Russia Rehearsing Tactics Along NATO's Baltic Frontline

On May 7, several drones originating from Russia entered Latvian airspace. One crashed at an oil storage facility, while Latvian authorities continued efforts to locate another drone believed to have fallen in Rēzekne municipality (Delfi; Latvian Public Media, May 7). Latvian defense officials chose not to intercept the drones due to concerns over civilian safety and critical infrastructure (Latvian Public Media, May 7). The Latvian president and prime minister said that the drone incidents are a consequence of Russia’s war against Ukraine, while the origin of the drone is not yet confirmed (The Baltic Times; Latvian Public Media, May 7).

The repeated incidents reflect a deliberate pattern of Russian pressure on NATO’s frontline. Moscow ultimately views the Baltic region as a key battleground in its broader conflict with the European Union and NATO, expanding from its war against Ukraine, and it considers the Baltic Sea “a potential theater of military operations” (see Jamestown Perspectives, May 27, 2025; see EDM, September 4, 2025).

NATO air defenses are vulnerable irrespective of whether the drones are Russian, involved in strikes against Ukraine, or Ukrainian involved in strikes against Russia. In March, drones originating from Russia crashed across all three Baltic states’ territories, including one that struck a power station in Estonia (Estonian World; LRT, March 25). During the 2025 Christmas period, Polish air defense services intercepted and escorted a Russian reconnaissance plane away from international waters of the Baltic Sea (Polskie Radio, December 25, 2025). The Lithuanian government has recognized that military actions on NATO’s border are more frequent and increasing due to Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine (LRT, March 25).

Rehearsing such tactics in the Baltics before implementing them elsewhere presents real threats to NATO members beyond the frontline. On April 9, U.K. and Norwegian authorities announced the disruption of a Russian military operation aimed at surveying subsea fiber-optic cables in the North Atlantic (Euronews, April 9). During the operation, a Russian attack submarine operated in and around British waters while other specialist vessels conducted nefarious activity near critical underwater infrastructure (U.K. Government, April 9). Russia has been testing this tactic in the Baltic Sea and the Arctic since at least 2021 (see EDM, February 5, 2025). In January 2025, the Silver Dania, a Russian-crewed cargo ship, was detained by Norwegian authorities for suspected acts of sabotage after reports that a fiber-optic cable linking the Swedish island of Gotland to Ventspils, Latvia,  had been damaged (see EDM, February 5, 2025). Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) appear to be collaborating on undersea infrastructure sabotage operations. In October 2023, damage was reported to at least three major undersea infrastructure items in the Baltic Sea, including the Balticconnector Pipeline, a 77-kilometer-long (47.8-mile-long) undersea pipeline in the Gulf of Finland connecting Finland and Estonia. Both the Russian nuclear-powered cargo ship Sevmorput and the Hong Kong-flagged Newnew Polar Bear (formerly the Baltic Fumar) were operating near the locations of the damaged pipeline and cable segments, and departed together (see China Brief, February 14, 2025). In November 2024, two Baltic undersea communications cables were cut, with indications that the PRC vessel Yipeng-3 was acting under the instructions of an unidentified Russian intelligence figure (see China Brief, February 14, 2025).

Russia is rehearsing threats and tactics against NATO by generating and exploiting vulnerabilities across the alliance’s Baltic frontline under real operating conditions. Moscow can maintain deniability in its Baltic operations so long as its war against Ukraine continues. With the threat entrenched along NATO’s frontline, Moscow’s continued ability to derail meaningful negotiations with Ukraine creates space to extend these tactics further.

Anna J. Davis is Fellow of Eurasia Studies at the Jamestown Foundation and a contrinuting editor of Eurasia Daily Monitor. She is an expert on nuclear energy policy and international relations, with a focus on the Eurasia region and the Arctic.

This article appeared originally at The Jamestown Foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor.