The Next CNO

Editors Note:  An error was noted in the article, in fact, Admiral Caudle was the commander of Submarine Group Eight.  In addition, it should be noted that Captain Michael Furey is a pen name.  Captain Furey is actually a retired Surface Warfare Captain.

Then, beginning in 2013, the entire system fell across the breakers of the "Fat Leonard" scandal. Many senior officers were tainted by these rolling investigations, and there were also those, many not directly implicated, whose careers were stunted by years-long investigations.  It is not an understatement to say that an entire generation of admirals was lost, either directly or indirectly, to those events. As a result, since 2015, not a single CNO has been able to meet the traditional, if unofficial, qualifications. The cupboard was first rendered bare by Fat Leonard, and the problem was subsequently exacerbated by both the Destroyer collisions of 2017, and most recently, by Senator Tommy Tuberville’s 2023 blockage of all military promotions.

So, while a taxpayer unacquainted with these rather esoteric events might sensibly expect the CNO to be an officer who has led combat organizations at sea, from small to large, while also becoming a seasoned Washingtonian insider, they would be anything other than correct.

Whether painful or not, the most recent CNO, Admiral Lisa Franchetti, was presumed by the entire fleet to be a DEI hire, and that immediately sapped confidence in her. The Navy’s admirals may take offense at this, but they are woefully out of touch with the operational fleet, and this is the simple reality. It was widely understood throughout the senior uniformed and political ranks of the post-Tailhook Navy that a female CNO was imperative, and accordingly, a handful of women were identified and groomed to be the first. Of these, only Franchetti survived, and by the 2010s it was apparent that she was the anointed one. It did not matter that her reputation as an operator at sea was troubled. What mattered was her sex. And while she failed the traditional criteria test, never having served in a four-star operational command, it hardly mattered. The Navy offered her, and the Biden Administration insisted.

As for her two predecessors in the Office of the CNO, they were different from Franchetti, and far more troubling.  The Fat Leonard situation plainly explains the elevation of both, first Admiral John M. Richardson (2015-2019), and then Admiral Michael Gilday (2019-2023). Both were shocking selections – at least in the operational fleet – because, unlike Franchetti after them, or virtually every CNO before – neither had anywhere near the credentials long deemed necessary. In the case of Richardson, he ascended to CNO from his position as Director of Naval Reactors."  No CNO had ever come from Naval Reactors, not even Admiral Hyman G. Rickover. As for Richardson, he never commanded one of the operational fleets (5th, 6th, or 7th) and never held a four-star operational command. He was an engineer, managing engineers, and the only reason he became CNO was that following the events associated with the scandal, no other viable four-star admiral existed. Richardson ascended by default.

As for Gilday, he became CNO after assignment as commander of 10^th Fleet. The 10^th Fleet is the operational arm of the U.S. Fleet Cyber Command (FCC), responsible for all Navy cyber warfare operations. His assignment was a complete anomaly to the point of absurdity. Unfortunately, this was all the Navy could do during those profoundly troubled years because Fat Leonard utterly broke the delicate chain of admiral assignment.

It seems impossible that the Navy can have more admirals serving than at any time in history – more than it has it has actual battle-force ships – yet the number of these who are viable candidates for CNO is vanishingly small. The necessary command jobs an officer needs to get to the top are few and far between, and so, while we are awash in admirals, most are terminal one and two-stars serving a specific, and often esoteric purpose. Qualified four star admirals are a rarity.

Through no fault of their own, neither Richardson nor Gilday were suited to the job. And even though Franchetti had many of the credentials long considered necessary, her capability and capacity as an officer in the fleet was – as far as the fleet was concerned - problematic. The consequences have been manifest. None of these three had either gravitas, or the naturally occurring self-confidence that might have otherwise accrued from having the assignments formerly necessary. Were they smart? Of course. Were they energetic? Yes. Did they do the job of at least slowing the Navy’s precipitous decline in recruiting, morale, and capability? No. And, frankly, the fact that the Navy bristles when this is suggested only demonstrates a "circle-the-wagons" mentality that does nothing to address the problem.

It is notable that since 1978, there have been thirteen CNOs. Of these, only two have been naval aviators; Admiral B Hayward (1978-1982) and Admiral Jay L. Johnson (1996-2000). That is two out of thirteen. On the other hand, five of thirteen have been submariners, and six have been surface warfare officers. More telling, since 2000, five of seven have been surface officers. Those guys, despite the shocking decline of the surface Navy, are doing something right when it comes to getting to the top.

Still, one would imagine that more than fifteen percent of CNOs, since 1978, would have been aviators. After all, while exact numbers are not readily available, it appears that in 2023, 40 percent of those selected to admiral were aviators, far outstripping either surface warfare or submariner selectees. There is, however, a reasonable explanation for this ongoing failure of pilots to make it to the top office. Generally speaking, if you are an upwardly mobile aviator, you stay out of Washington. In aviation, there is a powerful emphasis on staying in aviation, and Washington is not considered to be a "good" aviator job – it is correctly identified as tragically uncool and brutally inhumane to the majority of aviators. The net result of this is that while there are aviators who attain four stars; and while not all aviators stay out of Washington; and while several aviators have come close (Admiral Scott H. Swift and Admiral William F. Moran, for example), only one since Hayward has made it to the top.  Further, and right or wrong, so much emphasis in that community is placed on just flying the plane that they seemingly don't display any real interest in either learning either about the rest of the Navy or the Byzantium that is Washington.  Ultimately, this hobbles them.

As for submariners, they have their own problems. They are a vastly insular group and spend their careers almost exclusively in the company of only other submariners. In my career, which included multiple Pentagon tours, as well as many years in the operational fleet, I never once served with a submariner. So, while are all highly trained nuclear engineers, and extraordinarily expert at their own ICBM and sub-hunting business, they essentially know nothing about the rest of the Navy.   They deploy independently of any other ships or aircraft, and while the mixing of aviators and surface warfare officers in the fleet is extensive, submariners are little more than a rumor.  They aren't called the Silent Service for nothing.  

Still, while they demonstrably know nothing about the rest of the Navy – because they stay in their stovepipes - they are smart, and determined, and they grow up to become expert Washingtonians. They know how to get and defend funding, and how to amass political support. They also are smart enough to groom their most upward-bound officers for the position of CNO.   Admiral Greenert, the only submariner CNO of this century – other than Richardson – had command of 7^th Fleet.

As for the surface warfare admirals, they grow up in Washington, DC.  If you are considered for major command as a surface warfare officer – the last key step before flag selection – the selection board will review your record, and unless you have significant duty in D.C., you simply cannot be selected. The question they ask is this: What are you going to do for us after your major command at sea? Unless you are a trained D.C. operative, the senior surface warfare admirals expect that there's no place for you in the flag ranks. Unfortunately, unlike aviators and submariners, surface warfare admirals become largely detached from ships after they make flag, which explains the woeful state of the Navy’s surface ship community – but they do know Washington, and they become expert political infighters. This is why they have ruled the office of CNO in recent decades.

Now we are considering who should become the next CNO. There are commonly thought to be two, what might be called pretenders to the throne: Admiral James W. Kilby, the acting CNO, and Admiral Daryl Caudle who serves as Fleet Forces Command.  

This is a selection of the most critical sort.

After years of top-level inaction, incompetence, and drift, we are at an inflection point.  Some would argue that we are ramping up to a real war at sea with China. Some would argue that war is inevitable, as we back China into a corner, as we did Japan, in 1941. Some would argue that the soft war has already begun. Regardless, the much-vaunted "Pivot to Asia," first espoused by the Obama Administration, seems undetectable as our fleet size continues to dwindle relative to the Chinese. This can no longer be acceptable. While the CNO is not actually responsible for fighting the war, per se, he is one of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the organization to which all fighting commands report. He is also responsible for Navy culture, and that culture has been reflected in the last decade by abysmal recruiting and retention numbers.

One thing is certain:  The residue of the Fat Leonard catastrophe persists. Neither Caudle nor Kilby possesses the desired qualifications. In the case of Kilby, he did command a carrier strike group, but he never commanded a fleet, and he never had a four-star operational command. Further, unlike Caudle who commands Fleet Forces Command, he was never a combatant commander. What Kilby is, is an officer deeply steeped in the morass that is Washingtonian politics. He is stolid, steady, and reliable, and for what it's worth (and today it's not much) he has a sparkling reputation in the fleet – the place that actually cares about warfighting prowess.

As for Caudle, until his arrival at Fleet Forces Command – the four-star command charged with organizing, training, equipping, and maintaining Navy forces to ensure they are ready for deployment and combat – it is not too much of a stretch to say that his record suggests an officer who has never interacted with anyone other than a submariner since his commissioning.   It is not accidental that his professional biography spends its first two paragraphs fully exploring his education, which is admittedly impressive. He is a nuke's nuke. A lead engineer, not a lead Sailor. Like Kilby, Caudle never commanded a Fleet, and he never held a four-star operational command. He also never commanded a Submarine Group. Importantly, his viability as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be dubious at best since he hasn't had an at-sea command since he was a commander (O5).

Neither even comes close to meeting the historic metric evidently required until the advent of Fat Leonard, and Admiral Richardson. Neither is even close. They are competent, but they are not warfighters.

There are current four-star admirals who are fully qualified. For example, Admiral Christopher W. Grady, the Vice Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would be a better selection than either Caudle or Kilby.  Problematically, Admiral Grady is reported to be completely uninterested in the post. Rather, he prefers to go into the private sector at this point of his life. Then there is Admiral Stuart B. Munsch, who heads up Naval Forces, Europe. An adept tactician, strategic thinker, and four-star operational commander, he also possesses deep experience and networks in D.C. circles. Moreover, as a cancer survivor, he displays a grit that has been in short supply.

Having said that, and without any doubt or hesitation, it is Admiral Samuel Paparo, an eminently qualified aviator, steeped in the Pacific Theater, and currently commander of Indo-Pacific Command, who is the only sensible selection to be the next CNO. Paparo was nominated for CNO by Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin in 2023, while serving as Pacific Fleet, only to be left on the table when the Biden Administration instead chose Admiral Franchetti. 

But Paparo won't happen. The Navy is determined, right or wrong, that Caudle will.

Here's the Navy calculus:  The last time, the Navy attempted to tamper with Indo-Pacific command, they received a bloody nose. In 2018, Admiral Philip S. Davidson was scheduled to relieve Admiral Richardson as CNO. However, owing to both the Fat Leonard scandal, and a 2017 series of destroyer collisions in the Pacific, the four-star bench was essentially empty. Greatly amplifying the crisis, Admiral Richardson foolishly elected to sacrifice Admiral Scott Swift, then Commander of Pacific Fleet, to calm the furor growing out of the collisions. Richardson decided to put heads on stakes, and Swift was big enough to get the public to calm down. But with the loss of Swift, (the commander of the Pacific Fleet typically "fleets up" to Indo-Pacific Command which owns the entire region, including all services operating therein), there was no one left who could sensibly step into Indo-Pacific Command. So, the Navy began floating the idea of turning over command of the Pacific to the Air Force. When Senator John S. McCain (R, AZ) discovered this plan, he essentially became apoplectic. McCain threatened the Navy with fire and destruction were they to surrender command of the biggest and most important combat command since the Cold War, especially since the Navy had held the post since inception, and Senator McCain’s father had held the command from 1968-1972.

Admiral Davidson, who had not served in the Pacific Theater since he was a Lieutenant Commander, went to Indo-Pacific Command. As for who was going to relieve Richardson as CNO, the fallback became Admiral Moran – a P-3 pilot, and like Kilby, he was the Vice Chief of Naval Operations. Then, unbelievably, Moran had his own extraordinarily minor scandal, which knocked him out of contention, and that left Gilday to become CNO.

The best man for the job is Paparo, but the Navy is reticent to remove the best warfighter remaining from the Pacific as things heat up. Moreover, Paparo is considered to be a likely choice for the next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, following the currently nominated General Dan Caine, and the Navy wants that.  In short, the Navy just cannot afford to move Paparo. So, despite his glaring shortcomings, it appears that the Navy considers Caudle to be the right man for the job. Why Caudle? Why an admiral who realistically knows nothing about warfighting or the rest of the Navy? Here's your answer: He is thought to be the best choice to attack the ship-building crisis currently occupying and embarrassing the Navy.  He is, after all, a genuine, hard-hat engineer.

In short, the legacy of Fat Leonard continues. Caudle – eminently unqualified - will be the CNO. Not Paparo, not Grady, not Munsch, not Kilby, but Caudle. While the cupboard isn’t completely bare, it’s still close to empty.

There is, however, relief in sight, but not for another four years. Write this down: Following Caudle, the CNO will be Admiral Fred Katcher, who is currently 7th Fleet, and expected to ascend to Pacific Fleet, before assumption of CNO – the first CNO in what will be 15 years to possess the historic chops for the job. Katcher as CNO, Paparo as Chairman. There may be a better tomorrow, but not today. Not yet.

Here's hoping the Chinese can wait for the Navy to wake up.

Captain Furay deployed in every tour and to operational areas in the Middle East, Western and Eastern Asia, Europe, and South America while serving on numerous cruiser and destroyer-type ships. He commanded USS O’Kane (DDG-77) and USS Cape St. George (CG-71) as Air Warfare Commander. He has multiple Pentagon tours and attained a master’s from the Harvard Kennedy School.