Watch What Trump Does in Asia, Not What He Says

Ignore what he says. After six years in office, we know the only reliable way to assess Donald Trump’s intentions is through his actions. He is happy to say almost anything precisely because it distracts and confuses. He is unencumbered by ideology or higher principles, don’t look for strategy or long-term plans, his approach has been and will remain instinctive, personalised and opportunistic.

Do not expect a chastened Trump White House to respond to the Republican mid-term election drubbing and trim its sails.

In replacing chief of staff Susie Wiles with Stephen Miller, the architect of the hardline immigration policy and an unrepentant political pugilist in the style of Roy Cohn, Trump has made clear his response to this electoral right-cross.

Commentators are attempting to guess where Trump’s lame duck period may take US foreign policy and where, in turn, that will take the world. It seems likely that Trump will follow precedent and focus on his global legacy, but his mercurial tendencies mean that there’s a case to be made for almost any outcome.

The president is now expected in Asia for the annual summit season, offering a good opportunity to gauge Trumpian deeds that will provide at least some sense of where he might steer his final two years in office.

At APEC’s sidelines Trump and China’s Xi Jinping are scheduled to hold their third bilateral meeting of the year. It will be interesting to see whether it will be more than the bromide bromance of the year’s earlier gatherings. Will the “constructive strategic stability” formulation developed previously remain or will Trump attempt to put more pressure on the Chinese leader?

The most surprising feature of his second term has been the lack of hostility towards the People’s Republic. The hawkishness many assumed would be a central plank of US policy has failed to materialise. The absence of heat is welcome, but if this is the prelude to a “grand bargain” then the regional consequences would be immense.

For those expecting – or indeed hoping – for Trump to use the opportunity to ramp up pressure, the track record indicates that is unlikely. His personalistic approach is marked by solicitousness in bilateral engagements; indeed the wretched experience of Volodymyr Zelenskyy in February 2025 is the notable exception to a general unctuousness he adopts in leader-level meetings.

The White House and others have also trailed the possibility of a Russia–China–US trilateral sit-down to broker a deal to end the Ukraine War. While styled as a 21st  century Yalta, it is implausible that an arrangement including Russia and not involving Ukraine would create a lasting settlement, or indeed any peace at all.

While APEC gathers ostensibly to drive economic cooperation and advance trade liberalisation, that business will remain peripheral to the major topics under discussion. APEC matters, but the misalignment between its liberal ideals and the difficult geopolitics is nowhere more visible than at its annual summit.

Although the ASEAN meetings and East Asia Summit will attract fewer flashbulb moments than APEC, they should be watched closely. Will ASEAN work out a way to thread the needle on Myanmar? Or does Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s recent meeting with the self-styled president Min Aung Hlaing presage a coming in from the cold for a military regime in Myanmar that continues to slaughter its own people and lacks control over the country as a whole?

India and Indonesia’s position within the East Asia Summit process will also be interesting to watch as they try to advance a more ambitious global posture while carving out space between the US and China. ASEAN also has major concerns about energy prices, AI governance and maritime security. Will these be meaningfully addressed?

Asian multilateralism has faced considerable geopolitical headwinds in recent years. Not least that caused by Sino-American competition. The ability of these groupings to advance cooperation and boost a sense of trust and common cause in contested Asia has been severely constrained. The summit season is unlikely to return the region to a more optimistic period, yet it provides the chance to see the direction of geopolitical travel but also, just possibly, a glimmer of collaboration.

The shared interests of Asia’s states are immense and so much upon which they depend requires that they work together. The summits allow us to see where Trump is going and if Asia’s states are in the mood to cooperate.

Nick Bisley is Pro Vice-Chancellor Research and Professor of International Relations at La Trobe University.