Why Small Powers Are Not a Walkover

Historically, great powers have showcased a propensity to fight large-scale conventional conflicts. Conventional military, overwhelming firepower, and technological preeminence have informed the strategic calculus of great powers. Nonetheless, this disposition has proved counterproductive while fighting asymmetric conflicts with weaker adversaries. Major Robert M. Cassidy, a U.S. Army veteran, pointed to this recurring flaw, stating that rigid bureaucratic culture and an infatuation with fighting industrial conflicts constitute the Achilles heel for the great powers.

The U.S. military's thinking has been emblazoned with the precision strikes paradigm. The standoff precision-guided munitions (PGMs) were considered to be a substitute to circumvent the employment of land forces, dismantle the adversary’s center of gravity, and inflict a psychological paralysis. This ambitious strategy became a cornerstone for numerous fashionable concepts such as effect-based operations (EBO), shock and awe, and rapid dominance.

Nonetheless, Iran’s response nearly defied all this logic. Iran anticipated a prolonged and larger confrontation with the U.S. and Israel following the 12-day war. Instead of confronting its adversaries' crushing firepower, Iran’s ‘mosaic defense’ went into effect after the tactical decapitation of its top leadership. Capitalizing on its geographical depth, sub-surface defense infrastructure and dispersed command and control (C2), Iran prevented the U.S. and Israeli air forces from effectively striking their perceived center of gravity: drone and missile assets.

Along with this, Iran preserved its core retaliatory capabilities and employed them in a sequence against the U.S. military bases in the Gulf region. Similar to the 1991 allied ‘scud hunting’ campaign, Iran’s transporter erector launcher (TEL) evaded destruction despite sustained locating and targeting efforts by the U.S. and Israeli Air Forces. The dense geographical landscape and rugged terrain underscored the limits of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets.

Moreover, Iran’s decentralized C2 safeguarded the 31 commands of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) against decapitation attempts. This granted Iran a tactical flexibility to operate across multiple domains. While the U.S. and Israeli war planners remain fixated on dismantling Iran’s center of gravity. Iran not only preserved its center of power but also effectively dispersed it, facilitating seamless operations against a superior adversary.

Another notable aspect was Iran’s adaptive resilience. The collective historical memory, culture, identity, and economic hardships constituted a robust posture against foreign intervention. Together, the Near East South Asia Center of Strategic Studies treated these components as a ‘state-society-alliance-system’ that is capable of enduring prolonged pressure, upholding internal stability that makes it difficult for the external powers to dictate the outcomes of the conflict.

On the other side, the U.S. and Israel struggled with fluctuating political objectives and declining domestic political support. Blinded by technological hubris, both actors undermined Iran’s capabilities, threshold to incur pain and the ability to retaliate, creating significant effects. Similarly, the techno-centric worldview of war led the U.S. and Israel to ignore the historical constants of terrain, geographical contiguity, and societal layers. Such unaccountable non-tangible elements proved counterproductive against the U.S. and Israeli war efforts.

The Middle East conflict demonstrates that, unlike great powers, small powers do not embrace rigid war paradigms. Instead, they raise the ante of war by prolonging the conflicts, employing an indirect strategy of attrition, and fostering bottom-up innovation. This out-innovates the great powers in developing and operationalizing off-the-shelf technologies. Moreover, by employing asymmetric strategies, small powers capitalize on their adversaries’ lack of flexibility and homogeneity of military thought. Rather than confronting great powers' overwhelming military might and irresistible firepower, actors like Iran opt for fighting in the cheaper and more adaptive battlefield frameworks.

Shaheer Ahmad is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies, Islamabad. He can be reached at cass.thinkers@casstt.com

image: A billboard depicting a fallen Statue of Liberty and crowds carrying Iranian and Shiite flags overlooks Revolution Square as traffic drives by in Tehran, Iran, Monday, Aug. 3, 2026. (AP Photo/Vahid Salemi)