New Law Gives Kremlin Expanded Power to Use Force to Defend Russians Abroad

Executive Summary:

In the lead-up to the Duma’s approval of this measure, Russian commentators and Russian officials expressed concern about Russians who have been arrested abroad and, ever more often, about the possibility that the International Criminal Court will bring charges against Putin for his actions in Ukraine. In the words of Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin, “Western jurisprudence has in fact become an instrument of repression” against those it does not like and that “in these conditions, it is important to do everything so that our citizens will be defended” (VKontakte/@belrusinfo, April 14). Andrei Kartapolov, head of the Duma defense committee, added that Western courts have now been enlisted in “a campaign of rampant Russophobia” and thus must be opposed by Moscow with all the forces at its disposal (Ekho Rossiya, May 13). Other Duma members backing the Kremlin-supported measure adopted similar positions (RG.ru, May 13). At the same time, however, other participants in this debate suggested that, in their view, the Duma has done nothing more now than what the United States did in 2022 when it adopted a law protecting U.S. military personnel and civilian officials from actions by the International Criminal Court—even though the U.S. law did not call for military action against the court (Telegram/@thebell_io, May 13).

Many Russians have argued that what Moscow is now doing will have far-reaching and potentially dangerous consequences. Moscow lawyer Ilya Novikov, for example, says that the new law is likely to function as “a scare tactic,” much as Russia’s periodic threats to use nuclear weapons (The Barents Observer, May 13). He suggests that the next time the United Kingdom is considering arresting a Russian tanker and its crew for violating sanctions, some are likely to point out that the Russians, armed with this new law, may attack the United Kingdom and ask whether it is worth taking the risk. In the United Kingdom, Novikov continues, such arguments may not work. If an incident were to occur in a smaller Russian neighbor such as Latvia, however, the possibility that they could is far greater. “In Latvia,” the Moscow lawyer points out, “pro-Russian people are often arrested,” and that could now trigger Russian action under the new law. He further said, “Five years ago, we did not think Russia could introduce forces into Ukraine, but it turned out that it certainly could.”

The issue of Russians facing criminal charges or already convicted in foreign courts is certainly a growing one. Last month, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a report on the growing number of countries in which it operates. On the ministry’s list were “21 European countries, including Armenia, Bulgaria, as well as all Baltic and Scandinavian countries.” Other countries persecuting Russians, the foreign ministry said, included the United Kingdom, Canada, Brazil, Israel, the Maldives, and Thailand. As a result, the ministry said, there are now hundreds of Russians facing charges or already behind bars in “about 43 countries” (Stoletie, May 15). Russia thus has many options to threaten or even use force, and what it does in one case may have consequences in others. If Moscow took action against a country that some in the West might consider marginal or unimportant, that case could intimidate others even more than has been true up to now.

The Federation Council, the upper chamber of the Russian parliament, has now approved the law, and it now goes to Putin for what observers say is his almost certain signature (Charter97, May 20). This new law will go into force as soon as the end of this month. Exactly what this will mean, immediately or in the longer term, is uncertain. Under a measure adopted in December 2009 and still in force, the Federation Council granted Putin the right to use force beyond the borders of the Russian Federation, although it did not address the actions of foreign or international courts (Meduza, May 16). The most likely effect of this new law will be, as Novikov explained, that other countries will be sufficiently worried about the possibility that Putin will now use force to defend Russian citizens charged or convicted by their courts that they will avoid bringing new charges or possibly consider releasing those already convicted via exchanges or some other measure. That alone will have a chilling effect on these countries and likely lead more of them to ignore the call of the International Criminal Court in 2023 to arrest Putin, thus extending what has been a growing trend already (International Criminal Court, March 17, 2023; Human Rights Watch, October 8, 2025).

All this means is that the new Duma, as the bill outlines, will itself affect the actions of courts in various countries. It will especially affect the actions of international courts in ways that will give Moscow a kind of veto over their decisions. If that happens, then past progress toward an international order based on law will be further compromised if not destroyed, opening the way to an era in which might will again make right and a wider war ever more likely.

Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia.

This article appeared originally at The Jamestown Foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor.