Ukrainian Verdun

In the last weeks of August 2022, the Russia-Ukraine War has become an asymmetric stalemate. Russian artillery keeps the Ukrainians at bay, while the Ukrainians rely heavily on NATO-supplied high-tech weaponry, such as man-portable and mobile precision-guided missiles and launchers, precision artillery, and increasingly sophisticated drones to stop the Russians.

By January 1916, the German General Staff realized that their initial plan to rout the French forces, seize Paris, and defeat France had failed, consequently stalemating the German army in France and Belgium. Erich von Falkenhayn (Chief of the German General Staff) introduced an alternative strategy of using massive artillery bombardments to attrit the French army. Implemented in and around Verdun, the German attack launched on 21 February 1916 inflicted casualties and pushed the defenders back.

In late August 1916, Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff replaced von Falkenhayn. The new leadership soured on the Verdun offense, and, with the trench lines approximately where the fighting had begun, the battle of Verdun ended on 18 December.

The Western Front’s unalterable stalemate vexed commands on both sides of the trenches. Heralded as solutions, new weapons (poison gas) and tactics (mining under enemy positions) failed to deliver. Not until 1918, with the advent of massed tank formations, did the offense once again become a practical reality.

The course of the War in Ukraine approximates the First World War and the Battle of Verdun: First, a failed initial Russian campaign to overwhelm the Ukrainians and seize Kyiv; Next, an initially successful artillery-heavy Russian assault to capture the Donbas that eventually stalled; Now, a shift in the initiative, characterized by the Ukrainians and Russians both battling for limited territorial gains along the 500 kilometers of contested front lines, while also exchanging artillery and missile strikes on rear areas.

In 1914, most pre-War observers felt an offensive war of attack, employing the traditional cavalry, infantry, and fortification-busting artillery, would dominate and lead to a short conflict. Similarly, in 2022 before hostilities commenced, most military experts expected armor and airpower would steamroller the Ukrainian defense leading to a quick Russian victory. In neither case did the expected occur. Large-scale attacks yielded disappointing results. In World War I, machine guns, wire entanglements, and artillery stalled advances, leading to trench warfare. In 2022, Russian attacks faltered against man-portable anti-armor and anti-aircraft missiles, while the Ukrainians could not sustain advances against Russian artillery barrages.

When viewed from the perspective of offense versus defense, like the Western Front of World War I, the Russia-Ukraine War has seen the defense predominate:

First, with their man-portable missiles, the infantry gained a defensive advantage and prevailed against armor, low-flying attack aircraft, and helicopters. In the Russia-Ukraine War, the long-dominate, primarily offensive weapons have achieved little, and their destruction and wreckage often appear in cell phone images and videos.

Second, as videos testify, drones, often low-cost models, have proven deadly attackers, with their small bombs destroying numerous vehicles of all types.

Third, personnel, weapons, and supply concentrations have proven vulnerable to drone-directed, precision long-range artillery fires of both shells and missiles. Unlike World War II, where the offense dominated, prepared mass attacks of concentrated formations of soldiers and armor charging across a battlefield have become ineffective and costly.

Fourth, long-range precision-guided missile strikes have frequently destroyed: critical rear-area supply depots, command and control facilities, and high-value targets (ships, bridges, and airfields.)

Fifth, the widespread use of drones and satellite imagery has vastly improved battlefield surveillance. Surprising one’s adversary has become much harder to achieve. Increasingly, the element of surprise will require smaller units to accomplish their attacks quicker.

With the defense so clearly dominant, will the Russia-Ukraine War remain a slugfest between Russia’s more numerous but less sophisticated weaponry and Ukraine’s growing NATO-supplied high-tech missiles and artillery? Or will a new weapon, like the 1918 tank, emerge and give the currently moribund offense new life?

Unless one side or the other does something remarkable, neither the Russians nor the Ukrainians likely have a super weapon lurking in the shadows, ready to give their side the offensive oomph needed to be victorious. The Russians seem to have tried all that they have in their arsenal. The Ukrainians, pre-War, did not have much in the way of game-changing offensive weaponry. They now rely on mainly American and, to a lesser extent, European weapons, which give them a qualitative, but not a decisive, edge over the Russians.

Both Ukrainian and Russian commands now face the reality of a conflict where the defense is in the ascendancy. So far, the Russians have tried twice to attack and win. Both times, they failed. The Ukrainians talk of an offensive but have shown little inclination to initiate the determined and continuing attacks needed to evict the Russian forces from Ukrainian territory. Like the 1917 Western Front deadlock, neither the belligerents nor their allies in the Russia-Ukraine War seem to have a viable way to break the military stalemate.

Is there another option; Can either side do something to break the impasse?

In early 1917, recognizing that the German army could not: break through the enemy’s defenses, achieve a decisive victory, and end the strategic stalemate, the Germans shifted from military to naval and political means. U-boats resumed the unrestricted submarine warfare they had discontinued after the Lusitania sinking. Intent on crippling Russia from within, the German leadership arranged for Vladimir Ilyich Lenin and his exiled Communist revolutionaries to travel on the famous/infamous ‘sealed train’ to the Russian capital, Petrograd (now St. Petersburg). Both actions had a profound effect on the war. The unrestricted submarine war brought the United States into the conflict in April 1917. And with that entry, the Allies had a new set of war aims, Woodrow Wilson’s 14 points. In November 1917, the Lenin-led Bolsheviks seized power in the ‘October Revolution.’ Russia, now the Soviet Union, exited the war in March 1918 with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

After World War I’s Verdun battle, expanded military strategies, policy choices, or political changes, rather than a continuation of the current battlefield tactics, may transform the belligerents’ prospects in the Russia-Ukraine War. First, three obvious moves:

Assuming the stalemate continues, or its position worsens, will Russia:

If the weaponry and support already supplied to the Ukrainians does not break the stalemate or if Russia resumes making battlefield gains, what additional steps can the Ukrainians and their international supporters take:

Additionally, high-risk, or unlikely possible actions include:

Eventually, stalemates end. Sometimes, the exhausted belligerents recognize the futility of continuing hostilities. Other times, one of the combatants gains a war-winning advantage and emerges victorious. In either case, the issue becomes: Can the former enemies secure a lasting peace?

Robert (Bob) Purssell is a Massachusetts Institute of Technology graduate, Bob worked in the defense and semiconductor industry first as an engineer and subsequently as an engineering manager. Currently retired, he writes novels and gives talks on military and historical events.