
Evolve Defense Acquisition To Maintain Technological Lead Over Strategic Competitors
Last updated 03:44 PM EDT • Read time: 4m
As the U.S. technological lead over its principal strategic competitors narrows – and in some cases has already disappeared – our defense acquisition system must evolve to reverse the trend. Not only do China and Russia have prodigious military technological momentum, but our own technological position suffers from significant vulnerabilities. Today, the U.S. is contested in every warfighting domain – air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace.
Our defense acquisition enterprise provides our warfighters with the leading technologies to defeat our adversaries, not merely to sustain parity. The system must rise to our adversaries’ challenges by modernizing the force, fielding leading-edge technologies, and incorporating a constant evolution of capabilities to meet future threats.
Yet, for more than a decade, a combination of emphasis on affordability and sustaining legacy programs – as opposed to identifying and nurturing breakthrough technologies – has characterized U.S. defense acquisition. The outcome is predictable, conceding the frontiers of advanced technologies to our risk-taking adversaries, who know they must lurch technologically to outmatch the United States militarily. However, our defense acquisition system is rife with ineffective personnel policies, stifling regulations, and in some cases, corrupt practices which hinder our ability to procure and field the advanced technologies we need to win tomorrow's battles.
A major problem is the risk-averse culture permeating our defense acquisition enterprise, particularly the focus on compliance with a suffocating regulatory regime. Industry does not manage their acquisitions the way the government does – any business that did so would be out of business in short order. The defense acquisition workforce is not empowered to take risks; instead, it is hyper-focused on navigating regulatory requirements.
Nowhere are our acquisition vulnerabilities more challenging than in cyberspace, where the dizzying pace of technological advance means that the acquisition system must anticipate the next leap before the future technologies begin to mature. Less obvious markets, such as that for aerospace spare parts, are a significant weakness as well. Indeed, a GAO study of readiness rates for 46 aircraft across the military services found that between 2011 and 2019, 19 aircraft were 15% below their readiness goals, and 11 aircraft were more than 25% below their goals. These readiness rates were affected by shortages, delays, obsolescence, and diminishing supplies of spare parts. There is no excuse for such a failure.
The inefficiencies in our acquisition system are most evident in the defense acquisition workforce. A combination of poor hiring practices, subpar training, a suffocating regulatory regime, and a disempowered workforce combine to create a culture driving poor decision-making and encouraging improper influence on contract awards. In such an environment, a compliance mentality, lack of innovation, and excessive regulation will continue to plague the acquisition workforce. With the emphasis on regulatory compliance comes a counter-intuitive focus on winning and sustaining contracts, rather than developing leading-edge, game-changing technologies and getting the right goods and services to the warfighter in a timely manner at a fair price.
If overregulation is not getting us the results we want, the answer is probably not more regulation. If our programs do not field solutions to the battlespace-after-next, the answer is probably not sustaining the programs. And finally, if our defense acquisition workforce is unable to identify and seize the technological high ground over China and Russia, the answer is probably not continuing the same processes. To improve acquisition outcomes, we need to improve and empower the workforce rather than implement more onerous regulations. Across the enterprise, we will get better results.
John Adams, U.S. Army Brigadier General (Retired), is president of Guardian Six LLC and a former Deputy U.S. Military Representative to NATO’s Military Committee. He is a national security adviser and writer on national security and defense issues and was the lead author for the 2013 study on the U.S. defense industrial base, “Remaking American Security.”

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