What Washington Should Demand From Riyadh Before Providing the F-35

Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman is coming to Washington on Tuesday — and he has a wish list. Near the top of that list is Washington’s approval for Riyadh to procure up to 48 F-35 aircraft.

To be sure, the Saudi Air Force already boasts an impressive quantity of advanced fighters, including F-15 variants, Eurofighter Typhoons, and British Panavia Tornado IDSs. Saudi Arabia’s F-15 fleet includes dozens of F-15SAs, one of the most advanced versions currently available. It features an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar and can also carry a greater quantity and variety of weapons compared to older versions of the F-15.

Nonetheless, the increased difficulties of detecting the 5th-generation F-35 compared to 4th-generation aircraft, as well as the F-35’s formidable sensors and networking capabilities, would substantially improve the capability and capacity of the Saudi Air Force.

So, it is easy to see why Saudi Arabia wants the F-35. But what should Washington expect in return?

Washington should first expect that Saudi Arabia is committed to protecting the F-35’s technology and has an appropriate relationship with China, America’s foremost adversary, which is preparing for a potential war with the United States in the Pacific.

The United States cannot permit key technologies associated with the F-35 to find their way to Beijing. That would endanger American forces, not to mention 19 F-35 partner nations, that will rely on the F-35 for decades to come.

Riyadh would be wise to study how concerns regarding China played a major role in preventing the United Arab Emirates from acquiring the F-35. When it comes to relations with Beijing, Riyadh should not be held to a lower standard than Abu Dhabi.

While Riyadh’s representatives often say the right thing about China, some issues and questions need to be resolved.

“Pentagon officials who have studied the deal have expressed fears that F-35 technology could be compromised through Chinese espionage or China’s security partnership with Saudi Arabia,” according to a November 13 report by The New York Times. That same report said that China is helping Saudi Arabia acquire, build, and operate ballistic missiles.

Unfortunately, concerns related to Riyadh and Beijing do not stop there.

Riyadh conducted the Blue Sword-4 naval exercise with China in October. The exercise last month, which followed an earlier iteration in September 2023, was designed to “strengthen military cooperation between the two sides and to exchange expertise to raise combat readiness,” according to the Saudi Press Agency.

It is safe to assume that most decision makers in Washington believe partners worth trusting with the F-35 do not conduct military exercises with China.

If Riyadh fully remedies its current relationship with China and offers assurances that Washington can trust related to the F-35, the deal could perhaps move forward without endangering American security. 

However, it is important that Congress ensure that the law is followed.

That should include the statutory requirements related to Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME), codified in section 36(h) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S. Code § 2776(h)). Ensuring Israel’s QME is not optional, it is the law.

Some might respond that there is near zero chance of hostility between Saudi Arabia and Israel in the short term. That is thankfully true — but irrelevant.

The statute wisely makes no distinction regarding the current political disposition or policies of any other country in the Middle East. That is prudent because history and Middle East politics caution that leaders and policies can change quickly, so it is smart to focus on military capabilities.

That is why the law requires Washington to examine 1) “Israel's capacity to address the improved capabilities” regardless of the country in question and 2) ask and address how the sale would alter the “strategic and tactical balance in the region, including relative capabilities [emphasis added].”

There is no way to provide Saudi Arabia with America’s most advanced fighter jet without reducing Israel’s relative military advantages vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia. That does not necessarily mean that Washington should refuse to provide Saudi Arabia with the F-35, but it does mean that steps must be taken in that case to strengthen Israel’s capabilities even further to maintain its security and relative military edge, as American interests and the law require.

It is also worth noting that the law requires that Israel be able to counter and defeat any “individual state or possible coalition of states.” In that spirit, Washington must consider Turkey given its military capabilities and actions in the Middle East, not to mention Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's hostility toward Israel, regardless of whether one considers Ankara technically subject to the current QME statute.

Riyadh should satisfactorily address concerns related to China. Washington must also follow the law and take the necessary additional steps in advance to ensure Israel maintains its relative military edge. But there is still one more consideration: It makes no sense to transfer America’s most advanced fighter jet to any country in the Middle East that refuses to normalize relations with Israel, America’s most capable and important ally in the Middle East.

To be sure, Riyadh was close to normalization before the October 7, 2023, terror attack on Israel, and the kingdom will likely need to see progress in Gaza and on the 20-point Gaza Peace Plan before the crown prince is willing to normalize relations with Israel. Regardless, Washington should explicitly make clear up front that the first F-35 will not be delivered until Saudi Arabia normalizes relations with Israel.

It would be national security malpractice — and would unnecessarily undercut President Trump’s leverage — to demand anything less.

The crown prince will have a wish list when he arrives in Washington. How America responds will have significant ramifications for the region and U.S. national security interests.

Bradley Bowman is senior director at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Center on Military and Political Power, where Justin Leopold-Cohen is a senior research analyst.