Arms Control After New START: Comatose, Not Dead

There has been much concern about the “death of arms control” following the expiration of New START – the last remaining nuclear arms-control treaty between the United States and Russia.

Arms control, however, is not “dead”—it is simply “comatose” for the foreseeable future. And the reason is just as much due to Chinese reluctance to engage in arms-control discussions as it is to Russian “noncompliance with treaty requirements”—otherwise known as “cheating.”

For years, the United States has attempted to engage China in arms-control discussions. However, China consistently has rejected such outreaches. And not only for preliminary discussions for a treaty, but for non-binding activities such as confidence-building measures, transparency efforts, risk reduction, or basic discussions on strategic stability.

When combined with the Russian nuclear arsenal—which today has roughly 1,800 more nuclear weapons fielded than the United States—then the United States is at an acute disadvantage compared to the current and future combined arsenals of Russia and China.

As noted however, China is unwilling to engage in arms-control discussions, and the United States has no reason to engage in bilateral arms-control discussions with Russia. Even if the Russians didn’t cheat, they’re only part of the deterrence challenge the United States faces, given the ever-growing nuclear arsenals of China and increasingly North Korea.

So, if arms control is in a “coma”—what are the conditions in which it might “wake up?”

There are two primary conditions in which treaty-based arms control might once again become a feature of international relations.

First, the United States has to give China a reason to come to the negotiating table. That means fielding an arsenal that can hold at risk targets in both Russia and China. As a recent bipartisan commission noted, the U.S. nuclear modernization program of record is “necessary but insufficient” to deter threats posed by nuclear-armed adversaries, given the Chinese breakout and Russian aggression and nuclear cheating.

The United States currently has roughly 1,550 strategic nuclear weapons and 150 non-strategic nuclear weapons deployed—the same force levels established by President Obama’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). That NPR assumed a relatively benign future global security environment—one in which China would retain roughly 150 nuclear weapons, the United States and Russia would negotiate future treaties that would bring the number of nuclear weapons down even lower, and that all three nations would cooperate to address the scourge of “nuclear-armed terrorism.”

Suffice to say, this world never came about. Following the ratification of New START in 2011, Russia refused to engage in further nuclear-reduction talks and continued to field an arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons 10 times the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. It invaded Ukraine in 2014 and again in 2022. China began its nuclear breakout during this period and is well on its way to becoming a nuclear peer of the United States and increasingly threatens and coerces its neighbors.

For these reasons, the aforementioned bipartisan commission noted that given the deteriorating security environment, the United States must field a nuclear arsenal that is larger and more diverse than the one fielded today. Once the United States demonstrates that it has the ability and willingness to deploy a significantly larger and more diverse arsenal, it will have given China a compelling reason to come to the arms-control table.

Second, China will likely continue to build its nuclear arsenal for years to come—but it will likely not engage in an uninhibited numerical build-up akin to what the United States and the Soviet Union did during the Cold War, when each side fielded 30,000 or so weapons. China may grow its arsenal from 600 warheads to 1,500 to 3,000—but at a certain point it will likely believe it has sufficient weapons to achieve its purposes—whether that purpose is to deter a strategic attack on China or engage in nuclear warfighting. But without a strategic rationale to build endless numbers of nuclear weapons, China likely will feel it has achieved strategic sufficiency and does not require additional weapons.

When one or both or some combination of those two conditions are met—that the United States builds enough weapons to compel China to the arms-control table or China believes that additional nuclear weapons will not improve its security condition in a meaningful way—arms control will likely “awaken” from its dormancy. At that point, the United States, China, and likely Russia will be able to sit down at the negotiating table.

That point, however, is unlikely to come for many years—probably at least a decade or more, given the time scales involved in building and fielding nuclear weapons. It may be 2040—or later—until the world gets back to meaningful arms control.

For the time being, the United States should field the arsenal it needs to deter its adversaries and not worry about arms control.

It will return when the time is right.

Robert Peters is a Senior Research Fellow for Strategic Deterrence in the Heritage Foundation’s Allison Center for National Security.