What Constitutes a Winning Strategy in Ukraine

Washington’s continuing inability or refusal to formulate let alone execute a winning strategy in Ukraine impedes Kyiv’s efforts to do so and risks achieving defeat despite Russia’s abysmal strategic leadership.  Yet Washington continues to pressure Ukraine to declare a negotiation program and endgame even while denying it the means of defense let alone victory, arguably the sole possible acceptable ending for this war.  Therefore this essay aims to redress this strategic malfeasance by postulating the elements of a victorious Ukrainian and Western (not only American) strategy for this war.

In the military sphere strategy goes beyond providing Ukraine the conventional tools it needs to strike Russia freely to a strong executive program by the Biden Administration, its successor, and European governments to rebuild their conventional and nuclear capabilities as numerous bilateral commissions here have advocated.  Rebuilding conventional deterrence in Europe if not elsewhere thwarts Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean escalation at this level, deprives them of a usable nuclear threat and allows the West to preserve escalation dominance at the lowest possible level in both Ukraine and future contingencies.  The rebuilding of Western military capability requires strong and enduring executive and public support as well as secure long-term funding and decisive reform of antiquated procurement practices and ideas in the light of Russia and its allies’ threats.  Putin’s call to add another 180,000 men to his army at the risk of destroying Russia’s economy, and the risks of China’s unbridled military buildup plus Iranian and North Korean proliferation and Iranian sponsorship of terrorism indicate the need for this global rearmament program.

Economically it is equally urgent that Western governments allocate emergency funding and equipment now to provide energy relief to Ukraine to get through the impending 2024-25 winter.  This funding also can spur the revival of the indigenous Ukrainian energy sector that, properly led can offer a foundation for rebuilding that sector and providing the basis for Ukraine, possibly even in wartime to begin exporting energy to Central and Eastern Europe, another move that undermines Russia’s capacity to sustain this war.

No less urgently Congress must pass the Administration’s budget that contains Administration requests to provide another $60-61 Billion to Ukraine through various executive and legislative mechanisms that go to sustain not only Kyiv’s military efforts but the urgent necessities of maintaining a functioning economy and infrastructure, not least energy.  Apart from the negative impact on the U.S. of this annual budgetary charade, Ukraine depends on this funding to defend itself and provide for its population through the winter into 2025.  Failure to achieve a resolution in favor of this spending and to provide a basis for future legislative appropriations that are equally urgent and necessary will only confirm to hostile audiences that we have neither the will nor the intelligence to prosecute this war to the full extent of our superior power.

In that connection we might remember that as Napoleon said in war the moral is to the material as 3 is to 1.  The ongoing failure to grasp that we and our allies, not only Ukraine, are also under attack, make clear to Western publics, what is at stake or appropriate the resources needed to prevail only guarantee further crises and wars at even greater cost.  Due to considerations of space, we have only outlined the most urgent tasks.  Much more needs to be done here and abroad in a “whole of government” or integrated deterrence mode.  But more than talk is needed, Europe, not just Ukraine, needs action this day and for many more days, not talk.  Or as President Zelensky memorably said, “I need ammunition, not a ride.”

Dr. Stephen J. Blank is a Senior Fellow at Foreign Policy Research Institute. He is an internationally renowned expert on Russian and Chinese defense policy. He is the author of "Light from the East: Russia's Quest for Great Power Status in Asia" (Taylor & Francis, 2023). He was a Professor of National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College.