Restraint or Escalation: America's Nuclear Future?

Some analysts argue that a new international arms-control framework is the best path forward, contending that the only alternative to contrived restraint is escalation and global instability. But does this paradigm actually make sense?

This is a peculiar conclusion. When both the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) and the POR were adopted in December 2010, it was widely understood that New START fully accommodated—and, in practice, endorsed—the forthcoming U.S. nuclear deterrent modernization program. Even supporters of arms control described the POR as consistent with New START. That treaty with Russia reduced deployed strategic nuclear warheads to roughly 1,700–1,800, down from the 1,700–2,200 levels established under the 2002 Moscow Treaty.

First, arms control with Moscow has not necessarily been beneficial. During the 1972-77 SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) agreement and the subsequent 1979 SALT II framework with the Soviet Union, Moscow could increase its long-range strategic nuclear weapons by 600-1,200%, according to a 1983 Net Assessment of Soviet nuclear strategy. This included deploying over 3,000 high-yield, accurate warheads specifically designed to preemptively attack America’s key nuclear triad assets. This “window of vulnerability” widened dramatically during this period, leading to a sharply deteriorating strategic balance between the USA and the Soviet Union, as described by General Richard Ellis, Commander of the Strategic Air Command, in striking testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in early 1981.

Second, the U.S. must always keep in mind that Moscow has routinely cheated on every arms control agreement that it ever signed, including the SALT agreements of the 1970s.

Third, many assume that restraint works. But history is not on their side. President Reagan, not Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter, acquired and deployed Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missile missiles in Europe, which the arms control community widely opposed. Only with these deployments did the US gain the leverage to secure the elimination of all Soviet SS-20 missiles deployed in Europe and in Asia.

In December 1987, the United States and the USSR signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which eliminated thousands of SS-20 warheads. The agreement was historic in that it abolished an entire class of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. Yet even at the time, opponents of the treaty continued to advocate a nuclear freeze, opposed U.S. counter-deployments of regional nuclear weapons, and lobbied for American restraint and retrenchment—restraint that was not reciprocated by the Soviet Union.

Fourth, the START I reduction proposals, officially announced by the Reagan administration in a November 1981 address at the National Press Club, called for the first 50 percent reduction in U.S. long-range strategic nuclear forces. Ironically, when President Reagan first advanced these proposals, they were widely ridiculed by arms-control specialists, who insisted that Moscow would inevitably reject such deep cuts. Instead, the Soviet Union favored agreements like the 1972 and 1979 SALT accords, which permitted substantial growth in Soviet nuclear forces—particularly heavy, first-strike warheads—while relying on U.S. restraint.

President Reagan’s strategy of “peace through strength” ultimately turned the tables on Moscow, particularly after it was fully endorsed by the bipartisan Scowcroft Commission in its 1983 report. Moreover, Reagan’s March 1983 missile defense initiative—known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)—further pressured the Soviet leadership to enter negotiations. This approach was reinforced by Reagan’s clear-eyed understanding of the nature of the regime he confronted, articulated in his March 1983 address to the National Association of Evangelicals, in which he famously described the Soviet Union as an “evil empire.”

President Reagan—and later President George H. W. Bush—proved highly successful, with the first arms-reduction treaties, START I, adopted in January 1991 and START II in January 1993. In particular, START II represented a major breakthrough by banning multiple-warhead land-based missiles—the very Soviet force elements that had created the destabilizing “window of vulnerability” identified more than a decade earlier. By that point, after engaging in sustained economic and strategic competition with the USSR, the United States had made the continuation of the Soviet empire—and the massive military forces required to sustain it—untenable.

Years later, while the arms control community was actively working to dismantle the American-proposed missile defenses, Moscow’s Duma in 1996 rejected the START II treaty despite a plea from US Secretary of Defense Perry to ratify it. Moscow claimed ratification was “problematic” and suggested it should be “set aside.”

Members of the Duma criticized START II as favoring the United States and weakening Russia’s nuclear deterrent by requiring the elimination of MIRVed ICBMs, which they viewed as essential to maintaining parity. Supporters of ratification acknowledged these concerns but argued that Russia lacked the resources to sustain such forces. Many in the Duma also raised broader economic concerns and linked START II to U.S. missile defense plans, warning that missile defenses would further erode Russia’s deterrent once MIRVed ICBMs were eliminated.

Today, the alternative being offered to nuclear modernization—a congressionally mandated effort tied directly to the 2010 ratification of New START—is effectively unilateral disarmament. Under this approach, arms control constraints on adversaries such as Russia and China are ignored or rejected, while unilateral U.S. restraint is enthusiastically embraced.

The clearest example is a proposal advanced by Senators Sanders, Warren, and Markey, which would unilaterally reduce U.S. nuclear forces from the 800 missiles and bombers permitted under New START to just 182—a reduction of more than 77 percent. One is left to ask: where are the corresponding proposals from Beijing or Moscow? Were any such commitments even sought before advancing this plan?

Arms control requires deploying measures that the reluctant party opposes. The brothers mayhem—North Korea, Iran, China, and Russia—have no interest in nuclear restraint. They believe in the coercive use of nuclear weapons—to blackmail their geopolitical adversaries into inaction—as aptly described by the 2023 Strategic Posture Commission of the United States.

Restraint does not work. In 1991, for example, President George H. W. Bush unilaterally withdrew tens of thousands of U.S. regional, or theater, nuclear weapons. Russia did not reciprocate, despite promises to do so. Today, Russia is assessed to possess between roughly 1,900 and 4,000 such theater warheads, while the United States maintains only a few hundred gravity bombs, deployed in limited numbers in certain NATO countries—and none in the Middle East or the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, China fields hundreds of theater-range missiles capable of carrying low-yield nuclear warheads. The 2025 report to Congress on China noted that Beijing has shown little willingness to engage in nuclear risk-reduction discussions, whether bilaterally or multilaterally.

Given the minimal deterrent being proposed by Congressionally based abolitionists, there is no possibility of securing any kind of arms limits with China and Russia. With the USA having such a reduced force, these autocratic nations have no reason to pause their own
massive force modernization, and it would actually embolden them to serially threaten the use of conventional or nuclear force, free from being challenged by any countervailing US nuclear military capability.

Peter R. Huessy is President of Geo-Strategic Analysis and Senior Fellow, National Institute for Deterrent Studies.