
Integrated Deterrence: Grand Strategy's Poor Cousin?
Published Dec. 31, 2022 • Read time: 6m
On October 12 of this year, the Biden administration released the National Security Strategy (NSS)—which is supposed to serve as the administration’s grand strategy. Two weeks later, on October 27, the Department of Defense released the unclassified version of the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS), Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), and Missile Defense Review (MDR). These three documents exist to describe the Department of Defense’s role in achieving the administration’s grand strategy; the specific role nuclear weapons will play; and the role of missile defenses.
While all four documents received their fair share of analysis by the DC intelligentsia, it was perhaps the Nuclear Posture Review that received the greatest attention. This was for good reason.
Both advocates of nuclear disarmament and proponents of robust nuclear deterrence found the document disappointing in many ways. For the disarmament community, there was great hope that a Biden administration would radically depart from the Trump administration’s nuclear policy and adopt “no first use” or “sole purpose” as national policy. There was also hope that a Biden presidency would see cancellation of the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent, elimination of the W76-2 low-yield submarine launched ballistic missile warhead, and cancellation of a nuclear armed submarine launched cruise missile.
As is often the case, hope was mugged by reality when Russia invaded Ukraine and began making nuclear threats against the United States—laying waste to the hopes and dreams of the disarmament community. China’s dramatic increase in operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons did not help either.
Proponents of robust nuclear deterrence feared disarmament advocates would achieve in the Biden administration what they failed to achieve in the Obama administration. It was to the relief of proponents that funding for the nuclear triad remained—even if they were disappointed with the cancellation of the nuclear armed submarine launched cruise missile. In truth, modernization proponents dodged a bullet with a far more reasonable Nuclear Posture Review than many experts expected.
The administration’s formal description of “integrated deterrence” as its primary strategic concept received modest attention within the Beltway intelligentsia. First mentioned in an April 2021 speech by Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, integrated deterrence was later described by Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Sasha Baker, in congressional testimony as “a framework for working across warfighting domains, theaters and the spectrum of conflict, in collaboration with all instruments of national power, as well as with US allies and our partners.”
Formally ensconced in the National Security Strategy, integrated deterrence was, for the first time, described in a fashion that offered more than vagaries. The National Defense Strategy and Nuclear Posture Review offered more clarity to what the Secretary of Defense called “the cornerstone of US strategy.”
There is, however, a problem with integrated deterrence. It confuses grand strategy, the linking of national aspirations with all forms of national power to achieve or ensure national interests. Deterrence is a “way” for grand strategy to avert war, an expected national interest, that orchestrates the means available, such as the strategic nuclear triad. Integrated deterrence claims to move beyond our understanding of Cold War general deterrence, which relies on two adversaries understanding that a nuclear conflict between them will destroy them both, but it is the administration’s grand strategy. It seeks to maintain the status quo while reducing the role of nuclear weapons in national security. It is also a grand strategy that seeks to reduce defense spending while still maintaining the American-led international order. Deterrence is never an end unto itself, but a way to achieve a desired end-state...peace.
The National Security Strategy exemplifies our point. The document is largely political theatre with its early discussion of climate change, election denial, and inclusion and only discusses grand strategy when it introduces integrated deterrence halfway through the document. Remove the header from page twenty-two of the National Security Strategy, “Integrated Deterrence,” and you would think it is a discussion of the administration’s way to execute its grand strategy.
In many respects, integrated deterrence is similar to the Obama administration’s “lead from behind” approach that sought to increase the role of allies and non-military state power. Critics saw this approach as projecting American weakness. This is a questionable strategic choice at a time when Russia and China are making no bones about their efforts to change the international order that allowed both to grow wealthier than ever before. In his testimony to Congress, Vice Admiral William K. Lescher, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, stated that the Pentagon's strategy of integrated deterrence performed "very incredibly well" in Ukraine; to which Congressman Gallagher retorted, “My own view, and this gets to integrated deterrence and part of why I'm sceptical of the concept, is that if it is used to suggest that we can rely on nonmilitary tools, specifically sanctions or hashtag diplomacy, in order to deter—uncoupled from a credible military threat—then we'll have further deterrence failures.”
Setting aside the blurring of the desired effects for integrated deterrence and the purpose of achieving desired end-states of a grand strategy, it is important to understand that integrated deterrence, as it is described in the strategic documents discussed, does not better position the United States to further national interests. This is because the concept pays lip service to the threat posed by China and Russia while designing a grand strategy that only works if our adversaries share our values, which we know they do not—no matter how bad some want.
Integrated deterrence failed its first big test in the days leading up to the invasion of Ukraine, due to an over-reliance on the threat of nonmilitary economic sanctions and the under-reliance on the hard-power threat to deter Vladimir Putin. Economic sanctions, for example are rarely effective against states that are prepared for them or have robust economies to ignore them, or that America is overly dependent upon for its own economic survival.
According to Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations, deterrence is achieved when there is the “existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction.” A threat of unacceptable counteraction relies on fear to succeed. While the instruments of statecraft include the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic power of the state, no element of state power has proven as effective at deterring adversaries as nuclear weapons and the fearsome effects.
Contrary to claims that fielding a strong nuclear force is somehow Cold War thinking, the Russians and Chinese know the role they play in their own grand strategies. It is time the United States set idealistic aspirations aside and effectively counter Russia and China. As the former Commander of US Strategic Command, Admiral Charles Richard, said at the 2022 STRATCOM Deterrence Symposium, “Integrated deterrence doesn’t work unless you have the backstop of nuclear deterrence."
Dr. Christine Leah is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Dr. Adam Lowther is Vice President for Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Dr. Stephen Cimbala is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Curtis McGiffin is Vice President for Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

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