Wither Hybrid War

For years, so-called "hybrid war" has bedeviled Western planners and military theorists. The concept of grey-zone or below-threshold conflict saturated American planning assumptions for around a decade, whether against Russia, Iran, or China. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, however, demonstrates that "hybridity" did not transform the character of war, and kinetic force retains its primacy. Whether Putin succeeds or fails in his Ukrainian gamble, Western statesmen would benefit by taking note: China’s most logical actions against Taiwan mirror Russia’s in Ukraine.

Russia's master plan to pressure Ukraine internally was an utter failure. Former president Petro Poroshenko walked a fine line, challenging Russia in Donbas and courting NATO membership without fully abandoning the Minsk II agreement. Poroshenko lost to erstwhile comedian and actor Volodymyr Zelenskyy in 2019, with the new president initially appearing amenable to negotiations with the Kremlin but reversing his stance when faced with domestic pressure and, perhaps, a growing understanding that Russia posed a clear existential threat. The Kremlin's gambit to control the whole by controlling the part collapsed. The result was the Ukraine invasion, in which Russia hopes to secure Kyiv in its orbit and gain control of the land corridor between Donbas and Crimea, potentially capturing Odesa.

Russia’s invasion, as is now clear, has not gone according to plan. The historically competent Russian staff was far too ambitious given its means and far too operationally aggressive. Vladimir Putin’s obsession with operational security and Cold War counterintelligence mentality hampered offensive cohesion. And Russian intelligence severely underestimated the quality and resolve of Ukrainian forces. Whether Russia can correct its mistakes is immaterial. Its vaunted hybrid doctrine of informational manipulation and below-threshold pressure miscarried spectacularly. Ironically, Russia has had only limited success in the cyber domain and almost no ability to control the informational space. Modern social media has destroyed Russian propaganda, creating two media systems: state-controlled disinformation for internal Russian consumption and smartphone-filmed shots of Russian brutality that will live in the world’s imagination for a long time.

The informational space does remain relevant, as do other mechanisms of below-threshold pressure. However, Western statesmen and strategists risk making an equivalent analytical mistake in the Indo-Pacific as they did in Europe: indeed, how else can the American policy class' unwillingness to dispatch sustained, effective “lethal offensive aid” until an invasion became imminent be explained apart from a severe misunderstanding of Russian actions?

China’s below-threshold pressure against Taiwan is as clear as Russia's below-threshold pressure against Ukraine. The CCP's media outlets continuously parrot the Party's talking points on the island republic. CCP intelligence attempts to penetrate Taiwan's media institutions and compromise electoral candidates. The People's Maritime Militia and China Coast Guard harass Taiwanese vessels and those of other states. 

Yet none of this is a substitute for concrete military action, without which Taiwan is unlikely to be brought into China's orbit, much like Ukraine could not be brought into Russia's orbit. The Russian military clearly telegraphed its growing confidence from 2014 onward, deploying to Syria and staging larger and larger military exercises. Russia's year-long buildup along Ukraine's border was insufficient to take the country in a 100-hour war. Nevertheless, internally the Russian staff and political authorities clearly deemed a "military-technical solution" viable. And Russian political leadership, from Putin on down, telegraphed their increasingly hostile intentions towards Ukraine and their willingness to use force to resolve the issue in Russia's favor.

Chinese military expansion should be viewed in the same way as Russian military preparation over the past two years. Like Russia against Ukraine, China has continuously signaled its unwillingness to let Taiwan choose its own future. Like Russia, China has adopted an increasingly assertive military posture. And like Russia's leaders, China's leaders view Taiwan as a central aspect of their political-historical legacies.

The United States must move beyond this "grey zone" conception of modern warfare and its economized conception of modern politics. Force is always an option in international affairs. Modern combat is neither asymmetric nor limited but still a fast-flowing storm of steel, fire, and blood. After Russia opened the sluices in Ukraine, major powers were more likely to use their war machines to secure strategic objectives. We should not delude ourselves into viewing the Sino-American rivalry as merely an economic one. Much like its Russo-American counterpart, Sino-American antagonism builds towards combat.

Seth Cropsey is founder and president of Yorktown Institute. He served as a naval officer and as deputy Undersecretary of the Navy.