
Give Us Back Our Marine Corps
Published Sept. 13, 2025 • Read time: 6m
There is an intellectual war being waged within the United States Marine Corps. It centers on Force Design 2030, a force structure and mission reform that has pitted recent and current Marine leadership against a growing group of retired Marines who contend that the reforms, in retired Marine Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper’s words, have “destroyed the Corps’ combined arms capabilities” and will transform the Marine Corps from an offensive mobile warfighting force to a defensive “stand-in-force” that undermines “the very ethos of the Corps and not for the good.” The latest salvo in this war of words was fired by Ryan Evans, the founder of the web journal War on the Rocks, who writes that the critics of Force Design 2030 are a “small but vocal group of retired Marine officers” who have employed “doomsday rhetoric and distortions with . . . shameless fervor” and who falsely claim that there is a “crisis” within the Corps because of the reforms.
Evans essentially accuses the critics of Force Design 2030 of resisting needed change in the Corps’ mission and of wanting to fight the last war. The critics, he writes, “advocate for a Marine Corps divorced from strategic reality, current joint doctrine, and policy directives.” Evans claims he is for reasoned debate and responsible critiques of Force Design 2030, but he characterizes most of the critics as “unelected, unappointed cabals of retired octogenarians and nonagenarians” who have no legitimate role in running the military services. His use of the word “cabal” is revealing—it connotes a group of people secretly united in a nefarious plot. But there is nothing secret or nefarious about the critics of Force Design 2030. They are quite public with their criticism of the reforms, using a platform titled “Compass Points” to air their concerns.
The critics’ concerns are anything but “divorced from strategic reality, current joint doctrine, and policy directives.” Gen. Van Riper notes that seven of the eight living former Marine Corps commandants oppose Force Design 2030, the online platform used by the critics has more than 100,000 views per month, and email chains with at least 1300 members voice serious reservations or outright opposition to the reforms. That can hardly be called a “small but vocal group,” let alone a “cabal.”
Evans also complains that the critics have sought meetings with senior defense officials and elected officials, including in the White House. Perhaps Evans would deny retired Marines, including former commandants, their First Amendment rights of free speech and to petition their government. After all, many of those retired Marines fought to defend those rights for themselves and others.
To fully understand the changes undertaken and planned by the current Marine leadership in Force Design 2030, a good start is the Congressional Research Service’s publication “U.S. Marine Corps Force Design Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress.” It notes that this Marine Corps initiative was launched in 2019 by Marine commandant Gen. David Berger. It has since received continued support from current Marine commandant Gen. Eric Smith. Under the plan, the Marines have deactivated their tank battalions and transferred over 400 of their 450 tanks to the Army; eliminated towed cannon artillery and many fixed-wing aircraft from future plans; and phased out “legacy logistical capability” that was used for “sustained land operations.” These force structure changes are one aspect of Force Design 2030 seized on by the critics who say that the lack of armor, artillery, and aviation forces will detract from the Marines ability to act as an “effective combined arms force”; will limit logistics support; will hamper ground mobility; and will lessen the Marines ability to fight in urban areas.
But the heart of Force Design 2030 is the shift from fighting small wars to planning to fight against great power rivals, especially China. Gen. Berger and now Gen. Smith view Force Design 2030 as being consistent with the 2018 National Defense Strategy issued by the First Trump administration. Force Design 2030, however, calls for a restructuring of the Marines to shift from a mobile expeditionary force to what former Marine infantry officer John F. Schmitt calls a “faulty Island Chain Defense concept that seeks to prevent the Chinese navy from breaking out into the East and South China Seas in the event of war.” The plan is for “stand-in-forces” to be inserted onto key islands in the western Pacific who will use precision-guided munitions to attack Chinese ships as they attempt to move beyond island chains. Schmitt writes, however, that China is already taking steps to base its forces outside those island chains. So, Force Design 2030 fails strategically. It also fails operationally, writes Schmitt, because it assumes that future warfare will consist of “an attritional duel between competing kill webs of advanced technologies.” It fails tactically, according to Schmitt, because it “provides no adequate protection, sustainment, or support for the widely-distributed stand-in-forces once they are inserted in place.” And there is no guarantee that the governments of some of the island nations will agree to the prepositioning of Marine stand-in-forces on their territory.
More fundamentally, Force Design 2030, the critics charge, lessens the Marines’ ability to perform its traditional role of responding to emergencies anywhere in the world. China, to be sure, is our most dangerous adversary, but putting all of your eggs in one basket for a possible conflict with China ignores the need for a more versatile and more effective Marine Corps that has served us well throughout our nation’s history.
It is always difficult, if not impossible, to predict the nature of future wars and how they will differ from previous conflicts. Advanced technologies will undoubtedly play a role in future wars just as they are doing in current wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. But as the Ukraine war has demonstrated, conflict in the 21st century can resemble attritional wars of the past—the fighting there is reminiscent of the combat on the western front in World War I. The United States Marines have fought, as the song goes, from the Halls of Montezuma to the shores of Tripoli. They have fought in brutal island campaigns in the Pacific in World War II, in Korea and Vietnam, in Iraq and Afghanistan, and so many other places. Their proud tradition in war is to go anywhere our civilian leadership sends them to seize ground, hold it, and defeat our enemies. China is the pacing threat but it is not the only threat we will face in the future. The critics of Force Design 2030 appear to understand that better than the current Marine leadership.
Francis P. Sempa writes on military and foreign policy.

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