Strategic Analysis of Peace

The lodestar of President Donald J. Trump’s foreign policy, “America First," is reminiscent of the concept of raison d'état —the national interests—originated by Cardinal Richelieu, which prioritizes practicality and national interests and has been the basis of international relations for the last three centuries. No president since Theodore Roosevelt has so comprehensively defined America's position in global affairs through the lens of national interests as Donald Trump.

During an interview with Sean Hannity of Fox News on March 5, 2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio made a stunning admission. “And frankly, it’s a proxy war between nuclear powers – the United States, helping Ukraine, and Russia – and it needs to come to an end.  And no one has any idea or any plan to bring it to an end, “he said. 

Secretary Rubio inadvertently identified his primary challenge. The US has assumed the precarious role of mediator between its adversary and its proxy, producing a kind of diplomacy fundamentally incompatible with the US strategic objectives and a host of obstacles impeding the outcome.

The foremost political obstacle facing President Trump is that the involved parties for different reasons, are motivated to prolong the fighting. NATO, in particular, requires conflicts to validate its purpose, as no military alliance can sustain itself without a perceived adversary.

European nations remain steadfast in supporting the war for as long as it takes. France is vying with Germany for supremacy within the European Union, while Britain cannot take off the shackles of nostalgia for the lost imperial glory and is also seeking to assert its diminishing influence in Europe. The leaders of these nations endorse the war as part of their strategic agendas.

Ukraine lacks the capacity to end the hostilities under any realistic scenarios. American proxy Zelensky is a prisoner of crisis; he had himself engineered by relentless efforts to join NATO. The country faces the inevitable loss of territory, a significant reduction in its population, extensive destruction of its infrastructure, and a devastated economy. The potential return of hundreds of thousands of soldiers from the conflict, who will struggle to find employment and support their families, along with the requirement for elections, places Zelensky in a politically dangerous position; hence, he prefers the risk of military defeat to compromise.

There is also the Democratic Party, which openly exhibits its disdain for the President and actively works to undermine every Trump initiative.

In Russia, the propaganda apparatus has fostered the belief that the ongoing conflict represents a confrontation between Russia and a unified Europe, echoing similar confrontations throughout its millennium-long history. It cultivated a public sentiment akin to the renowned World War II song, "We need one victory, one for all; we are ready to pay the price." Nevertheless, Putin is the only one open to peace, albeit on his terms. His demands have been delineated in his numerous statements. The key points include: Ukraine must commit to neutrality, renounces its intention to joint NATO, and must formally recognize Russian claims over annexed territories.

Trump, deeply distrustful of Zelensky, has appointed Steve Witkoff as a special envoy for direct talks with Russia, perhaps to facilitate such an agreement. However, any peace deal reached with Putin will inevitably raise the all-too-familiar specter of collusion. Furthermore, Europeans in a concerted afford with the Democrats to topple Trump, most likely disregard the agreement and persist in their support for Ukraine's military efforts.

Trump possesses a penetrating sense of reality and a powerful vision, but these are rarely sufficient for success. Trump lacks the necessary strategy and experienced diplomatic personnel to develop and execute it.

The peace agreement must be negotiated and signed by the primary parties committed to ending the devastation of war—the United States and Russia. The negotiation process should be guided by strategic considerations rather than the emotions of the moment. The United States must remain mindful that, despite its many shared interests with Russia, time favors Putin. The war is unfolding in his favor, and he does not face the challenges of a hostile Congress or impending midterm elections

To undermine the European pro-war coalition, prevent them from supplying weapons to the war zone, silence the critics, and impose peace by force, if necessary, Trump ought to equate strategic objectives with moral principles.

In this context, Trump must redefine the territorial dispute as a mission to liberate the peoples of Russia, Hungary, Romania, and Poland—those who found themselves trapped within Ukraine’s borders against their will following the chaotic dissolution of the Soviet Union.

While the Russians living in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine were abandoned by the Soviet Government, Poles, Hungarians, and Romanians became victims of the most consequential injustice stemming from the Yalta Conference held in February 1945 in Crimea. During the conference, the leaders of the free world, Roosevelt and Churchill, essentially legitimized the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact by recognizing Soviet dominance over Eastern Europe. Stalin subsequently partitioned Hungary, Romania, and Poland and incorporated these regions into Ukraine.

Following Ukraine's declaration of independence from the Soviet Union, it retained control over territories forcibly annexed by Stalin in 1945. Though Hungary, Romania, and Poland reclaimed their sovereignty, embracing their European cultural heritage, freedom, and identity, millions of their compatriots remained under Ukrainian rule, enduring continued hardship.

The war offers Trump a unique opportunity to redraw the map of Eastern Europe and let Russians, Hungarians, Romanians, and Pols join their historical homelands.

The suggested framework has a solid moral underpinning. Ukraine will end occupation of the territories it acquired due to the Crimea Conference. Carpathian Ruthenia currently referred to as Zakarpattia, will be returned to Hungary, while Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia will be restored to Romania. The region formerly known as Eastern Poland, which includes the city of Lvov (Lviv), will be transferred to Poland.

Crimea, which lacks historical ties to Ukraine, and the Donetsk region—historically designated as Novorossiya and predominantly populated by Russians—will be recognized as parts of Russia.

Ukraine’s refusal to acknowledge these regions as belonging to other countries is of no consequence. Such territorial disputes are not unprecedented; for instance, Japan rejects Russia’s claim over the Kuril Islands, Argentina contests British control of the Falkland Islands, and China refuses to recognize Taiwan’s independence. Likewise, Ukraine may choose to disregard this reality.

Fortunately, the solutions to other issues are relatively straightforward. When it comes to NATO Ukrainian membership, the decision ultimately lies with NATO itself, not Ukraine. Therefore, whether Ukraine renounces its intention to join NATO or not is inconsequential. As a party to the conflict, the United States has a responsibility to commit to preventing Ukraine’s accession to NATO for as long as it remains a member of the alliance.

Ukraine’s demand for security guarantees is disingenuous. Ukraine's security is already guaranteed through its neutral status, in accordance with the 1997 Treaty on Friendship between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. The Treaty clearly addressed the issue of Ukrainian neutrality, as detailed in section 6, page 148:

“Each High Contracting Party shall refrain from participating in, or supporting, any actions directed against the other High Contracting Party and shall not conclude any treaties with third countries against the other Party. Neither Party shall allow its territory to be used to the detriment of the security of the other Party.”

Unfortunately, Ukraine’s leaders never grasped that Moscow saw this Treaty as a key element of Russia’s security and would not allow Ukraine to join NATO without facing consequences for violating its terms. Henceforth, Ukraine's compliance with the 1997 Treaty stands as a crucial safeguard for its own security.

The peace accord linking the territorial disputes to the emancipation of people is poised to garner strong backing from Eastern European nations. By becoming signatories to the peace agreement Eastern Europeans will not only weaken the European pro-war coalition but also jeopardize the cohesion of both NATO and the EU. Furthermore, Poland and Romania—key transit hubs for supplying materiel to the war zone due to their shared border with Ukraine—will obstruct these transfers to uphold the provisions of the accord. As a result, Ukraine and its European allies will find their efforts to prolong the conflict increasingly untenable.

The detractors would find it difficult to critique a peace agreement incorporating the aforementioned provisions and is endorsed by Russia, the United States, Poland, Hungary, and Romania.

The European Union, which upholds territorial integrity as a core European principle among its member states, cannot abdicate its responsibility and must acknowledge that the time has come to reverse Ukraine’s imposition on Hungarians, Romanians, and Poles.

Ultimately, Ukraine will be compelled to accept the terms of the US-Russia agreement, as is often the fate of proxy actors. It will abandon its dream of joining NATO, a prospect that, as we know it now, has never been available to it anyway. The war would end, killing would stop, and Ukrainians would begin rebuilding their country.

Russia would expand its territory and safeguard Crimea, the key element of its security. Poland, Romania, and Hungary are also set to increase their territories. As NATO member states, these countries will contribute to an expansion of NATO's geographical reach and human resources.

The United States will conclude another unnecessary war and shift its focus to more significant political and economic matters. It will be able to obtain control over some natural resources and other valuable assets from Ukraine as compensation for its financial investments associated with the war.

President Trump will be historically recognized not only as a peacemaker akin to President Theodore Roosevelt, who facilitated the Treaty of Portsmouth that ended the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05, earning him the Nobel Peace Prize but also as a liberator of the people of Western Ukraine.

Alexander G. Markovsky was born and educated in the Soviet Union. He earned a Ph.D. in economics and political science from the University of Marxism-Leninism and a Master of Science in structural engineering from Kharkov and Moscow Universities. He is the author of two notable books "Anatomy of a Bolshevik" and "Liberal Bolshevism: America Did Not Defeat Communism, She Adopted It." Furthermore, he contributes to a range of publications, including Newsmax, American Thinker, and The Hill, with his writings featured in the Washington Times, New York Daily, and American Infrastructure.