warned European countries of possible Russian hybrid attacks in Europe, most probably in Poland or the Baltic, with the aim of re-connecting to the exclave of Kaliningrad (Gordon.ua, August 13). Some European officials do not rule out the possibility that the act of preparing for war was itself a hybrid psyops move designed to spread panic in the target countries. This may take the form of a false-flag attack on infrastructure in Latvia or Poland. In Germany, the Leipzig/Halle airport, which is used for NATO logistics and is a European hub for Ukrainian Antonov Airlines, suspended flights temporarily after detecting an armed drone near a plane (Parlament.ua, August 13). Markus Reisner, an Austrian colonel, said in an interview with German newspaper Welt that the drone discovery represented a “completely new level of threat” and, while it is impossible to be sure of who sent it, the most likely culprit (and beneficiary) is Moscow. He went on to say that while a direct military clash between Moscow and the West is unlikely, the threat of information chaos is imminent and real. In this case, “1,000 Internet trolls in our societies are more effective than 100,000 heavily armed soldiers” (Welt, August 17).

Another example of a recent Russian hybrid attack occurred in Poland. Polish police thwarted an attempt to kill Ukrainian rapper Albert Vasiliyev, who goes by the name of Kyivstoner. The would-be assassin was a refugee from the Donbas who was acting on the orders of the Russian security forces, according to the Polish special forces. The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) alleges Vasilyev was involved in a planned “massive attack” on Moscow with 35 drones and had been sending money to the Ukrainian army (Meduza, August 14). These recent actions from Moscow suggest the Kremlin is likely to escalate the war, with the only remaining question being how it will do so.

Professor Richard Arnold teaches at Muskingum University and is a member of the PONARS network.  He is the author of "Russian Nationalism and Ethnic Violence: Symbolic Violence, Lynching, Pogrom, and Massacre" (Routledge, 2016) and the editor of Russia and the 2018 FIFA World Cup (Routledge, 2021).  He has written numerous articles on Russia, including in Problems of Post-Communism, Theoretical Criminology, and Post-Soviet Affairs. His current interests are the connections between sport and politics, Cossack movements in Russia and Ukraine, and far-right activity in Russia.

This article appeared originally at The Jamestown Foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor.