Investment and Infiltration: Turkish Leverage in the US Defense Industrial Base

Should a country that supports Hamas hold leverage over U.S. bomb supply? One now does, after defense contractor Repkon USA purchased the General Dynamics facility in Garland, Texas. 

Repkon USA is a subsidiary of Turkish defense producer Repkon, and in March 2025 it announced its  acquisition of the Garland facility, the sole domestic manufacturing plant for MK-80 series bomb bodies, from General Dynamics, pending US government approval. The transaction cleared by mid-June.

MK-80 series bombs are used with Joint Direct Attack Munitions, the most common precision guided air-launched munition in the U.S. arsenal. Allowing Repkon USA to monopolize domestic production of one of the main component parts for these munitions worsens supply chain security, making the single point of failure more vulnerable by adding foreign leverage to a list of vulnerabilities that already includes natural disasters, sabotage, labor strikes, and more.

In December 2020, the U.S. imposed sanctions on Turkey in response to the Turkish Defense Industry Agencies purchase of a S-400 surface-to-air missile system from Rosoboronexport, a Russian state-owned weapons exporter. That purchase led the U.S. to kick Turkey out of the F-35 program, raising further questions about the wisdom of allowing Turkish companies into the U.S. defense industrial base. 

While Repkon USA is not the Turkish state, Turkey can exert its influence through Repkon USA’s parent company. The Turkish government has significant leverage over Turkish defense companies, as is the case in the relationships between governments and their defense industries more broadly. Repkon receives contracts from the Turkish government and relies on government authorizations—meaning it is tied to Turkey’s national interests. 

Increasing market share in U.S. munitions production would grant Turkey indirect leverage over U.S. foreign policy, like the provision of MK-80 series bombs to Israel. Even short of turning off production, which would risk nationalization, Turkey could slow production down with excuses like labor issues or a need to repair production lines. 

MK-80 series bomb production isn’t the only U.S. munitions production Repkon USA is involved in. Rather, it recently won a contract to build a Kentucky TNT plant, and the Garland facility it purchased is also involved in other munitions production. 

In allowing Repkon USA to make this purchase, CFIUS failed to do its job—and its process must be amended. 

One practical way to update CFIUS is by requiring that members of Congress be notified when a national security review has been started, as opposed to the current system where select members of Congress are notified after the review’s conclusion. Another way to update the CFIUS process is to create a mechanism for members of Congress to raise concerns and offer feedback.

While foreign direct investment can improve the U.S. military industrial base (e.g., the Hanwha acquisition of Philadelphia Shipyard), foreign direct investment must not be allowed to compromise supply chain security.

To safeguard national security and limit the vulnerability of defense production output, the United States must ensure the CFIUS review process is fulfilling its purpose.

Jim Fein is a Research Associate for National Security and the Defense Industrial Base at The Heritage Foundation.