Taiwan, the Long Game Not Invasion

China enters the Lunar New Year amid uncertainty over domestic power dynamics and the implications for policy toward Taiwan.

Beijing regards Taiwan as an integral part of China. In 1949 the leaders of the Republic of China  (ROC) retreated to Taiwan   following defeat in the civil war. In 1971, the United Nations transferred recognition to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Beijing insists “reunification” is inevitable. Xi has called on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be capable of invasion by 2027 and to complete unification by 2049. Hawks in the west see these as timelines for conflict. Pragmatists note that 2027 marks the PLA’s centenary and 2049 the PRC’s hundredth anniversary—historical milestones rather than launch dates.

Instead, they view China’s approach as consistent with ancient Chinese strategic thought that rewards patience, encirclement, and indirect pressure,  breaking  the enemy’s resistance without fighting.

It is true that over recent decades, China’s military has expanded rapidly. The Congressional Research Service assesses the PLA Navy as the world’s largest, with roughly 400 battle-force ships compared with America’s 287. China also possesses the world’s largest  coast guard, a key asset in any quarantine scenario.

Beijing has also developed amphibious capabilities and rehearsed landings in exercises such as Justice Mission 25. However, the PLA lacks combat experience in large-scale amphibious or joint warfare operations. A 130-kilometer crossing of the Taiwan Strait would expose initial waves to heavy fire, while limited landing sites would complicate reinforcement and resupply. The widescale purges of the military also make this an inopportune time for such a complex operation.

Taiwan relies on geography and asymmetric defense and the prospect of urban warfare. Rugged coasts, steep mountains, and dense urban terrain favor defenders. Taipei has adopted a “porcupine” strategy built around, mines, rapid-strike naval vessels, and missile defenses designed to make invasion prohibitively costly.

Regional powers are committed to keeping South China Sea lanes open. In August, the Philippines and Australia conducted the Alon 25  naval drill in disputed waters. Another exercise, ANNUALEX 2025, followed in October in the Philippine Sea under Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). The Philippines’ geography makes it strategically pivotal. The former U.S. base at Subic Bay is being revived, and U.S.–Philippine ties are deepening under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), granting U.S. access to bases relevant to regional contingencies.

Under the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States maintains unofficial ties and provides arms to Taiwan. The Taiwan Assurance Implementation Act”, signed in December 2025, further clarified Washington’s position. The U.S. Navy underscored its commitment by sailing the  USS Abraham Lincoln through waters claimed by China at the start of the New Year.

Since the election of President Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), viewed by Beijing as independence-leaning, the PLA Air Force and Navy have stepped-up incursions into Taiwanese airspace and waters. “Joint Sword” exercises rehearse encirclement and gray-zone tactics that normalize Chinese presence while testing Taiwan’s defenses.

Alongside military pressure, Beijing pursues engagement. Millions of Taiwanese live, work, have family ties, invest in or study on the mainland. China, including Hong Kong, remains Taiwan’s largest trading partner, supporting a pro-engagement bloc led by the Kuomintang (KMT), which directs a coalition majority and endorses the 1992 Consensus for “One China.” The DPP’s failed effort to recall 31 KMT lawmakers exposed divisions Beijing could exploit ahead of Taiwan’s 2028 presidential election.

China’s Taiwan policy blends intimidation with inducement, seeking to make unification appear inevitable. While military action cannot be ruled out, current indicators point toward sustained encirclement and coercion rather than imminent war.

David W. Wise is a retired businessman who publishes frequently about public policy. He is a graduate of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University