Lebanon's Strategic Role, Hezbollah's Evolution, and Iran's Regional Ambitions

The recent Hezbollah attack on the Golan Heights, which tragically resulted in the deaths of 12 children, has significantly escalated tensions in the region. This event brings the prospect of a major conflict between Israel and Iran closer. Understanding Lebanon's role amid this growing antagonism is crucial for comprehending the dynamics at play.

Lebanon's significance stems from its strategic location and small size. Positioned between two major conflicts—the Arab-Israeli wars and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—Lebanon becomes a focal point in regional tensions. Additionally, its small size exacerbates political, ethnic, and religious tensions, which in turn can trigger indirect military confrontations among these actors.

Despite Lebanon's limited participation in the Arab-Israeli wars, the outcomes of these conflicts profoundly impacted the country's socio-political landscape. The significant influx of Palestinian refugees into Lebanon and the growing influence of this new population group disrupted the fragile balance among Lebanon's political factions, which already had a history of internal hostilities.

The root of Lebanon's disruption lies in the history of sectarianism and multiple ethnic-religious fractures fostered during the French colonial period. The French aimed to provide favorable conditions for the Maronite Christian communities rather than promote national unity. The Maronite Christians envisioned a sovereign state with a European identity, while Sunni Arab Muslims sought regional integration influenced by pan-Arab narratives. Meanwhile, the Shia community, historically marginalized and economically disadvantaged, focused on improving their socio-economic conditions and political representation within Lebanon.

Over time, the demographic reality of these ethnic tensions changed. The Maronite Christian community ceased to be the majority in Lebanon, disrupting the power balance established in 1932. By the mid-1970s, these circumstances had significantly shifted. The massive influx of Palestinian refugees further exacerbated ethnic tensions, leading to a rapid escalation of conflicts.

A political-religious alliance emerged, with many Palestinians aligning with Lebanese Muslim sectors and left-wing groups that shared their revolutionary ideology. This alignment was to the clear detriment of the Maronite Christians, adding greater volatility. Additionally, in the early 1970s, the political leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization settled in Beirut, and many of its armed militias spread across the country. Consequently, the Lebanese capital quickly became the new regional command center for PLO operations after their expulsion from Jordan, following a brief civil war with forces loyal to King Hussein of Jordan.

In 1974, the PLO gained formal recognition as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian cause by the Arab League, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Additionally, the deployment of militias from Jordan to southern Lebanon, near Israel's northern border, enabled the area to be used as a platform for launching numerous attacks against Israeli targets. The PLO also managed to consolidate almost absolute territorial control in large regions of southern Lebanon, especially between the cities of Tyre and Sidon, effectively becoming a state within the Lebanese state.

Previously, the Cairo Agreement had granted the PLO permission to control Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut. The PLO also committed to obtaining prior consent from the Beirut government for any armed action against Israel. However, over time, these agreements were largely ignored. From 1970 onwards, Palestinian militia attacks on Israeli cities and towns became more frequent, leading to increased Israeli reprisals against these militias operating in Lebanon. These reprisals affected not only the combatants but also many Shia populations in the south of the country.

Many in Lebanon interpreted the political and military advances of the Palestinian cause, its leadership, and its armed militias as contrary to their national interests. Militarily, they criticized being caught in the crossfire of a conflict they did not initiate but suffered from; politically, residents of the Lebanese capital soon began complaining that Yasser Arafat, the PLO leader, was effectively the mayor of West Beirut.

Lebanon began taking harsh measures against the Palestinian refugee population, preventing them from accessing nationality and benefiting from national social security. Palestinians were relegated mainly to unskilled labor, especially in agriculture and construction, and faced severe restrictions on accessing justice and the ability to purchase and inherit property. Many Lebanese, especially within the Maronite Christian sectors, began to resent the Palestinian political and military leadership for behaving as if they owned the territory rather than as guests.

With the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt in 1979, post-revolutionary Iran emerged as a key supporter of resistance against Israel. Lebanon, with its significant presence of historically marginalized Shia communities and Palestinian militias opposed to Israel, became a fundamental platform for Iran's regional strategic objectives.

Consequently, from its inception in 1975 until its conclusion in 1990, the Lebanese Civil War went through two fundamental stages. The first stage was marked by Palestinian commando actions against southern Israel, leading to Israeli military operations, including the 1982 invasion, and the expulsion of Yasser Arafat and his Palestinian militias from Beirut. The second stage involved the Israeli military occupation of a security zone in southern Lebanon and the creation of the Shia militia Hezbollah, with Iranian support, as a resistance movement against American and Israeli interests in the region.

The significant Shia Muslim community in Lebanon attracted the attention of the post-revolutionary Iranian government, which leveraged this transnational religious identity to advance its foreign policy interests. Consequently, Hezbollah's origins are closely linked to the Lebanese Civil War and Iran's strategy to counterbalance American and Israeli interests through Shia communities in the region.

The roots of Hezbollah can be traced back to the creation of the “Movement of the Deprived” in 1974 by Musa al-Sadr, an Iranian cleric who arrived in Lebanon in the late 1950s at the invitation of local religious leaders in Tyre. Following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, a group of these clerics and militants splintered from AMAL to establish Hezbollah.

At the time, Israel invaded part of southern Lebanon to eliminate the threat posed by PLO militias, which had made Lebanon their primary operational base after being expelled from Jordan. Following the invasion, an al-Quds force deployed from the Iran-Iraq war to the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon. Their mission was clear: to provide support to militants and Shia clerics who had disbanded from AMAL and others.

Given these circumstances, Hezbollah maintained a close relationship with the political and religious establishment of post-revolutionary Iran. Many of Hezbollah's founding clerics had studied in Qom and Najaf under Ayatollah Khomeini, whom they recognized as the supreme political authority. Through Khomeini, they secured economic, technical, and armament support. Additionally, Hezbollah's surprising effectiveness in its early fights against Israel and other state actors resulted in significant casualties among peacekeeping forces in Lebanon, ultimately forcing their withdrawal from the country.

Hezbollah's effectiveness compelled Israel to withdraw from most of the territory it had invaded in Lebanon, retaining only a small security zone in the south until its complete withdrawal in 2000. After the Israeli occupation, Iran capitalized on the power vacuum by continuing its support for Hezbollah and strengthening relations with the Shia population through social, cultural, and religious programs. This aid helped alleviate infrastructure damage caused by the Israeli military and fostered social acceptance of both Hezbollah and Iran.

Lebanon was crucial to Iran's regional expansion and consolidation, allowing it to maintain influence from Central Asia to the Mediterranean, including Iraq, Syria, and the Gaza Strip. Iran also intended to use Lebanon as a bargaining chip to advance its nuclear program, which required strengthening Hezbollah's operational capabilities.

General Suleimani had openly acknowledged his role as an advisor to Hezbollah during the 2006 war in Iranian television. Indeed, Iranian officers served in advisory roles in joint command centers with Hezbollah and at the underground facilities of the Iranian embassy in Beirut, Hassan Nasrallah and Imad Mughniyeh coordinated with these Iranian officers.

The 2006 Lebanon war was not solely a conflict between the Israeli armed forces and Hezbollah; it also tested the operational capabilities of Iran. The supply of improved missiles and rockets from Iran aimed to enhance the impact capacity of Hezbollah's rockets, which had traditionally targeted northern Israeli communities.

During the years that Israeli security forces were stationed in southern Lebanon, the buffer zone effectively protected northern Israel and the country as a whole. During this period, fewer than ten incursions by Palestinian guerrillas reached the Israeli border, with only two penetrating Israeli territory. On both occasions, the militants were neutralized before they could commit any acts of violence. Additionally, Hezbollah launched around four thousand Katyusha rockets, resulting in seven civilian deaths.

However, political pressure against the military presence increased, making the costs and benefits a central topic in public debate. Ehud Barak’s political victory fulfilled his promise to withdraw troops. This withdrawal had significant consequences, including the deployment of Iranian operational capabilities and the strengthening of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. Over the 18 years of the Israeli presence in southern Lebanon, approximately 300 Israeli soldiers died. In contrast, during less than 35 days of fighting in 2006, 119 soldiers were killed, with 34 of those deaths occurring in the last two days of the conflict.

The defenses encountered by the IDF during the 2006 operations confirmed that Hezbollah spent years preparing southern Lebanon for hybrid warfare. Concrete bunkers with provisions, equipment, and electricity allowed Hezbollah to sustain engagements as a conventional force, while village fortifications provided guerrilla warfare flexibility and prevented Israel from accurately assessing their forces.

Hezbollah's fixed defensive infrastructure, similar to the French Maginot Line, was used for supply, storage, and supporting mobile tactical units rather than for static defense. This strategy allowed them to maintain flexibility and adapt their tactics as needed.

Among the assistance received by Hezbollah, the participation of Iranian communications experts was vital. They configured a resilient communications network that could not be destroyed and functioned effectively under attack, maintaining command and control lines. The key to this achievement was the use of fiber optics instead of wireless sources, which prevented detection by countermeasures.

Israeli intelligence encountered significant difficulties due to the use of diverse Lebanese Arabic dialects by Hezbollah. These dialects, rich in regional slang and idioms, posed a major challenge for Israeli analysts attempting to intercept and decode communications accurately. The linguistic complexity of these dialects often eluded those unfamiliar with them, resulting in limited insights into Hezbollah's plans and movements and hindered Israeli strategic and tactical decision-making and complicated military operations.

Despite Israeli military claims that they had destroyed half of Hezbollah's offensive capabilities during the first week of the conflict, the situation appeared quite different. Hezbollah continued to carry out an average of approximately one hundred attacks per day. In fact, the day before the ceasefire, Hezbollah set a record with more than 200 rocket launches. While the Israeli Air Force may have successfully targeted several of the longer-range multiple rocket launchers—due to their large transport vehicles and complex, time-consuming launch preparation—they are easier to detect and target with air strikes. However, the shorter-range Katyusha rockets, which are launched in smaller quantities or individually, present a significant challenge for Israeli forces. This difficulty is why Hezbollah was able to sustain a high level of firepower until the very end.

Israel has the capability to address missile attacks from systems like Scud or Shahab, which have greater volume, power, and higher altitude and range trajectories. However, it does not yet have good technology to intercept smaller rockets that impact within seconds. Until such technology is available widespread, the concept of strategic territorial depth is challenging. While it is possible to neutralize a significant area and prevent the deployment and launch of short-range missiles, Hezbollah could still use more powerful missiles to maintain a significant attack capacity.

Traditionally, Hezbollah used Katyusha-type rocket launchers with limited range and accuracy, serving primarily as psychological tools against northern Israeli populations. However, with sophisticated weapons like the C-802 anti-ship missiles and AT-14 anti-tank missiles, Hezbollah demonstrated advanced tactics. The use of RPG-29 launchers and other high-tech weaponry caused significant damage to Israeli armored vehicles.

Hezbollah's use of Mirsad-1 unmanned aerial vehicles during the 2006 war represented a significant tactical advancement. Capable of operating in darkness and conducting surveillance, these UAVs were difficult to detect and could perform intelligence and combat missions with various payloads. Despite being primarily used for reconnaissance, many were intercepted and shot down by Israeli air defenses during the conflict.

Anti-tank rockets became a central element of their arsenal and posed a significant challenge to the Israeli Defense Forces. Advanced guided rockets such as the Russian-manufactured 9K11 Malytka, 9K115-2 Metis-M, and 9M133 Kornet were particularly effective. These missiles, which can be launched from distances of one to three miles, were instrumental in destroying various Merkava tanks and other armored vehicles, and were responsible for nearly half of the casualties during the conflict.

Israeli forces initially deployed tanks in open areas, which made them vulnerable to Hezbollah's advanced anti-tank missiles, such as the TOW. This deployment strategy proved problematic due to the high effectiveness of these missiles against tanks.

In response to the threat, Israeli forces began to adjust their tactics by employing a combined arms approach. They increased the use of infantry, supported by artillery and helicopters, to better protect the tanks and engage Hezbollah's anti-tank units.

Despite these adjustments, Israeli forces encountered significant challenges. The dense and varied terrain of southern Lebanon, coupled with Hezbollah’s well-prepared defenses and the need for rapid tactical changes, limited the effectiveness of these measures. Logistical and operational constraints further complicated the situation, making it difficult to fully neutralize the threat posed by Hezbollah’s anti-tank capabilities.

Hezbollah demonstrated effective control of the operational theater through various tactics. They employed deception maneuvers and ambushes, displayed high mobility and tactical flexibility, and operated in small groups of 2-3 men. They utilized advanced weaponry, including night vision goggles, advanced rifles, and anti-tank missiles, and used mining techniques. They took cover in numerous fortified and underground installations, deployed snipers, and generally showed a high level of preparation and resilience that significantly hindered the Israeli ground advance.

In addition to their weaponry and training, Hezbollah's strong ideological convictions, particularly their belief in martyrdom, also play a crucial role in their combat effectiveness and limit the effectiveness of conventional deterrence strategies. Over the years, extensive underground fortifications were secretly constructed in southern Lebanon. These included command centers with computerized communications, electronic observation systems, weapon depots, and missile launch points, all of which were unknown to Israeli intelligence.

In 2006, Israel gave birth to the "Dahiya" doctrine, which focused on using disproportionate force against specific targets to maximize damage and undermine the enemy's ability to respond. From the perspective of Israeli planners, delivering a decisive blow to Hezbollah's center of gravity, as in past Arab wars, was not feasible. Lt. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot, then Chief of the General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces, believed that the doctrine should not differentiate between factions and that the Lebanese state must be held accountable for the actions of militias operating within its territory.

Their aim was to achieve a decisive result without relying on international intervention or support. This approach, named after the heavily targeted Beirut neighborhood during the Lebanon War, emphasized overwhelming retaliation to incapacitate adversaries. The heavy-handed tactics employed in Gaza, marked by extensive damage, significant civilian casualties, and the resulting humanitarian disaster echo the "Dahiya" doctrine's emphasis on disproportionate force.

Israeli officials have always assumed that a conflict with Hezbollah is inevitable, so temporarily subduing the enemy would produce a prolonged period of calm, allowing adequate preparation for the next campaign and avoiding a cycle of permanent guerrilla warfare that would increase the loss of lives and material resources within the modern asymmetric warfare context.

Hezbollah also adjusted its doctrine after 2006 aimed to eliminate the idea in the Israeli mentality that there is a war front and a safe domestic front.