Trump's Defense Sales Executive Order Is an Important First Step

The Trump administration is moving quickly to reform foreign defense sales through an executive order issued on April 9. The order reiterates the value of capable allies to Americans and directs important reforms related to the prioritization of partners, adjustment of congressional reporting thresholds, and review of the foreign military sales-only (FMS-Only) list. Taken together, these make the executive order a well-crafted, laudable, but insufficient first step to address a security assistance system in urgent need of reform.

Despite these mounting threats, “business as usual” seems to often prevail, with contract negotiations and weapons deliveries sometimes dragging on for years. The problem is not limited to an insufficient sense of urgency in the Pentagon but also includes the practices, processes, and regulations associated with foreign defense sales. Those are the problems Trump’s executive order seeks to address.

Section two details the policy goals of the executive order, the first of which is ensuring “predictable and reliable delivery” of arms to partners. Predictability and reliability are good, but in some cases, speed may be even more important. Perhaps that is why the second listed goal is to expedite decision-making across agencies to avoid long, sequential (rather than simultaneous) processes. The order also seeks to streamline the rules and regulations involved in the defense sale process. As the focus should be on innovation, scale, and speed of delivery, changing or eliminating burdensome regulations makes sense. But the details and manner of implementation will matter.

The order also seeks to “increase government-industry collaboration to achieve cost and schedule efficiencies.” While good in principle, a potential pitfall of this approach could be prioritizing cost efficiencies over speed of delivery. For partners facing actual or imminent aggression, paying more for faster delivery may make more sense than trying to shave a few percent off the price tag.

The Pentagon frequently waits until multiple foreign orders have been placed for a system before awarding contracts. While this “bundling” practice may be designed to lower the unit cost by taking advantage of economies of scale, it is partially responsible for years of delays and likely makes sustaining production lines more difficult by depriving companies of regular, consistent orders. While combining orders from several allies and partners for the same system can reduce unit cost, the savings associated with such a practice must be weighed against the costs associated with delays in delivery to beleaguered partners. Sometimes, speed of delivery is more important than cost savings.

Section three of the executive order details how the administration wants to achieve these goals. It directs the re-implementation of National Security Presidential Memorandum 10 (NSPM 10) from April 2018, which is a memorandum governing Conventional Arms Transfer Policy that was issued during the first Trump administration. The Biden administration issued its own memorandum in 2023 that focused more on human rights than economic security, which the second Trump administration is now walking back.

Implementation of Trump’s executive order also includes reevaluating export restrictions imposed by the Missile Technology Control Regime, a smart move considering the significant technological advances in long-range strike capabilities since the regime was first created.

Importantly, President Donald Trump also directs the Secretaries of State and Defense to submit a joint letter to Congress proposing an update to the dollar threshold that triggers the congressional review of arms sales. This reflects one of the recommendations of FDD’s monograph entitled Arsenal of Democracy: Arming Taiwan, Ukraine, and Israel While Strengthening the U.S. Industrial Base. Adjusting the congressional reporting threshold is an important step in expediting the arms sale process given that the threshold numbers were last updated in 1981 and haven’t been adjusted for inflation since then.

The executive order also requires the establishment of “a list of priority partners for conventional arms transfers,” another recommendation reflected in the FDD monograph. First come, first serve might make sense for a fast-food restaurant but probably doesn’t make sense when it comes to arms transfers designed to help allies and deter and defeat aggression. Not all arms transfers are equally urgent or impactful, and U.S. weapons delivery queues should reflect that fact. Delivery queues for key munitions and weapon systems should be periodically examined and reordered to align with U.S. national security interests.

The White House also directs the creation of a list of priority defense items for transfer, which could help bring increased attention to the delivery of items most needed to deter aggression. The logic here is sound. Some systems can contribute to deterrence more effectively than others.

The executive order also calls for “increasing our allies’ capacity to meet capability targets independently, without sustained support from the United States.” While increasing allied capability can help counter common adversaries and secure common interests at a lower cost to U.S. forces, arms transfers should not be viewed as an automatic replacement, especially in the short-term, for forward-positioned U.S. forces or for the deployment of U.S. forces in the event of adversary aggression. Many partners, such as Taiwan, could dramatically improve their capabilities and still find themselves in need of assistance from the United States if they confronted major aggression.

The United States should seek to make Taiwan a porcupine, an unappealing candidate for consumption by the predator in Beijing. That should be a top national security priority for this administration. Delivering key weapons to Taiwan now could delay or deter altogether an invasion. But if deterrence fails and China invades Taiwan, Beijing is likely to prevail if American forces do not come to the aid of the free people in Taiwan.

If the United States goes to war against China, thousands of American service members may lose their lives. However, abandoning a democratic partner would empower the Chinese Communist Party and deal a serious blow to American security, credibility, and prosperity that will reverberate widely for years to come.

That’s why Washington should focus on giving Taiwan the means to deter a blockade or invasion from happening as quickly as possible.

Lastly, the order directs the Secretaries of State and Defense to review and update the FMS-Only List, which is a list of systems only available for purchase through the Foreign Military Sales process. The FMS process, in which the Pentagon negotiates with companies on behalf of foreign partners, often moves slower than Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), in which foreign governments negotiate directly with U.S. companies. Expanding the number of items available through DCS could speed up delivery of some capabilities to partners. It is worth noting that some systems should still be available only through FMS.

Reforming foreign defense sales is a laudable goal, and Trump’s executive order, if properly implemented, is a step in the right direction. Working to change the threshold for congressional review, developing a priority list of partners, and reviewing the FMS-Only List are all recommended policies identified in Arsenal of Democracy.

As the Trump administration continues working to bolster foreign defense sales, it should consider taking additional steps such as working with allies and partners to co-produce systems, implementing a time-bound State Department review process for arms sales, constructing an annual report on weapons delivery queues and timelines, and expanding the use of Presidential Drawdown Authority for Taiwan.

Increased cooperation among adversaries necessitates closer cooperation between the United States and its allies and partners. Delivering combat capabilities to allies and partners as quickly as possible is critical to deterring aggression and bolstering U.S. industrial capacity. That’s why the Trump administration’s executive order is a positive step worthy of bipartisan support.

Ryan Brobst is a senior research analyst at FDD’s Center on Military and Political Power where Bradley Bowman is the senior director. For more analysis from the authors and CMPP, please subscribe HERE. Follow Ryan on X @RyanBrobst_ and Brad @Brad_L_Bowman. Follow FDD on X @FDD and @FDD_CMPP. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

This article appeard originally at Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD).