Recent Developments in Russian Nuclear Capabilities

According to the 2024 Director of National Intelligence (DNI) threat report, “Russia will continue to modernize its nuclear weapons capabilities and maintains the largest and most diverse nuclear weapons stockpile.” (Emphasis in the original.) President Putin agrees. In June 2024, he stated that Russia has the “largest arsenals of nuclear weapons.” Worse yet, there are estimates of Russian nuclear capability, particularly in Russian sources, which are much higher than U.S. estimates. Estimates of Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons numbers are up to over 10,000 or about five times the typical U.S. assessment. In 2021, noted Russian military journalist Pavel Felgenhauer wrote, “Indeed, taking into account nonstrategic (tactical) nuclear weapons, which no one has ever verifiably counted, Russia may have more (maybe twice as many overall) than all the other official or unofficial nuclear powers taken together.”

The implication of this assessment is that Russia is in violation of the 1,550 deployed warhead limit of the New START Treaty. This aspect of the DIA report has been ignored in the media. However, it is important because the Biden Administration attempted to create the misleading impression that Russian violation of the New START Treaty was limited to its refusal to allow on-inspections and its failure to provide Treaty-mandated notifications and that Russia’s  “suspension” of the New START Treaty has not resulted in a violation of the deployed warhead limit, or at least not much of one.

Unfortunately, Russian violation of arms control agreements is the norm. The bipartisan United States Strategic Posture Commission pointed out “…there is no prospect of a meaningful arms control Treaty being negotiated with Russia in the foreseeable future…” and that, “Over the past 20 years, Russia has either violated or has failed to comply with nearly every major arms control treaty or agreement to which the United States is or was a party.” The 2014 report of the House Armed Services Committee said the same thing only in greater detail. It read:

According to the testimony of senior officials of the Department of State, the Russian Federation is not complying with numerous treaties and agreements, including the INF Treaty, the Open Skies Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Vienna Document, the Budapest Memorandum, the Istanbul Commitments, the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Russian Federation has recently withdrawn from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). 

In 2020, Russian expert Sergei Rogov stated that despite the supposed New START Treaty limit of 1,550 deployed warheads, the number of Russian strategic nuclear weapons, including those in storage, may be up to 6,000. Since the last New START Treaty on-site inspection was in March 2020, all or nearly all of Russia’s strategic missiles could have been covertly uploaded.

In December 2017, Bill Gertz reported, “Russia is aggressively building up its nuclear forces and is expected to deploy a total force of 8,000 warheads by 2026 along with modernizing deep underground bunkers, according to Pentagon officials. The 8,000 warheads will include both large strategic warheads and thousands of new low-yield and very low-yield warheads to circumvent arms treaty limits and support Moscow’s new doctrine of using nuclear arms early in any conflict.” In August 2019, then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters Rear Admiral (ret.) Peter Fanta confirmed the Gertz report, stating that “The Russians are going to 8,000 plus warheads.”[1] In 2019, then-Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency Lieutenant General Robert P. Ashley, Jr stated that, “In contrast to the United States, during the past decade Russia has improved and expanded its [nuclear weapons] production complex, which has the capacity to process thousands of warheads annually.” This makes no sense unless Russia plans a major expansion of its nuclear warhead numbers. This increase is sufficient to support a Cold War-level nuclear arsenal. In addition, he said Russia was engaged in low-yield nuclear testing.

The exact number of Russian nuclear weapons is unknown. Most the media regard the low estimated numbers in the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) annual report of Russia nuclear capability as authoritative. It is not. The reports are clearly the product of extensive research but contain almost no sourcing for its numerous estimates of Russian nuclear warhead numbers. I do not believe that there are published sources for their assessed numbers. It is clear that their numbers for Russia strategic nuclear missile forces come from very old START Treaty data (mainly 1990). The problem with the FAS analysis is that it ignores Russia’s almost complete strategic nuclear modernization which Putin says is at 95%. The FAS argues that the new and/or improved Russian missiles cannot carry more warheads than the old ones. Russian sources frequently report much higher warhead capability than presented in the FAS analysis. Moreover, based on current evidence, Russian modernization will not end when it reaches 100%. Indeed, it is likely that the still newer systems will be even more capable.

In December 2024, General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff, affirmed that, “The nuclear triad is the basis of our nation’s security.”[2] The year 2024 was not a good one for the its strategic nuclear weapons program. The new Sarmat “super heavy” ICBM suffered a massive explosion that destroyed its silo launcher. For the first time in many years Putin did not mention the Sarmat in his annual December meeting with the Defense Ministry Board. Before that, Russia was speaking unrealistically about very near-term Sarmat deployment. It appears unlikely that the program will be abandoned but the explosion is a major setback.

In the long term, the Sarmat will pose the most serious threat to U.S. national security. According to the Russian Defense Ministry, the Sarmat “…will be able to carry up to 20 warheads of small, medium, high power classes.” Furthermore, it will also carry hypersonic glide vehicles and be capable of attacking the United States over the South Pole.

The claim of 20 warheads is quite credible. It matches the throw-weight increase from the 1979 SS-18 Mod 4 (which reportedly could carry 14 warheads) to the Sarmat. There is now proof that the SS-18 Mod 5 is a 14 warhead system. I have documented that the press reports that credit the Sarmat with 15 warheads relate back to an early concept for the Sarmat which had about half the throw-weight and launch-weight of the missile that Russia actually built.[3] The FAS is in complete denial about the Sarmat’s ability to carry more than ten warheads.

At this point, the timeframe for the deployment of the Sarmat is unknown. At a minimum, the Sarmat will eventually replace the SS-18 Mod 5 in about 50 silos. In 2019, Putin was briefed that Russia was planning 20 Sarmat regiments.[4] This is several times as many deployed missiles as the number of SS-18 Mod 5 silos.

In December 2024, Colonel General Sergei Karakayev, Commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, said, “Work is also underway on testing and introducing into combat the new Sarmat and Osina strategic missile systems.” The Osina reportedly is another new Russian ICBM first tested in 2022 and derived from the 2010 RS-24 Yars ICBM. He said that Russia was deploying Yars ICBMs and Avangard hypersonic missiles. General Karakayev also stated that, “And these are far from all the examples.” (Emphasis in the original.) TASS reported that Russia is developing the new Kedr ICBM to replace the RS-24 Yars ICBM in 2030. STRATCOM has confirmed this report. 

General Karakayev indicated that Russia had modernized 88% of the Strategic Missile Forces (the ICBM force) and had completed the deployment of mobile Yars ICBMs. He said that the Strategic Missile Forces were “…fulfilling its 2023 tasks, [and] continues to increase its grouping.” This suggests that the number of deployed ICBMs is increasing. Silo-based deployment of the RS-24 Yars ICBM continues.[5]

In December 2024, Russia announced it had completed the deployment of a division (presumably three regiments) of Avangard two megaton-yield intercontinental-range hypersonic boost-glide vehicles.

In December 2024, Admiral Alexander Moiseyev, Commander of the Russian Navy, said that the Navy’s strategic nuclear force had been “completely upgraded.” The 2024 DIA report indicated that, “The sea-based leg of Russia’s triad contains at least 10 SSBNs under operational control of the Naval High Command.” This formulation suggests that Russia has more than 10 missile submarines although DIA is not sure if the additional submarines (Delta-IV) are operational. The DIA assessment leaves three Delta-IV submarines unaccounted for. There have been no announced retirements of Russian Delta-IV missile submarines in many years.

General Gerasimov said state tests of the eighth of the new Borei-class ballistic missile submarine is nearing completion,[6] reportedly entering service in June 2025. He stated that two more Borei submarines will be added to the fleet by 2028.[7] In 2018, TASS reported that Russia planned 14 Borei (three Borei and 11 Borei-A) ballistic missile submarines. The improved quieter Borei-A is the submarine the Russians call 4^th generation. In 2019, state-run TASS reported that Russia might develop and deploy two Borei-K strategic cruise missile submarines after 2027.

Beyond the Borei, Russia plans the Husky “5th generation” nuclear missile submarines. Reportedly, the Husky will carry both ballistic and cruise missiles. In 2020, Sputnik News reported that the Husky will carry the Zircon nuclear-capable hypersonic missile. It is unknown when the program will begin construction. The 2024 DIA report confirmed that “…Russia is currently developing new ballistic missile submarines…” Note the plural.

In December 2024, the fifth Russian Yasen-class (885-class) submarine entered into service. It can carry at least 32 nuclear-capable (cruise or hypersonic) missiles. TASS states that the range of the improved Kalibr-M nuclear-capable cruise missile is 4,000-km. This missile is capable of performing both strategic and non-strategic strikes.

Russia is developing the Poseidon nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed, ultra-fast and ultra-deep diving drone submarine. The early Russian press reports said the Poseidon had a yield of 100 megatons. The Russian government’s daily Rossiyskaya Gazeta said that the weapon could achieve “extensive radioactive contamination” and “could envisage using the so-called cobalt bomb, a nuclear weapon designed to produce enhanced amounts of radioactive fallout compared to a regular atomic warhead.” The weapon is intended to launch genocidal attacks on civilians. Russia has converted the Belgorod Oscar-class submarine to carry six Poseidon drone submarines. In 2023, Russia said the Poseidon would be deployed in 2025. This may slip a year or two. Russia reportedly plans to deploy 30 Poseidons.

General Gerasimov stated that modernization of the Tu-160s and Tu-95s continues.[8] He said that the first modernized Tu-160M strategic bomber was delivered to the strategic aviation forces in 2024.[9] Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov said that four will be added in 2025. Russia has announced a program to build at least 50 improved Tu-160 bombers. These bombers can carry 12 very long-range nuclear cruise missiles and reportedly can carry twice the number of short-range nuclear missiles and/or nuclear bombs.[10] They can also carry hypersonic missiles. Russia is also developing a stealth heavy bomber called the Pak-Da and plans to deploy it within a decade. The high cost of this system suggests that the timelines may slip. In November 2024, Russian sources indicated that the Tu-95MSM bomber had been modified, taking into account the lessons of the Ukraine war. This modification included “ultra-long-range cruise missiles.”

In November 2024, Russia attacked Ukraine with what it called an intermediate-range missile called the Oreshnik. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) stated “…that Russia did launch an experimental intermediate range ballistic missile. This IRBM was based on Russia’s RS-26 Rubezh intercontinental ballistic missile model.” The DoD neglected to mention that the RS-26 Rubezh was accountable as an ICBM under the New START Treaty per Russia’s declaration, presumably to evade the INF Treaty prohibition.[11] Ukraine linked the Oreshnik to the Kedr ICBM program. If the Oreshnik is the RS-26 Rubezh, and it is deployed in Belarus in 2025 as Putin suggested (Belarus said that ten Oreshnik will be deployed in Belarus in 2025), it will result in a number of New START Treaty violations: 1) deployment of ICBMs outside of national territory; 2) deployment with the Treaty requirement for a missile demonstration; 3) violation of a number of notification requirements; and 4) an additional violation of the New START Treaty limit on deployed missiles. Russia has made it clear that it does not admit that the Oreshnik is accountable under the New START Treaty.

Russia launched a full court press on the Oreshnik immediately after its attack against Ukraine, promoting it to the status of Russia’s new superweapon. General Karakayev announced that it is nuclear-capable. Russia made an unprecedented number of lies, distortions and exaggerations about the significance of this missile. Within one week of the attack, state-run Sputnik News ran over 40 articles on it. The most ridiculous Putin claim was that “…two, three, or four [Oreshnik] systems - it will be comparable in strength to a nuclear strike.” Not to be outdone, Sputnik News said that the conventional Oreshnik (reportedly a 40-ton missile) with conventional weapons had the destructive potential of 150,000 tons of TNT. In reality, it would take about 2,000 one-ton conventional bombs to match the blast effectiveness of even a World War II 20-kiloton nuclear bomb. The effects of a conventional Oreshnik would be closer to what one or two modern strike fighters could deliver although the Oreshnik would have a much greater range, much shorter time to target and much better potential to penetrate defenses than fighters, except perhaps the most advanced stealth aircraft. However, the Russian claim it cannot be intercepted is bogus.

Sputnik News even grossly exaggerated the destructive potential of the nuclear version of the Oreshnik, claiming that it could be upgraded to be about equivalent of an SS-18 heavy ICBM.

The Oreshnik missile is certainly a threat. Based on what Ukraine and the Pentagon have stated, the Oreshnik can carry six nuclear warheads (presumably the light 100-150 kiloton versions) which is twice the number of nuclear warheads that the Cold War SS-20 could carry. Older Russian reports said that the Rubezh could carry four 300-kiloton warheads. (The new Russian warheads reportedly have variable yields with power as low as tens to hundreds of tons of TNT.) It is certainly more accurate than the 45 year old Soviet SS-20, but it is unlikely be capable of precision attack. The Oreshnik does not need precision accuracy with even low-yield nuclear weapons.

The Russian inventory of non-strategic nuclear weapons is extremely large and diverse. Nearly all Cold War capabilities have been preserved and some new ones have been added. Dual capability is the norm. The 2024 annual threat report of the Director of National Intelligence stated that, “Russia is expanding and modernizing its large and diverse set of nonstrategic systems, which are capable of delivering nuclear or conventional warheads…” The 2024 DIA report states that Russia is “…replacing Soviet-legacy non-strategic nuclear weapons with new weapons having new capabilities.” This apparently is a reference to accurate low-yield/low collateral damage weapons. As far back as December 2017, Dr. Philip Karber, President of the Potomac Foundation, stated that roughly half of Russia’s 5,000 tactical nuclear weapons have been modernized with new sub-kiloton nuclear warheads for air defense, torpedoes and cruise missiles.”

One of the oldest issues of Russian noncompliance with the 1991/1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives are the reports of continued routine Russian deployment of nuclear weapons on their warships. This is an important issue because the Biden Administration based its deterrence policy on the assumption that the United States would have sufficient warning time because Russia would have to field deploy its non-strategic nuclear weapons from central storage sites before launching an attack. In 2022, several Ukrainian experts raised the possibility that the Moskva cruiser sank with nuclear weapons aboard. In December 2024, Stepan Yakymiak, a retired Russian Captain First Rank, observed:

I think that of the sixteen [missiles on the cruiser], at least two, maybe up to four [were nuclear]. That’s my estimate. I haven’t seen any classified documents on this matter, but going by the practice and experience of combat training and going on combat duty – and this is a ‘special military operation’ – a ship has to be fully combat-ready for immediate and subsequent tasks, and nuclear war and the ability to repel attacks from NATO are an element of that.

For many years Russia’s state media have been reporting that Russia’s long-range nuclear-capable cruise missiles have been deployed on its fighter aircraft and Backfire bombers. Such deployment is a violation of the New START Treaty because it turns them into heavy bombers which would put Russia further above the New START Treaty limits.

Actual combat performance of dual-capable Russian missiles in its war against Ukraine provides additional evidence that they were designed for a primary mission of nuclear strike. For example, the conventional Zircon hypersonic missiles used by Russia against Ukraine carried only 40-kg of high explosive. This makes little sense for conventional attacks particularly against major warships. Dr. Phil Karber has pointed out that with even 20-ton yield nuclear warheads, the percentage of Russian missiles that would destroy their targets would double.

Despite the costs of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Russia’s nuclear modernization and force expansion continues unabated. The qualitative and quantitative enhancements to its nuclear capabilities, both strategic and non-strategic, continue to pose an ever growing threat to the security of the United States and that of its allies. Nuclear threats buttress Russia’s belligerent foreign policy which seeks to challenge international stability and the existing global order. It will be at least several years before there will be the slightest modernization of U.S. strategic nuclear forces which are very old. The West must recognize the Russian threat and meet this challenge.                            

[1] “082319 Crane Naval Submarine Warfare Center Symposium on Strategic Nuclear Weapons Modernization and Hypersonics with Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matter Peter Fanta,” mimeo.

[2] Ibid.

[3] “Russian Missile Designer Reviews Arguments Over Liquid, Solid Fuel Missiles,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye Online, July 15, 2011, available at https://wnc-eastviewcom.mutex.gmu.edu/wnc/article?id=39793684.

[4] “Testing of Sarmat Intercontinental Missile to be over in 2021 - Russian Defense Management Center,” ITAR-TASS Daily, December 24, 2019, available at https://on-demand-eastviewcom.mutex.gmu.edu/browse/doc/56709629.

[5] “Russia modernizes 95% of its nuclear triad arsenal, says defense ministry: UKRAINE WAR,” EFE News Service, December 18, 2024, available at https://dialog.proquest.com/professional/professionalnewsstand/docview/3146473237/fulltext/193546B0819/2?accountid=155509&accountid=155509&site=professionalnewsstand&t:ac=193546B0819/1&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocksbrief&t:zoneid=transactionalZone_1c569a6a470b2.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Loc. cit.

[8] Loc. cit.

[9] Loc. cit.

[10] Ryan Cunningham, Modern Russian Military Aircraft (London: Amber Books Limited, 2023), p. 66.

[11] Dr. Mark B. Schneider, “Confirmation of Russian Violation and Circumvention of the INF Treaty,” (Fairfax VA: National Institute for Public Policy, February 2014), p. 9.