U.S.-Japan-ROK Security Partnership: The Concept of a "Virtual Alliance"
Published Nov. 10, 2016 • Read time: 5m
“Virtual alliance” still remains practically non-existent among the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (hereafter, South Korea). With new leadership on the horizon for the United States and South Korea, it is time to revisit the idea of a “virtual alliance” among the three nations. The United States, Japan, and South Korea all share strong democratic values, and the United States is a security partner of both South Korea and Japan, committed to their security as a result of defense treaties ratified in 1953 and 1960, respectively. Nuclear threats from North Korea and the rise of China provide the primary basis for these relationships, and U.S. support remains high in both countries all but assures the continuation of these alliances in the future. Despite historical and territorial disputes, the current maritime security situation in Southeast Asia affords a strong motivation for increased cooperation between South Korea and Japan. Therefore, a virtual alliance can be achieved through a revitalized US-Japan partnership, the continuation of a sound US-South Korea security relationship, and most importantly, a strong security cooperation linkage between Tokyo and Seoul.
What has remained an issue is the bitterness of Japan-South Korea relationship. As the weakest link of the “virtual alliance,” Japan and South Korea is the greatest obstacle the United States faces. This is truly disappointing as South Korea persists its sense of historic distrust for its neighbor. To South Korean policymakers, Japan and Prime Minster Shinzo Abe remain a major concern of today and future threat of tomorrow. Seoul’s viewpoint repeatedly collides with Washington’s, whose national security strategy rests upon the establishment of robust US-Japan-South Korea relations. What is more, the United States wants a greater Japanese involvement in regional security affairs within the framework of Japan’s Peace Constitution, but Seoul perceives Japan’s latest security and defense reforms only as a dangerous re-militarization.
Evidenced by remarks made by former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and Vice President Joseph Biden during their trips to the region in 2013 and President Barack Obama’s attempt as an intermediary role in the nuclear security summit at The Hague in 2015, the United States is highly interested in a more cooperative Japan-South Korea relationship. President Obama acted as a mediator in order to bring Washington’s two biggest allies in the region—Japan and South Korea—together. Yet, their longtime bitterness over the issue of comfort women and their constant territorial dispute over Dokdo (Takeshima in Japanese) in the East Sea continue to severely damage their relationship. That being said, in order to achieve rapprochement between Prime Minster Abe and President Park Geun-Hye of South Korea, President-elect Donald Trump should act more decisively to repair relations.
During future visits to Japan, President-elect Trump needs to practice great diplomacy so as to unite, rather than affront his fellow ally state. While showing compassion towards the Korea fatigue in relation to the comfort women issue, the President should persuade Prime Minister Abe to discontinue Tokyo’s provoking rhetoric regarding the matter, such as revising the so-called Kono Statement or visiting the controversial Yasukuni shrine. When President-elect Trump visits Tokyo, while highlighting the alliance, he should strive to further deepen their economic ties, including through the latest Trans-Pacific Partnership. Moreover, he must highlight that the cooperation between the United States, Japan, and South Korea may resolve a range of political challenges against China.
Likewise, when visiting South Korea, President-elect Trump needs to reaffirm the U.S.’ commitment to a stronger alliance with South Korea and remind President Park that repeated nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches from North Korea call for a more ferocious pursuit of denuclearization. Moreover, the President-elect should persuade Madam Park that Japan’s latest security and defense reforms do not signal re-militarization. It is crucial that the President-elect clarify Tokyo’s decisions are merely defensive measures taken against Beijing’s coercion and intimidation of late. He should continue to explain that Japan’s reinterpretation of its right to collective self-defense and its reversal on the ban on exporting weapons are actions forced by China in order to protect Japan’s Senkaku Islands (Daioyu Islands in Chinese). Moreover, the President-elect should encourage Park to accept Japan’s sincere apology regarding comfort women and move on from this troubling part of history. The President-elect should also reinforce Park that a volatile, yet nuclear North Korea still exists in the Korean Peninsula to date and is the most dangerous threat to her country. Additionally, in case of the North’s demise, South Korea should review collapse scenarios and develop joint contingency plans with Japan to best respond. The President-elect should convince Park that one cannot indefinitely dwell on the past without jeopardizing the future.
As aforementioned, historical issues, as well as differences in strategy serve to keep relations between Japan and South Korea on an unstable footing. Significant challenges still remain as how to bring the three sides closer in a way that fulfills all three countries’ security interests and ensures a broader regional stability. Ralph Cossa’s use of an old Russian proverb best sums up the current challenge: “forget the past and lose an eye; dwell on the past and lose both eyes.” It is time for the people of Japan and South Korea to concede their resentments and advance towards rapprochement with both eyes wide open. As the Japan-South Korea bilateral relationship strengthens, US-Japan-South Korea can present a sense of unity in the U.S. led block against North Korea’s nuclear brinksmanship and China’s belligerence in Asia, thus naturally rebooting the “virtual alliance.”
Christopher Lee is an active duty Major in the U.S. Army. He holds a B.S. from West Point and an M.A. from Columbia University. He is currently pursuing his Ph.D. in International Cooperation from Yonsei University. He has served for eight years as an intelligence officer, and is currently serving as a Foreign Area Officer for the Northeast Asia region. Chris can be reached via Twitter @chrislee733.

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