Factors Influencing Strategy: The Objective-Narrative Nexus

Earlier this year, The Strategy Bridge asked civilian and military students around the world to participate in our seventh annual student writing contest on the subject of strategy.

“We are all here. Our military is here, citizens are here. We are all here defending our independence, our state, and it will be so further. Glory to our defenders, glory to Ukraine!”[1] With those impassioned words, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, flanked by his Prime Minister and party leaders around a cell-phone screen, galvanized his country and sent a message of defiance to the world on the first night of Russia’s invasion. At the time of this writing, Ukraine has met the call of President Zelenskyy’s words. Russia and President Vladimir Putin remain unable to overthrow the Zelenskyy government or gain control of the Ukrainian state.

While 20th-century leaders used mediums such as radio and television addresses, President Zelenskyy leveraged the power of smartphones to film the speech and promulgate it into the 24-hour news cycle through social media dissemination. The narrative stands well with the day of infamy speech by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt on December 8, 1941, or President George W. Bush’s impromptu bullhorn address at the World Trade Center site.[2]

The address gave not only the Ukrainian people, but Zelenskyy’s military commanders at all echelons clear objectives and a unified narrative to rally around, focused on the defeat of Russian forces and defense of Ukraine’s sovereignty. Ukraine has maintained its objectives and unified narrative since the outset of the war, leveraging the power inherent in the objective-narrative nexus to its advantage. The United States should look to Ukraine’s use of the objective-narrative nexus as a benchmark example as it competes with the pacing challenge of the People’s Republic of China, Russian aggression in Europe and Africa, and the states of Iran and North Korea.

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There are two key terms and two assumptions to frame the argument. First, strategy, as defined by naval officer and theorist J.C. Wylie, is “a plan of action designed in order to achieve some end; a purpose together with a system of measures for its accomplishment.”[3] This definition provides sufficient boundaries for the additions of objective and narrative. The “end” constitutes the objective, and “narrative” is inclusive of purpose and how that purpose is communicated. Second, U.S. Army doctrine defines operational art as “the design of campaigns and operations by integrating ends, ways, and means, while accounting for risk.”[4] It is the bridge between strategy and tactics, arranging tactical actions and incorporating outcomes to achieve strategic goals.

This paper assumes the U.S. Congress will not declare war—something it has not done since December 1941. Authorizations for the use of military force will remain the status quo. As a result, certain authorities, permissions, or funding streams will be unavailable to joint, department, and theater command staffs. This assumption does not impact the necessity of objective or unified narrative, as both are vital in competition or in limited crises. This paper acknowledges that authorizations for the use of military force limit resources and concepts that might be viable in a declared war.

The second assumption is that while there are multiple definitions of operational art—nearly a dozen across a cursory literature review—the U.S. Army’s definition of operational art will remain constant through 2040. Furthermore, including objective, unified narrative, and the objective-narrative nexus does not interfere with the future operating concept for the U.S. Army of 2040 and henceforth can be considered as recommended additions to the concept. This assumption accepts the validity of the operational level of war, as well as the tactical and strategic levels in accordance with U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations. Arguments concerning the validity of the operational level of war are not considered here.

The nine elements of operational art—end state and conditions, center of gravity, decisive points, lines of operations and lines of effort, tempo, phasing and transitions, culmination, operational reach, basing, and risk—are tools used by commanders and staffs to “help understand an operational environment and visualize and describe their approach to conducting an operation.”[5] They are not imperatives, and therefore all are not necessary for success, but effective commanders seek to apply a majority to achieve victory and continue operations. Proper employment of operational art ensures tactical actions are arranged and resourced to meet strategic objectives. The elements must be revised if they are expected to be relevant in support of U.S. strategy now and in 2040.            

The first revision concerns the end state and conditions. The end state is “a set of desired future conditions the commander wants to exist when an operation ends.”[6] It is a confusing and ill-advised term. The singular end state of a military operation is a set of desired conditions, plural, that are likely outside of a commander’s control.

Furthermore, the term end state does not account for the complexity within a system, a common issue during experiments about logics of failure.[7] Consider a combatant command during this present age of great power competition and integrated deterrence. At what point does a combatant command achieve an end state when it is constantly in a state of competition? Multiple attempts at the same end states may not result in the desired future conditions, and, as recent history shows, plans become emergent based on the complex system of unforeseen events such as a global pandemic.

A more specific and usable term is objective, “the clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every operation is directed.”[8] A clear, concise, specific objective or set of objectives helps planners avoid unclear goals or negative goals that add to the fog and friction of military activities.[9] Sets of objectives can be nested across services and domains, as well as synchronize various elements of national power, thereby enabling integrated deterrence.[10]

Each member of a team, be it the joint force commander or the squad leader, should know what the objective is for a given operation and their roles and missions within them. This does not mean commanders, their staff, and soldiers disregard the conditions for those objectives. Rather, a return to the term objective, instead of end state, allows units to respond to problems presented by the environment and adversary and incorporate resultant outcomes, instead of pursuing nebulous end states that are desired but may well be unattainable.

The second proposed revision is to add the term narrative into the elements of operational art. In a growing age where altered photos, video, and speech are the norm for spreading disinformation, misinformation, and malinformation, the need for a clear narrative for all forms of military operations is paramount. Strategists should be aware of the power available when connecting the stated objective with a coherent, unified narrative, and leverage that objective-narrative nexus for comparative advantage. This nexus also ensures the integrated and coordinated use of information-related capabilities throughout military operations, be they joint training or combat.[11] Operational planners will focus their efforts on clarifying and maintaining the objective while units at all echelons will know why they are fighting, what they are fighting for, and take their own initiative to spread the narrative.

The revisions to operational art are thus: remove the uncertain element of end state and replace it with the element of objective; add in the element of narrative, defined in joint doctrine is an “overarching expression of context and desired results;”[12] and revise strategy and operational doctrine to acknowledge the objective-narrative nexus and the resultant power therein. An example definition of the objective-narrative nexus could read something like this:

The objective of the operation must be clearly tied with the narrative of that objective, and the narrative must consistently and clearly state the goal of the endeavor. There is power of will and spirit in the objective-narrative nexus that must be known and leveraged by all, whether in competition, crisis, or conflict. The narrative should be known at all echelons, where a unified narrative improves morale, reinforces the purpose of the objective, and the ways in which the objective will be accomplished.

Adding in the elements of objective and unified narrative will improve the theory of operational art and refine it for 21st century warfare.

The objective-narrative nexus is not new in warfare. Carl von Clausewitz in On War qualifies the moral elements as “among the most important in war.”[13] He goes on to describe how the elements create a spirit throughout the war closely aligned with the will that leads an army.[14] Furthermore, Clausewitz posits that the source of the army’s spirit comes from “frequent exertions of the army to the utmost limits of its strength.”[15] This growth and reinforcement of spirit comes from the exhortations of clear objectives and a unified narrative. Clausewitz saw the power of objective and unified narrative in Napoleon’s Grande Armée and the lack of it in his native Prussian forces. Soldiers, be they rifleman or corps logisticians, must know what they are fighting for and what they will tell those who question the worthiness of the endeavor.

Successful U.S. military campaigns leverage the power of the objective-narrative nexus. The Vicksburg Campaign of 1862-1863 began with the primary objective of opening the Mississippi River for Union control, along with the freedom of action to exercise judgment and initiative.[16] This led into the narrative of the campaign and the narrative for the unconditional surrender terms of the Vicksburg garrison. Another example stems from the limited war aims of President Polk and the subsequent limited operational plans of General Winfield Scott during the Mexican-American War.[17] The objective for expelling Iraqi forces from Kuwait was clear and aligned with narratives set forth from President George H.W. Bush from 1990 to 1991 and resulted in rapid termination of the conflict once Iraqi forces left Kuwait.

President George H.W. Bush meets with General Norman Schwarzkopf, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell to discuss the Gulf crisis on August 15, 1990. (Gary Cameron/Reuters)

Perfection in strategy is impossible, and the U.S. experience during the Vietnam war abounds with unclear objectives, narratives that were disbelieved, and chaos instead of power at the objective-narrative nexus. Incurring casualties at an average rate of over 100 killed in action per week over muddled, misunderstood, and unachievable objectives cannot save even the best of narratives.[18] Future histories of the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan may likely uncover missed opportunities to clarify objectives and maintain unified narratives.

A compelling example of the lack of the objective-narrative nexus comes from Russia’s side during the current Russia-Ukraine war. Since February 2022, Russia’s narrative has changed multiple times, covering everything from a war against fascism, defense of the Russian diaspora, and a war of unification.[19] This change in narrative has forced changes in Russia’s objectives so often that they are stalemated in eastern Ukraine and Crimea, unable to achieve their lofty and ever shifting goals. At the operational level, Russian troops may not maintain their spirit to do their utmost because they likely do not know for which objective or narrative they are fighting. Furthermore, international states and their citizens are less apt to believe Russia’s talking points, especially when such confusing and perhaps false narratives come through official state channels.

Unofficial channels such as internet and video blogs or chats such as Telegram also play an important role in echoing the narrative of a state during a crisis. Caveat emptor applies, as unofficial information operations groups supporting either side can dominate global social media and news platforms by willfully or unwittingly disseminating unverified or fake content.[20] Adversaries using unofficial sources to spread the narrative is nothing new, though; Al-Qaeda and ISIS used unofficial sources to spread scenes of violence and terror by filming and distributing public burnings, beheadings, and suicide bombings. U.S. strategists and operational planners should learn from our adversaries and seek to incorporate unofficial channels throughout the range of information-related capabilities.

Strategy must evolve with the changing environment of war, and this means strategic thinking must consider the power derived from the nexus of clear objectives and a unified narrative. Commanders and their staff cannot afford to dismiss political considerations in warfare or great power competition. They must think of objective and narrative as tools for the design of campaigns, be they security force assistance or large scale combat operations.

Policymakers must not only agree on the unified narrative. They must be able to incorporate bottom-up narratives as well. There are multiple historical examples showing the benefits of the objective-narrative nexus and how strategists and operational commanders leveraged its power with great effect. Russia’s failure to subjugate Ukraine provides the most recent example of a lack of clear objectives and disparate and shifting narratives producing a logic of failure. U.S. Army doctrine has to prepare itself for warfare in the 21st century. The addition of objective and narrative as elements of operational art, the bridge between strategy and tactics, would be a welcome step toward comparative advantage in competition and conflict.

Marshall McGurk is an Army officer and recent graduate of the Advanced Military Studies Program, School of Advanced Military Studies, academic year 2022-2023. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

This article appeared originally at Strategy Bridge.

[1] USA TODAY, “Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy Shares a Message from Kyiv | USA Today.” 25 Feb. 2022, video, 00:46, https://youtu.be/tLv9IqcoNe8.        

[2] UVA Miller Center, “December 8, 1941: Address to Congress Requesting a Declaration of War” UVA Miller Center: Presidential Speeches. Accessed 19 April 2023. https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/december-8-1941-address-congress-requesting-declaration-war, and FOX 35 Orlando, “George W. Bush’s bullhorn speech still echoes, ‘I can hear you! The rest of the world hears you’” 11 September 2019, video, 1:40, https://youtu.be/zi2SNFnfMjk.

[3] J.C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989), 14.

[4] US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2022), 3-1.

[5] US Department of the Army, Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2019), 2-5–2-6.

[6] ADP 3-0, Operations. 2-6.

[7] Dietrich Dörner, The Logic of Failure (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1996), 38-39.

[8] US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 1-02.1, Operational Terms (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2021), 1-72.

[9] Dörner, The Logic of Failure, 52-53.     

[10] The White House, National Security Strategy: October 2022 (Washington DC, 2022), 22, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf. It is notable that the National Security Strategy speaks multiple times about achieved objectives and desired objectives, instead of end states.

[11] FM 1-02.1, Operational Terms, 1-52. FM 1-02.1 defines information operations as “the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.” Army doctrine defines misinformation but not disinformation or malinformation. See FM 1-02.1 Operational Terms, 1-67.

[12] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 2-13 Commander’s Communication Synchronization (Washington DC: Government Publishing Office, 2013), III-9.

[13] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Everyman’s Library, 1993), 216.

[14] Clausewitz, On War, 216-217.

[15] Clausewitz, On War, 221.

[16] Donald Stoker, The Grand Design: Strategy and the U.S. Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 209-210.

[17] Timothy D. Johnson, A Gallant Little Army: The Mexico City Campaign (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2007), 16.

[18] William F. Owen, “The Tactics Gap: Why We Wrestle With The Basics.” Military Operations, Vol 2, Issue 1. Winter 2014, 17-19, https://www.tjomo.com/article/the-tactics-gap-why-we-wrestle-with-the-basics/.

[19] Al-Jazeera, “‘No other option’: Excerpts of Putin’s speech declaring war.” Al-Jazeera>News>Russia-Ukraine war. Accessed 03 April 2023. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/24/putins-speech-declaring-war-on-ukraine-translated-excerpts.

[20] Amanda Seitz and David Klepper, “Propaganda, fake videos of Ukraine invasion bombard users.” APNews, February 24, 2022, accessed June 3, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-technology-europe-media-social-media-80f729025396abf9ad9e4e9d0b4f5ece.