Deterring North Korea: A Reckless Gamble We Cannot Afford

Summary 

Dealing with North Korea's Nuclear Threat: The Options

The North Korean regime is completely committed to its nuclear program, and no diplomatic option will lead to North Korea freezing or disbanding it. This being the case, North Korea is and will be capable of launching a nuclear strike at the U.S. and its allies (either on purpose or by accident). To deal with this risk, the U.S. can either: i) limit North Korea's incentives to launch a nuclear strike through deterrence; or ii) eliminate North Korea's ability to launch a nuclear strike by means of a preventive war that eradicates the Kim regime and North Korea's WMD program. 

Let us measure the cost to the U.S. and its allies of the preventive war and deterrence options by the number of by civilian deaths that follow from each choice in South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. I implicitly assume here that: 1) economic and other costs are proportional to lives lost; 2) military deaths are small in proportion to civilian deaths. I assume that North Korea will pose a threat for 30 years (until 2048), after which time the probability of nuclear war falls to zero.  

The expected number of deaths that results from each option is a function of the deaths resulting from a war if one happens at a given point in time and the probability of a war at that point in time. Consider each factor in turn.

North Korea's Nuclear Arsenal

Following Congressional testimony by David Albright of the Institute For Science and International Security, I assume that North Korea's 2018 nuclear weapon inventory consists of 25 weapons each with a yield of 20 kt and that North Korea will be able to build four additional weapons per year. In light of North Korea's now demonstrated ability to construct thermonuclear weapons and North Korea's rapid advances in missile design, I further assume that all new weapons will have a 250 kt yield and that these weapons can be launched at the U.S.

On targeting, I assume that: 1) the 20 kt weapons will be targeted at South Korea and Japan with a 50%-50% split; 2) the 250 kt weapons will be targeted at South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. with a 25%-25%-50% split; and that: 3) only 50% of weapons successfully detonate over their target (due to a combination of mechanical defects, guidance problems, and missile defense). These targeting assumptions do not make a material difference to the overall outcome of the analysis. And while the actual proportion of successful strikes is of course highly uncertain and will affect the absolute number of deaths resulting from each option, any constant success rate used will not affect the ranking of the deterrence and preventive war options.   

I calculate the deaths a successful detonation will cause by using the NukeMap website. Since not every weapon can detonate in the same place, I set a weapon's impact equal to the average of a detonation over a range of cities. A weapon that detonates in Japan will cause deaths equal to the average of an air detonation over Tokyo and Kyoto. A weapon that detonates in South Korea will cause deaths equal to the average of an air detonation over Seoul and Busan. A weapon that detonates in the U.S. will cause deaths equal to the average of an air detonation over Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, Washington D.C., and New York. I weigh South Korean, Japanese, and American lives equally. So, a successful detonation of a 20 kt weapon causes expected deaths of 112 thousand and the successful detonation of a 250 kt weapon causes expected deaths of 546 thousand.

Given these assumptions, a war in 2018 will cause 1.4 million Japanese-South Korean-U.S. deaths (25 weapons (20 kt) * 50% chance of successful detonation * 112,000 deaths per successful detonation). The number of deaths resulting from war will increase by 1.1 million per year (4 additional weapons (250 kt) * 50% chance of a successful detonation * 546 deaths per successful detonation). It follows that a war in 2019 will cause expected deaths of 2.5 million, a war in 2020 will cause expected deaths of 3.6 million, and so on. A war in 2048 will cause expected deaths of 34.2 million.   

The Risk of Accidental Nuclear War

While both the Americans and the Soviets were rational actors during the Cold War (at least as rational as Kim Jong Un, anyway) and while both the Americans and the Soviets knew that nuclear war would have disastrous consequences, there were nonetheless a number of occasions when the Americans and the Soviets came very close to starting a nuclear war by accident. These near misses arose from a combination of military misunderstandings, technical malfunctions in early warning systems, and human error. To illustrate: 

Military Misunderstandings: During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviets sent a squadron of 4 submarines armed with nuclear torpedoes towards Cuba with the intention of establishing a base on the island (Operation Anadyr). The subs ran into the U.S. naval blockade. In the tense circumstances of the Crisis and under an enormous amount of stress, the captain of one of the subs came under the mistaken impression that his sub was under attack by a U.S. task force led by the carrier USS Randolph and that war may have already broken out. Thinking that they were doomed, the captain cried out "We will die, but we will sink them all..." using the nuclear torpedo. It is highly likely that a Soviet attack that destroyed a U.S. carrier with a nuclear weapon at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis would have led to a full-scale war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and that this war, in turn, would have led to a nuclear exchange. Fortunately, the squadron chief of staff was also on board, and he was able to dissuade the captain from pursuing that course of action.  

Reflecting upon the Crisis, Graham Allison wrote that while President Kennedy thought that the chance of nuclear war was between 33% and 50%, "what we have learned in later decades has done nothing to lengthen those odds."  

Technical Malfunctions: In 1983–a time of high U.S.-Soviet tension–the Soviet Union's early warning system detected a signal that the U.S. had launched a first strike. The system indicated that the signal was of the highest possible level of reliability. In this situation, it was the duty officer's responsibility to report the alert and its reliability level to his superiors. Soviet nuclear protocols then required that the Soviets launch a counter-strike before the U.S. missiles hit. Fortunately, the duty officer on the night was Stanislav Petrov. He had a skeptical streak due to his scientific background, and he thought that the attack signal might be too reliable to be real. Torn between reporting and not reporting the alarm, he finally decided to disobey his explicit orders and to instead notify higher command that the system had malfunctioned. He believed that if any of his colleagues (all of whom had a military education) had been on duty that night, they would have reported the alarm as an attack. If the alarm had been passed on, it is possible and perhaps even likely that the Soviets would have followed protocols and launched an accidental first strike at the U.S.

Human Error: In 1979 a training tape simulating a full Soviet nuclear attack was somehow loaded onto the main NORAD early warning system. Fortunately (again), the flight time of Soviet missiles gave NORAD time to check the raw radar data to see if it confirmed the information on the early warning system before the U.S. had to take a launch-no launch decision. Finding that it did not, the U.S. did not launch a retaliatory strike by accident.   

Examining nuclear war near misses using engineering reliability assessment methods, Barrett, Baum, and Hostetler estimate that there was a 2% chance per year of an accidental U.S.-Soviet nuclear war during the Cold War. Since President Kennedy's estimate of the probability of nuclear war arising from the Cuban Missile Crisis alone puts the probability of accidental nuclear war at between 1.4% and 2.4% per year over the course of the Cold War (1960 to 1989) without even considering the Petrov incident, the NORAD training tape incident, and other such incidents, this 2% per year probability seems very plausible.

Does this Cold War estimate apply to North Korea? Examining the factors that contribute to the probability of accidental nuclear war, I think that the probability of accidental nuclear war with North Korea is if anything higher (and probably much higher) than was the probability of an accidental U.S.-Soviet nuclear war. 

To err in favor of the deterrence option, then, I estimate the cost of gambling on deterrence under two cases. In the first, I assume that the probability of an accidental U.S.-North Korean nuclear war is 2% per year. In the second I assume that there is one incident over the next 30 years that creates a 25% chance of an accidental nuclear war.

Should the U.S. Take the Deterrence Gamble or Launch a Preventive War?

If the U.S. chooses to deal with the North Korean nuclear threat by means of a preventive war, then there is a 100% chance of a war in 2018 (clearly, if the U.S. is going to launch a preventive war, then the sooner the better). This war will lead to North Korea launching 25 nuclear weapons (20 kt each) at cities in South Korea and Japan and will lead to 1.4 million deaths (given the assumptions above). 

I note that this is an extremely pessimistic estimate. A preventive war will almost certainly begin with a U.S. nuclear strike on North Korean command-and-control and nuclear assets with the goal of eliminating North Korea's ability to launch a nuclear attack. Furthermore, the U.S. will utilize its missile defense assets to defend South Korea and Japan against any North Korean attack. However, to err in favor of the deterrence option, I assume here that this U.S. strike has no effect on the probability that North Korea can detonate a nuclear weapon on target. While it would certainly be rash to assume that the U.S. efforts to eliminate North Korea's nuclear threat will be 100% effective, it is highly likely that the U.S. will be able to degrade the effectiveness of North Korea's nuclear threat to some degree.  

If the U.S. chooses to gamble on deterrence, then the probability of accidental nuclear war will lead to 1) 7.5 million deaths on average in the 2% chance of accidental nuclear war per year case; or 2) 4.4 million deaths on average in the single 25% chance of accidental nuclear war case.  

This estimate of deaths under the deterrence gamble is extremely optimistic. First, I assume that the probability of a successful detonation remains constant over time. However, it is highly likely that North Korea's ability to successfully detonate a nuclear weapon on target in the U.S. will increase over time as North Korea continues its rapid advance in weapon and missile design. Second, I assume that North Korea's ability to increase weapon yield stops at 250 kt. Instead, it is highly likely that North Korea will eventually be able to develop full hydrogen bombs and so increase the yield of their weapons to far higher levels. It follows that an accidental war in the future will be far more devastating than I have assumed and may be sufficiently severe so as to pose an existential threat to the U.S.

On the other hand, I am also assuming that advances in missile defense do not eliminate the North Korean nuclear threat. While I strongly support a much stronger effort to improve U.S. missile defense capabilities, caution advises against assuming that missile defense will be completely effective (and certainly those making the case for gambling on deterrence are not doing so because they think that missile defense will work). But, to the extent that one is willing to bet on missile defense, the case for deterrence is strengthened. 

So, the bottom line of this analysis is that gambling on deterrence is far more dangerous than launching a preventive war now.

Conclusion

To deal with North Korea's nuclear threat by choosing to deter them is to gamble that avoiding a war now with a relatively weak North Korea is worth the risk of an accidental nuclear war in the future with a vastly more powerful North Korea. In essence then, to choose deterrence is to bet that North Korean adventurism in times of political tension will never lead to an equivalent of the Cuban Missile Crisis, to bet that North Korean early warning systems will never be subject to human error, and to bet that North Korean officers in the nuclear command-and-control chain will rely upon skeptical gut instincts rather than follow direct orders given a seemingly reliable signal of a U.S. attack. In other words, to gamble on deterrence is to bet that, since we spun the cylinder and survived a round or two of deterrence roulette with the Soviets, fortune will always favor us. Needless to say, any bet that requires continuous good fortune is a reckless and foolish one. 

The fecklessness of the Obama administration's policy towards North Korea has left us in a hole, but we are where we are. The goal of U.S. policy must now be to eliminate the enormous risk of an accidental nuclear war with a more powerful North Korea in the future. Preventive war is the only way that we can accomplish that goal. Consequently, preventive war is the wise and prudent response to the North Korean nuclear threat.  

Kevin R. James is a Research Fellow in the Systemic Risk Centre at the London School of Economics (@kevinrogerjames).