Trilateral Security Cooperation Needed for North Korea
Published April 19, 2016 • Read time: 6m
In September 2011, the South Korean government established the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS) with the aim of advancing prosperity and concord with their neighboring countries, Japan and China. Noting the enormity of power and wealth shared between this triangle of nations, the creation of the TCS was a critical step in normalizing – presumably enhancing – relations amongst three of the most influential players in the region. Nevertheless, historic grievances between South Korea and Japan have prevented the promising TCS from coming together for nearly four years. Indeed, it took until November 2015 for the first trilateral summit between the three nations to occur because leaders of South Korea and Japan could not forgive or forget past behavior. Unfortunately, past transgressions sometimes blur the vision of a promising future for members of the TSC, but holding onto the past prevents forward progress. In order to genuinely reconcile and put its good intentions into action, the TCS must focus its energy into restoring a healthy bilateral relationship between South Korea and Japan. Simply put, without repairing this fractured bilateral relationship, the TCS cannot move forward and succeed.
Given contested territorial rights, an unpredictable North Korea, inter-connected economies, and shifting politics that exist in Asia today, it is painfully reasonable that two of the most powerful democracies in the region set aside their differences. Should South Korea and Japan fail to reconcile, the Secretariat’s ability to work as a functioning and reputable organization in the region is doomed, and everybody loses. China alone cannot uphold the TCS; the TCS is a triangle that depends on harmony and balance between three countries striving for a better, more connected future. Accordingly, the ongoing strain between South Korea and Japan upsets the necessary balance and deteriorates the Secretariat’s mission. This makes it imperative that the two bitter nations permanently resolve their differences.
To mend the decades of malevolence against each other, South Korea and Japan must first understand the source of their mutual disdain. The difficult relationship between Seoul and Tokyo – Washington’s two biggest allies in Asia – is precariously based on their background of longtime acrimony over issues of unreconciled views of history. Reasons for their splintered relations are primarily found in historic anger over issues of comfort women, the continuing feud over two islets called Dokdo, and insincere apologies by Japanese premiers for their visits to the controversial Yasukuni shrine. These collective factors, including Japan’s semi-remilitarization in 2014, all foment the political imbalance that hinder cohesion between the two countries and preclude the TCS from smoothly operating as a unified body.
The TCS should remind President Park Guen-Hye that she, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, and President Xi Jinping all face a significant shared threat in the region: Kim Jong-Un’s nuclear and missile programs. A simple launch of one nuclear warhead can destroy the triangle and the entire region. Indeed, Kim is a ticking time bomb of instability with a treasure trove of lethal weaponry that he is itching to use against his rivals, namely Park.
Another matter worthy of consideration is what to do should the Kim regime implode from within. If North Korea falls, the humanitarian and environmental disasters that are sure to follow will impact all three nations of the TCS; having a plan in place to address these potential disasters will benefit everybody. To reiterate, rather than dispute over historic grievances, Park needs to concentrate on how to diffuse Kim, not Abe. She needs to work with the TCS to ensure regional peace and security in an era of heightened concerns over Kim’s ongoing weapons tests and threats to wage nuclear war against her country.
Recent developments concerning North Korea call for fiercer endeavors for its denuclearization. As Kim Jong-Un continues to defy orders to discontinue his weapons programs, accordingly, triangle states must posture strong defensive measures in the event that Kim acts on his threats. Subsequently, an evolving regional security climate prompted Abe’s government to expand the role of its national self-defense forces for purposes of its survival. Abe and the TCS must persuade Park that Japan’s latest security and defense reforms do not signal a dangerous remilitarization. Rather, Japan’s reinterpretation of its right to collective self-defense and its reversal on the ban on exporting weapons are actions forced by North Korea’s constant threats to East Asia’s order.
The international community may applaud the South Korean government for their good intentions and the initiation of the idea of peace and common prosperity amongst the three critical countries in East Asia. Nonetheless, the TCS must collectively put all of its efforts in resolving the bilateral relationship between South Korean and Japan in order to bring the desired effects of a successful trilateral relationship. If South Korea and Japan can work together with humility and good faith to develop a cooperative relationship, I am convinced that the TCS will succeed and serve as a positive force in East Asia. In short, if a robust bilateral relationship between Seoul and Tokyo can be established, the three nations will be able to play an even greater role in Asia than they have done hereto.
TCS leaders must be strident in convincing Park that a volatile, yet nuclear North Korea still exists in the Korean Peninsula to date and is the real threat to TCS member states. Consequently, in the event of the North’s demise, proactive measures like Abe’s expanded self-defense force roles would be truly valuable to the Korean Peninsula. It would also be wise of President Park to review North Korea collapse scenarios and develop joint contingency plans with fellow triangle members Japan and China in order to best respond to this potential scenario. If Park and TCS leaders aspire to disarm Kim, then they must present a united front. The TCS should stay focused on the North Korea challenge, promote greater trust and establish an environment that is more conducive to collaboration. Park must forgive and realize that one cannot indefinitely dwell on the past for doing so jeopardizes the future.
Christopher Lee is an active duty Major in the U.S. Army. He holds a B.S. from West Point and an M.A. from Columbia University. He is currently pursuing his Ph.D. in International Cooperation from Yonsei University. He has served for eight years as an intelligence officer, and is currently serving as a Foreign Area Officer for the Northeast Asia region. Chris can be reached via Twitter @chrislee733. The views expressed are his own and not those of the United States Army or the Department of Defense.

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