
From Thucydides to Twitter
Published April 14, 2025 • Read time: 8m
The Urgent Need for Long-term Strategic Thinking
The recent shuttering of the Office of Net Assessment marks the end of an era at the Pentagon, closing the book on one of the few institutions that helped America think beyond the present moment. Whatever replaces it—whether it’s a restructured version of the same office or a new entity altogether (perhaps something with a name like the Office of Strategic Advantage)—will face a challenge far greater than mere bureaucratic reorganization: the modern strategist is drowning in information.
Crafting good military strategy requires slow, deliberate judgment and creativity, away from the noise of the present. Today, however, the strategist is often expected to function less like a grandmaster at a chessboard, creatively calculating future moves, and more like a stock trader, reacting in real-time to an unceasing flood of open-source intelligence, social media updates and political noise. The temptation to prioritize the immediate over the enduring, the transient over the real, is a relentless struggle in our digital age, and the sheer volume of information often obscures the truths that actually matter.
Friedrich Nietzsche saw the early symptoms of this disease in the 19th century. A brilliant classicist, he quickly grew disillusioned with the Prussian education system, which he saw as trading deep learning for superficial knowledge. In a series of lectures titled On the Future of Our Educational Institutions, Nietzsche lamented that students, after spending the day reading the great works of history and literature, would immediately reach for the daily newspaper. They surrendered their minds to mass opinion and immediacy, allowing headlines to shape their understanding of the world rather than the enduring lessons of history. “The daily newspaper has effectively replaced education,” he warned, describing how it coated every intellectual discipline with a “sticky layer of journalism.”
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If that was true in Nietzsche’s time, it is exponentially more so today. The strategist who allows himself to be formed by the immediate—especially by the digital ecosystem that conditions people to think in 280-character bursts—becomes not a strategist but a functionary of the moment. He will offer only "presentist strategies." Just as the student who reads only newspapers and never books becomes informed but not educated, the strategist who follows only the news becomes reactive but not visionary. B.H. Liddell Hart once remarked that “there is no excuse for anyone who is not illiterate if he is less than three thousand years old in mind.” Today’s minds can hardly remember what occurred three hours ago. Those minds have no place in strategic planning.
The best American strategists of the 20th century understood this. Figures like Bernard Brodie, George Kennan, Paul Nitze and Herman Kahn were all in their own way steeped in the Western tradition of literature, history, and philosophy. They read deeply—from Thucydides to Shakespeare—and used these texts to refine their understanding of power, conflict, and human nature. Their immersion in the Western canon allowed them to think in centuries rather than news cycles, avoiding the trap of presentism. In his last book before his passing, Henry Kissinger identified “deep literacy” as a vital character trait that the good stateman ought to possess, for it “helps leaders cultivate the mental distance from external stimuli and personalities that sustains a sense of proportion.” Deep literacy cannot be cultivated via social media.
The irony of our era is that the more information we have, the harder it is to know what to do with it. Clausewitz wrote about the "fog of war"—the uncertainty inherent in military operations. But today’s strategist faces a different kind of fog, generated not by a lack of information but by an overabundance of it. The strategist must not only present himself with superb skills of discernment, so that he can pick out the relative details needed to craft good strategy, but he must also have a temperament and disposition that has not been corrupted by the digital era we all inhabit.
Kissinger noted that while the internet and social media make news immediately more accessible, “this surfeit of information has hardly made us individually more knowledgeable – let alone wiser.” Mere information and data points are useless to the strategist, he says. “For information to be transmuted into something approaching wisdom, it must be placed within a broader context of history and experience.” In our digital age, leaders and strategic thinkers must struggle against the tide of this social media landscape.
This is why modern strategy demands a kind of retreat. The strategist must, to some degree, be a modern caveman. He must step away from the news cycle, strip away the superfluous noise inherent in the bureaucracy and focus on the essential components that have historically made for good strategy. The creative questions the strategist must ask are not ones that will be answered by minds that have been formed on the ephemeral nature of social media, nor the maelstrom that is modern political life. They require disciplined, secluded thinking, informed by a deep study of history and strategic theory. Moreover, the best strategies have almost always been crafted away from the interagency process; one cannot crowd the strategists’ office with policy makers and bureaucrats who have more immediate concerns.
The dangers of presentist strategy are not hypothetical. Take, for instance, the Biden administration’s response to the war in Gaza. From the outset, the White House focused heavily on humanitarian concerns, pressuring Israel to increase aid to Gaza, even though aid was consistently stolen by Hamas. The Israeli government complied, facilitating an unprecedented level of assistance. Yet the Biden administration, seemingly paying more attention to social media narratives than to strategic considerations, decided that more needed to be done. The result was the ill-fated floating pier—a project conceived in the heat of media pressure rather than strategic necessity (had no one stopped to wonder about the success of a floating pier in the tumultuous Mediterranean Sea?). Tens of millions of dollars were wasted, and an American servicemember lost his life. This is what happens when foreign policy is dictated by the news cycle, when too many voices shout down the strategist’s need for quiet, deliberate thinking and judgement.
Contrast this debacle with the Cuban Missile Crisis, a great example in slow, deliberate strategic thought and planning. In October 1962, the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExCom) had to navigate a nuclear standoff under immense pressure. Yet despite the urgency of the crisis, they could only move as fast as intelligence and diplomatic channels allowed. Unlike today’s policymakers, who are inundated with real-time updates and social media trends, ExCom members were forced to analyze incomplete data and make decisions with limited knowledge. They did not succumb to the tyranny of the moment. Instead, they methodically debated each course of action, weighing the risks of escalation against the benefits of diplomacy, guided by their real life experience and historical study. Secretary of Defense McNamara’s central insight during the crisis—that missiles in Cuba did not fundamentally alter the strategic balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union—is the type of insight that might have been harder to see had he lived in a world where social media shapes the narrative and reality of the day. Just imagine what the Tweets would look like and how they might have reached ExCom and altered its process. Had they reacted impulsively to each piece of incoming intelligence, or had they seen how the outside world reacted to the events in Cuba (when they lacked the complete picture) the world might have faced a nuclear cataclysm.
Strategy requires intellectual discipline. It demands a willingness to step back from the noise of the present in order to discern the patterns of history and the enduring principles of power. The caveman, in this sense, is not a hermit who disengages from reality but a thinker who understands that the best decisions are not made in the frenzy of the moment but in the solitude of careful deliberation. In the cave, there must only be present those tools and people that can help ensure clear and creative strategic thinking. There is no room for petty politics, personal vendettas or an eye towards the newspaper and its daily headlines.
If the Pentagon hopes to replace the Office of Net Assessment with something better, it must resist the urge to create another bureaucracy driven by short-term demands. It must instead carve out a space for thinkers who are willing to retreat into the cave, to study history, to grapple with enduring strategic principles and to emerge only when they have something of true consequence to say. It is this willingness to be secluded from the tyranny of the present that should be the most important character trait that the Department of Defense looks for in its future strategists. It was the slow, deliberate and relentless pursuit of truth that characterized the late Andrew Marshall’s approach to net assessment. His own reflections on net assessment are a testament to his extraordinary ability to think through problems from all angles and bring his wide and deep reading to every problem. We must honor his legacy by ensuring that a rebuilt Office of Net Assessment continues that same approach to long-term strategic planning and net assessment.
In an age of infinite information, strategy must be finite. In an era of instant reaction, the best strategists must embrace the discipline of restraint. And in a world that prizes the now, the strategist must think not in minutes or news cycles but in decades. The caveman is not obsolete—he is more necessary than ever.
Phillip Dolitsky is a Strategic Advisor at The Philos Project.

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