
Megaspeed Proves: Congress Must Act on Chip Security
Published Nov. 19, 2026 • Read time: 5m
Megaspeed, a Singaporean company founded in 2023, bought nearly $2 billion of Nvidia’s most advanced chips in about a year.[i] Last year, Senator Tom Cotton asked the Commerce Department to investigate how “billions of dollars of U.S. chips started flowing to Megaspeed” through “near-empty offices in Malaysia and Singapore.”[ii] Then, on October 29, the New York Times reported that U.S. intelligence officials concluded Megaspeed executive Alice Huang—who is close with Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang—was passing information to Beijing.[iii] The Wall Street Journal reported that officials suspect Chinese intelligence recruited her because of her relationship with Jensen Huang.[iv]
Huang admitted the relationship. Nvidia’s board launched an inquiry.[v] Three House chairs asked him to brief their committees.[vi] But the national security story is bigger than one man.
The White House’s AI Action Plan, released in July 2025, directed the Commerce Department to “explore leveraging new and existing location verification features...to ensure that [advanced U.S.] chips are not in countries of concern.”[vii] In November 2025, the Justice Department charged two U.S. citizens and two Chinese nationals with routing Nvidia chips to China through Malaysia and Thailand.[viii]
But policy is only as effective as the people enforcing it. Commerce has not (yet) required location verification of advanced U.S. chips. Congress should respond by codifying chip security into law.
Three bills are in the Senate’s negotiating text for the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).[ix] The Chip Security Act requires location verification for export-controlled chips. It also requires companies to report signs of diversion.[x] In other words, it does what the AI Action Plan asked for. The AI OVERWATCH Act requires licenses for advanced U.S. chip exports to countries of concern.[xi] The Multilateral Alignment of Technology Controls on Hardware (MATCH) Act sets a 150-day window to align our controls on chipmaking equipment with allies like Japan and the Netherlands, so China cannot buy from them what it cannot buy from us.[xii]
Some in the President’s orbit worry these bills will slow the export of the American tech stack. But the AI Action Plan answers them by saying American AI should go to countries willing to “meet U.S.-approved security requirements and standards.”[xiii] Megaspeed is exactly what the standards, adopted and enforced, are meant to stop.
The window is tight. The House passed its NDAA 216-212 in July, but the Senate never got a floor vote—and fiscal year 2027 began October 1 without a defense bill. Final negotiations start this week. The bills are only in the Senate text, so conferees could drop them quietly. But given the stakes of the AI race, they need to keep all three of them.
The executive branch should act too. Commerce should finish its Megaspeed investigation, deny licenses to buyers associated with the company, and, if the findings hold, add the company to the Entity List. And it should require location verification of advanced U.S. chips. The White House should consider leveraging the Defense Production Act to enable AI labs and chipmakers to share threat information without antitrust risks. Designating them as critical infrastructure could give them federal assistance with physical and cyber security. And leveraging the SAFETY Act could limit their liability in security incidents they worked with the federal government to protect against.
None of this is anti-AI or anti-business. Smuggled chips hand Chinese rivals the American technology they cannot build. Secure American chips are requisite to American AI leadership. Congress should act now and codify chip security into law.
LtGen Michael Groen (U.S. Marine Corps, ret.) is the former Director of the Joint AI Center (JAIC) and Senior Advisor to American Security Fund, a nonprofit nonpartisan 501(c)(4) organization engaging policymakers to advance American tech leadership.
notes:
[i] Ana Swanson, Tripp Mickle and Paul Mozur, “A Mystery C.E.O. and Billions in Sales: Is China Buying Banned Nvidia Chips?” New York Times, October 9, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/09/technology/nvidia-chips-china-megaspeed.html.
[ii] Sen. Tom Cotton, letter to Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, October 13, 2025, released October 14, 2025, https://www.cotton.senate.gov/news/press-releases/cotton-to-lutnick-investigate-chinese-government-spin-off-megaspeed-for-skirting-us-export-laws.
[iii] New York Times report of October 29, 2026, as summarized in ABC7 News, "Nvidia denies report that its CEO was allegedly targeted in Chinese spy plot," October 30, 2026, https://abc7news.com/story/nvidia-denies-report-ceo-was-allegedly-targeted-chinese-spy-plot/20000206/.
[iv] Amrith Ramkumar, Lingling Wei and Robbie Whelan, "Chinese Executive Close to Nvidia CEO Suspected of Giving China Information," Wall Street Journal, updated October 31, 2026, https://www.wsj.com/tech/chinese-executive-close-to-nvidia-ceo-suspected-of-giving-china-information-798eb6a1.
[v] Anthony Ha, “Nvidia will investigate CEO Jensen Huang’s relationship with possible Chinese spy,” TechCrunch, November 8, 2026, https://techcrunch.com/2026/11/08/nvidia-says-its-investigating-ceo-jensen-huangs-relationship-with-possible-chinese-spy/.
[vi] Letter from Reps. Brian J. Mast, John Moolenaar and Eric A. “Rick” Crawford to Jensen Huang, November 4, 2026, requesting a joint closed-door briefing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Select Committee on the CCP and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on November 18, 2026; see House Select Committee on the CCP, “Moolenaar, Mast, and Crawford Seek Briefing from Jensen Huang on Ties to Chinese Intelligence Asset,” https://chinaselectcommittee.house.gov/media/press-releases/moolenaar-mast-and-crawford-seek-briefing-from-jensen-huang-on-ties-to-chinese-intelligence-asset.
[vii] The White House, "Winning the Race: America's AI Action Plan," July 2025, "Strengthen AI Compute Export Control Enforcement," https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Americas-AI-Action-Plan.pdf.
[viii] U.S. Department of Justice, "U.S. Citizens and Chinese Nationals Arrested for Exporting Artificial Intelligence Technology to China," November 20, 2025, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-citizens-and-chinese-nationals-arrested-exporting-artificial-intelligence-technology.
[ix] Americans for Responsible Innovation, "Senate NDAA Takes Major Step to Strengthen AI Chip Export Controls," July 14, 2026, https://ari.us/senate-ndaa-takes-major-step-to-strengthen-ai-chip-export-controls/; The AI Policy Network, FY27 NDAA conference letter, August 31, 2026, listing SA 6683 (Chip Security Act), SA 6585 (MATCH Act) and SA 6575 (AI OVERWATCH Act), https://theaipn.org/aipn-fy27-ndaa-conference-letter/.
[x] American Security Fund, “ASF Applauds the Advancing of the Chip Security Act,” https://89813af4-8ef5-4758-bad8-0351c4aeee7d.filesusr.com/ugd/1db8d9_63fce00c01fd44b3b1fbbf383a9883e2.pdf.
[xi] Sen. Jim Banks, “Banks Secures AI OVERWATCH Act in Senate NDAA,” press release, July 14, 2026, https://www.banks.senate.gov/news/press-releases/banks-secures-ai-overwatch-act-in-senate-ndaa/.
[xii] Multilateral Alignment of Technology Controls on Hardware (MATCH) Act, H.R. 8170, 119th Cong., https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/BILLS-119hr8170ih; companion bill S. 4281; American Security Fund, “American Security Fund Applauds the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) for Strengthening Export Controls,” https://www.americansecurityfund.com/_files/ugd/1db8d9_1855aee363ed4bb682e103f4a48a0853.pdf.
[xiii] America's AI Action Plan, "Export American AI to Allies and Partners" (cited above).

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