Mobile ICBMs are a Bad Idea

Nuclear weapons have been making news lately, as the debate rages over whether or not the United States should adopt a No First Use (NFU) policy. Nuclear policy towards Turkey begs evaluation, both in light of the coup attempt and as general policy. As Modernization costs loom and the Long Range Standoff Weapon (LRSO) is hotly debated, the Air Force has released a Request for Proposal (RFP) for new missiles.

In a conflict with the Soviet Union, the United States would have used nuclear weapons to blunt or destroy a massive assault. The logical counter to this, which indeed turned out to be Soviet strategy, was to go nuclear early and destroy NATO’s ability to use nuclear weapons to prevent conventional defeat. The key is that resort to nuclear weapons on either side was envisioned in conjunction with conventional strategy. Pending conflict would almost certainly be signaled by mobilization of Warsaw Pact militaries, massing of troops, forward deployment of aircraft, or other recognizable actions which would trigger dispersal. Once dispersed, the missiles would actually add to stability because NATO nuclear weapons would be much harder to eliminate in the opening hours of a conflict.

On the strategic front, the United States developed not just one, but two systems for deploying mobile ICBMs. The MGM-134 Midgetman was a vehicle-borne system, meant to disperse from a half dozen central bases in times of increased tension. Along the same lines, the original plan for the Peacekeeper missile included rail garrison, a scheme to deploy missiles in modified freight cars during times of conflict. Similarly to the GLCM concept, dispersing missiles in a crisis would have lessened the chances for a first strike by making the missile force more survivable, but both systems were canceled as the Cold War waned.

Where cruise missiles and ICBMs are different is in the unique nature of a strategic nuclear exchange. A future nuclear war could indeed come at the apex of a regional dispute turned hot, maybe in the Baltics or the South China Sea. Even with such increased tensions, it is possible that the mobile ICBMs would not be sent to the field, either for failure to recognize the danger or for fear of being provocative. It is also possible that an adversary, having decided that the United States was a long term threat and that eventual war was inevitable, could launch a nuclear strike at our bomber, missile, and submarine bases without warning. Vehicular or rail garrison missiles would be the fattest of targets while at their central staging areas, and would require hours of warning to disperse.

A counter to vulnerability at their home bases would be to keep all or a portion constantly on the road or rails, but would present security, safety, and logistics challenges. Weapons would be far more susceptible to terrorist attack when in vehicles or railcars than when protected in silos on the Great Plains. The Great Plains are also thinly populated, and silos are miles away from the nearest towns; even keeping to back roads mobile ICBM convoys would have to constantly transit directly through the middle of small towns and cities, and the nation's rail lines all travel through our largest population centers. It is unknown whether the American people would tolerate a fleet of constantly moving nuclear missiles on its roads or rails. Ready to fire rockets and people shouldn't mix. Finally, keeping the majority of the missile ready to fire would be challenging with any substantial portion on the road.

Mobile systems only make sense if they are in addition to an already robust and survivable land based deterrent. In today's environment, the Air Force is constrained by both fiscal resources and by arms agreements capping the number of deployed warheads. Any new mobile system would replace silo-based systems 1-for-1 at best, and it is unlikely the Air Force could fund both a mobile system and a follow-on silo based system, so the choice would be either one or the other. Plus, every new weapons system risks following the trajectory of the F-22 Raptor and the B-2 Spirit where setbacks and spiraling costs led to quantity reductions that hobble operations; we could end up with a couple dozen very expensive missiles concentrated at a single installation rather than our current dispersed force of hundreds.

Our best course of action is a fleet of new-production missiles based on current designs, perhaps updated to reflect modern manufacturing techniques. At the end of the day, the nation does not require any new capability out of its ICBMs, only that they continue to launch reliably and land where they are intended. If we are going to live in a world with nuclear weapons, a hardened, dispersed fleet of single warhead missiles is the most stable configuration to keep the peace.

Brian E. Wish, PhD served 7 years on active duty with the United States Air Force, where he has continued to serve as a reservist for 17 years and holds the rank of Colonel. He is a 1991 graduate of the United States Air Force Academy where he majored in Political Science. He also holds a Master's in Administrative Management from Bowie State University and a PhD in Public and Urban Administration from the University of Texas at Arlington. The opinions expressed here are his own.