A Tripartite World – Sort Of…

Project 2025, as detailed in its "Mandate for Leadership," advocates for a significant shift in U.S. foreign policy, moving away from the traditional liberal international order towards a more unilateral and assertive approach. The plan emphasizes prioritizing national sovereignty and interests over multilateral engagements and international alliances.​

• Reevaluation of International Commitments: The document calls for a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of U.S. participation in international organizations, suggesting a potential withdrawal from entities deemed not directly beneficial to American interests. This includes questioning support for various United Nations agencies and proposing the elimination of what it considers "wasteful spending" in foreign aid programs. ​
• Restructuring Foreign Aid: Project 2025 proposes overhauling the U.S. international aid and development sector to make it more competitive against global initiatives from countries like China. This includes renaming and refocusing agencies such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to concentrate on areas like global health, food security, and disaster response, while integrating them more closely within the State Department. ​
• Emphasis on Military Strength: The plan underscores the need for the U.S. to maintain global military dominance, advocating for increased defense spending and a more confrontational stance towards perceived adversaries, notably China and Russia. It promotes a "peace through strength" doctrine, suggesting that a robust military presence is essential for deterring aggression and protecting national interests.
• Reducing Engagement in Global Climate Initiatives: Project 2025 recommends a "whole-of-government unwinding" of climate policies, including withdrawing from international agreements like the Paris Accord and its parent treaty, the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This move would position the U.S. outside global climate governance structures, aligning with the plan's broader skepticism towards multilateral commitments. ​

Bottom line up front (BLUF):

Discussion:

• End the war in Ukraine. Presently, Russia is a pariah nation existing outside the rest of the world order. The vision calls for Russia to be one of the great powers ruling the world order,[i] and the Administration would like to open diplomatic and economic relations with Russia to help put that in place. However, the Administration can’t make a case for this with an active war going on in Ukraine. So, the war must end. On any terms. I don’t think the Administration really cares what the terms are, they just need the fighting to stop so that they can proceed with re-establishing diplomatic and economic relations with Russia, thereby bringing Russia back into the world order.
• Russia. Russia faces rapid and accelerating demographic collapse, with a unique form of government: part dictatorship, part kleptocracy, and part oligarchy. But it is rich in natural resources, it has lots of nukes, and one should never underestimate the ability of the average Russian to accept poor rule and withstand physical, political, psychological, and economic hardship. “I am an adherent of the theory that baked deep into the Russian national security consciousness is the idea that their national security is only ensured by controlling the land invasion routes into Mother Russia.”[ii]  So, Russia will always pose some level of threat to its “near abroad” neighbors.
• China. Yes, the Administration has levied tariffs on Chinese products, but surprisingly, they aren’t picking on China much. The Administration fancies itself as a deal maker, and once it gets Russia set up, and locks up North America (more on that later), it will want to make a deal with China to carve out mutually agreed upon spheres of influence. Taiwan will be on the negotiating table, as will treaty allies Thailand and the Philippines – the good news here is that I don’t believe China will ever invade Taiwan – they won’t need to. ASEAN will likely go along with whatever the U.S. and China decide, especially if they are able to retain their political independence.[iii]  China is headed toward rapid demographic and (I believe) economic collapse, which will sorely test its government: I wouldn’t rule out societal collapse or civil war.  And they have a growing number of nukes.
• Europe. The vision for Europe is it will be a natural resources customer for Russia (think natural gas), a market for Chinee and U.S. products, and a quaint tourist destination for rich Americans, Russians, and Chinese.  Yeah, that ain’t gonna’ work. After the end of the Cold War, Europe tried working with Russia, and Russia invaded and occupied Transnistria (1992), invaded and occupied part of Georgia (2008), seized the Crimea (2014), and then invaded Ukraine outright (2022). Europe doesn’t trust Russia, and rightfully so: note that the invasion and occupation of Transnistria occurred when Russian Atlanticists were still competing for the geopolitical future of Russia. My earlier point about Russian strategic insecurity is paramount.
• NATO. The Administration has already cast significant doubt on the idea that the U.S. would honor any Article V commitment to come to the aid of another NATO member nation that has been attacked and has floated the idea in the past of the U.S. formally withdrawing from NATO. The deterrence value of a collective security organization like NATO resides in everyone – members and non-members alike – believing that all members are committed to the alliance. The U.S. is clearly not committed to the alliance, no one knows if the U.S. would come to another NATO nation’s aid, and so NATO is no longer an effective deterrence organization. NATO will eventually dissolve.
• European Union (EU). I don’t believe the EU sees Europe as “just a tourist destination” and willing supplicant of the U.S., Russia, and China. While there is great overlap between the countries that make up the EU and NATO, it is not a perfect overlap.[iv]  And although the EU has been moving slowly towards adding a security dimension to their primarily economic and political alliance, they aren’t there yet. It appears, however, that recent diplomatic moves by the US to try to end the war in Ukraine will leave Russia an even greater threat to the security of Europe. The EU seems to have recognized this, as they recently approved a massive increase in defense spending across the Union. It is significant that this was an EU, and not a NATO, decision, and I assess the EU will move even faster towards establishing a functional security element.[v]   Should NATO formally collapse, I believe the majority of the non-U.S. members of NATO will fall in with the EU into a new collective security organization.
• U.S. sphere of influence. The vision here is that U.S. territory will extend from Greenland to Guam, and from the Mexico border to the North Pole, with the Panama Canal in U.S. hands to ensure U.S. control of trade via that route.
• • Taking over the Panama Canal Zone should go smoothly: the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) conducts military exercises every year with the Panamanian defense forces, so they all know each other, and they know how this will go operationally. My assessment is that when ordered to seize the Canal Zone, Admiral Holsey will call up his Panamanian counterpart and convince him that it is in Panama’s best interest to roll over on this one.
  • Greenland is a different story: Greenland doesn’t want to become part of the U.S., and Denmark doesn’t support that idea, either. Attacking Greenland or Denmark militarily will trigger NATO Article V commitments within the alliance, and no one knows what happens then. Another open question is what the U.S. military will do: taking over the Canal Zone is one thing, but attacking a NATO ally that poses no security threat to the U.S., who already hosts U.S. military bases in Greenland, and who has invited the U.S. to station whatever U.S. forces they want in Greenland to protect U.S. security interests, well…no one knows how that order would be received.
  • There is another relevant issue associated with the U.S. use of military force: after the Principals Committee meeting on Signal regarding the Houthis, everyone in the U.S. military knows – repeat, knows - that the Secretary of Defense himself – repeat, himself – cannot be trusted to secure classified information – nor can the Director of the CIA, the Director of National Intelligence, the National Security Advisor, or the Vice President – so they know that any military operation they engage in has more than likely already been compromised.
  • There is a final point to be made about the U.S., its sphere of influence, and its national power: the U.S. is rapidly shedding both its security and economic partners, so while it will still be a great power, the US will never again be as powerful in absolute terms as it is today.
•  
• India. Left out of this vision is the most populated country in the world. Of the four great powers, the only one that has the potential to grow in strength is India. They just seem to be having trouble getting their act together, and “non-alignment” runs deep in their national character. And they have nukes. I wouldn’t want to be Pakistan in the future, because I don’t see any of the other great powers caring much about their future.
• Japan and South Korea. Both U.S. allies. Both geographically close to China and Russia (Japan is technically still at war with Russia, a remnant of the last World War). Both large trading partners with China. Both threatened by North Korea (Japan much less so). While Russia is less of an issue, both are going to have to figure out how to live within China’s geographic sphere of influence, and both will have to provide for their own security vis a vis North Korea, because I don’t see the U.S. maintaining that commitment for long.
• Canada. It is the stated position of this Administration that Canada will become, through economic coercion, if necessary, a member of the U.S. as its 51^st state.[vi]  Fantastic as this statement would appear to be, that is the Administration’s position, and it is entirely consistent with the vision outlined above.  Coupled with tariffs imposed on it by its closest economic partner, Canada is not happy. With the likely dissolution of NATO, Canada will likely turn to the EU in some sort of security arrangement. This will not be well received by the U.S.
• Israel. Israel is rapidly working its way into strategic isolation, with its only real friend being the U.S., and it lives in a dangerous neighborhood. And it has nukes. The U.S. will likely lose its existing bases in Spain and the Mediterranean Sea, so it will become a lot harder for the U.S. to continue supporting Israel’s security.
• Iran. Iran will cozy up to both Russia and China. It will eventually acquire nukes.
• Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia will continue to balance the U.S., China, and Russia. I would not count on the US continuing to guarantee the security of oil shipments out of the Gulf of Arabia (Persian Gulf?), but I think much of that function is being performed by China now anyway, both diplomatically and economically. Saudi Arabia and the member nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) will have to figure out a future relationship with Iran, as I see the U.S. becoming less involved in the region. If Iran gets nukes, Saudi Arabia will, too – heck, they might anyway.
• North Korea. The Ukraine war has breathed new life into the North Korea-Russia relationship, and that seems to be growing.[vii]  North Korea’s challenge will be to try and please both China and Russia, both of whom, I would think, would urge North Korea to not get into a shooting war with South Korea.
• Turkey. Frustrated in its efforts to join the EU, and still a strategic competitor with Greece (an EU member), with the dissolution of NATO Turkey will likely fall in with Russia. With Greece and Turkey no longer both in the same security alliance, I see future conflict between the two to be almost inevitable.
• Australia/New Zealand. These two countries are geopolitically on the outs with the rest of this new world order, but that might work in their favor. I don’t think China cares about them much, other than as trading partners, especially if they are no longer militarily aligned with the U.S. As long as the U.S., Russia, or India doesn’t try to claim them in some way as a means of gaining a strategic advantage in the region, I think China will just leave them alone. They could end up as the most neutral, non-aligned, and secure countries in the world!

A former boss used to lecture us about “norms, standards, rules, and laws,” a useful framework in trying to understand how people, organizations, and nations deal with one another. Now we have a situation where the world’s only superpower is actively working to not just disrupt but destroy the norms, standards, rules, and laws the world has operated under for decades. Such a period of rapid change is a recipe for anarchy, chaos, confusion, and unrest, and will undoubtedly be characterized by friction and conflict – the world will be lucky to escape without another world war.

Notes: