U.S., South Korean Alliance Becoming an Imperative

With both South Korea and the United States focused on domestic issues, corruption in politics and Hurricane Harvey respectively, it will be extremely difficult to offer exit strategies to North Korea’s imposing threats in the foreseeable future.  Further compounding the situation, China is by no means a reluctant stakeholder, but rather a self-interested, reluctant leader.

As I mentioned two years ago, North Korea is not Iran, and it is at a dead end.  P5+1 will not be able to negotiate a deal with Kim, and no country, not even the U.S. will be able to stop North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship.  Therefore, South Korea’s President Moon Jae-in must focus on what he can control.  Seoul needs to rely on strengthening the Alliance with Washington and continue to work on defense modernization geared towards its Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD).  A robust and integrated layered defensive system is critical to counter the increased North Korean ballistic missile threat to the Korean Peninsula.

For the past few years, the U.S. has deployed its third-generation Patriot missile batteries (PAC-3s) to South Korea, which increases the shoot down capability of enemy ballistic missiles due to enhanced performance in range, altitude, maneuverability, and detection.  Upgraded software enables tailored searches for Theater Ballistic Missiles and a “keep-out altitude” to destroy missiles with chemical warheads or early release sub munitions at specified altitudes, minimizing ground fallout.

South Korea has vast arrays of Armor, Aviation, Air Defense, Aviation and Missiles in their armed forces.  South Korea also has Patriot Configuration 2 (PAC-2) firing batteries and missiles.  However, while the PAC-2 systems are high-quality general air defense systems, with partial BMD capabilities through a proximity-detonation method, they are not ballistic missile “hit-to-kill” intercept capable like the U.S. PAC-3s.  To enhance coverage for BMD, in 2015, the South Korean government decided to upgrade its PAC-2s to PAC-3s – which, when combined with current US PAC-3s, will create an effective missile defense system across the Korean Peninsula.

While South Korea-U.S. Alliance’s ability to adapt and modernize to meet the North Korean threat has enhanced regional and global security, success is not limited to equipment such as the Patriot upgrade.  The Alliance must continue to improve interoperability and institutional combined operations.  The Alliance’s ironclad strength is made manifest through its signature ability to seamlessly integrate personnel and systems.  By working together, the Alliance can win the “Fight Tonight” and defeat the threat.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to overstate the threat North Korea poses to the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia.  With the world’s fourth largest conventional military located merely 35 miles away, the South Korea-U.S. Alliance confronts and deters a potentially devastating conflict daily.  Nonetheless, after Pyongyang’s sixth nuclear test, now more than ever, it is critical that the Alliance make every effort to maintain readiness to defend South Korea at a moment’s notice.

Bolstered by the frequent modernization of capabilities and ongoing efforts to strengthen interoperability, the Alliance may conceivably develop into a resilient and adaptable partnership to best respond to a changing security environment.  In short, by upgrading and modernizing its military, South Korea will continue to grow as a middle-power country as they fulfill their role as a buffer and rapid deployment force in the Asia-Pacific Theater, constraining North Korea.

Christopher Lee is an active duty Major in the U.S. Army. He holds a B.S. from West Point and an M.A. from Columbia University. He is currently pursuing his Ph.D. in International Cooperation from Yonsei University. He has served for eight years as an intelligence officer, and is currently serving as a Foreign Area Officer for the Northeast Asia region. Chris can be reached via Twitter @chrislee733.

The views expressed are the author’s and do not reflect the position of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.