The Xi before Xi

With slightly over a year to go to before the next national congress of China’s Communist Party, held every five years, China watchers are again busy updating their files on Xi Jinping, China’s enigmatic leader.

But there are many unknowns. Will Xi in his next term maintain his tight grip on power, supported by a small group of trusted allies? Or will he acknowledge that an eventual leadership transition is inevitable and take steps to put his own stamp on the next generation of party leaders? Much will depend on whether Xi allows potential successors to be appointed to top party positions, something he has so far carefully avoided.

In The Party’s Interests Come First, Joseph Torigian provides an authoritative biography of Xi Jinping’s father, Xi Zhongxun. Torigian’s thoroughly researched book also sheds light on events that have shaped Xi Jinping. Torigian is a professor at the School of International Service at American University and a research fellow at Stanford University. He has written widely on elite politics in China and Russia.

This was particularly true of Xi Jinping. His early years were sheltered and privileged thanks to his father’s high status. The elder Xi’s list of achievements is remarkable. He helped to establish Mao Zedong’s communist base in Yan’an in the 1930s, served at the right hand of senior leaders Zhou Enlai in the 1950s and Hu Yaobang in the 1980s, initiated the special economic zones that spearheaded China’s economic reforms, and led efforts to control China’s Tibetan, Uyghur and Mongolian minorities.

In 1962, when Xi Jinping was just nine, his privileges ended. In the paranoid atmosphere of the time, Xi Zhongxun was accused of leading an ‘anti-party clique’ and purged from the leadership. He spent the next 16 years in internal exile, first managing a remote tractor factory, and later incarcerated and persecuted by Red Guards (Maoist youth of the Cultural Revolution). He was only fully rehabilitated in 1978, after Mao’s death. As a result of Xi Zhongxun’s fall from grace, his family lost its special status, and amid the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution his eldest daughter killed herself.

During the Cultural Revolution, Xi Jinping himself spent seven years working in a remote village. However, upon returning to Beijing, his mother used her connections to get him appointed as personal secretary to Vice Premier Geng Biao, who later became defence minister. This kickstarted the younger Xi’s political career.

Xi Zhongxun spent much of his life working on economic reforms. His views were not hardline, but he was loyal to the party line. The 1989 demonstrations at Tiananmen square, however, put this loyalty to the test.

In his capacity as the first vice-chairman of the National People’s Congress (NPC), China’s rubber-stamp legislature, Xi Zhongxun spoke out against the suppression of the demonstrations proposed by Premier Li Peng. However, unlike Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang who was quickly ousted for his conciliatory views, Xi Zhongxun ultimately came out in support of the imposition of martial law. Nonetheless, the crackdown marked the end of his political career.

In the months that followed, Xi Zhongxun reportedly behaved erratically at NPC meetings and had several bitter exchanges with Li Peng. Li Rui, a former secretary to Mao Zedong, attributed these outbursts to ‘several years of pent-up resentment’.

Just three months after Tiananmen, Xi Zhongxun stopped going to NPC meetings. The following year he moved to Guangdong and only returned to Beijing nine years later, after Deng Xiaoping’s death. It remains unclear whether Xi Zhongxun’s move was voluntary, but several sources confirm that he was ‘dispatched’ to Guangdong by Deng.

Torigian concludes with a fascinating chapter on the potential influence of the elder Xi on his son. He reminds us that loyalty to the party and the family are not synonymous. For many princelings, including Xi Jinping, loyalty to the CCP has taken precedence over the grudges and antagonisms of their parents’ generation. At the same time, Torigian wonders whether Xi Jinping’s concentration of power is an explicit rejection of his father’s concern with the dangers of autocracy.

Robert Wihtol is an adjunct faculty member at the Asian Institute of Management and former Asian Development Bank country director for China and director general for East Asia.

Image: Chinese President Xi Jinping, left, younger brother Xi Yuanping, middle, and father Xi Zhongxun, right. This family photo was taken in 1958, before the Cultural Revolution changed things in the late 1960s. (Wikipedia Commons: People's Daily)

AI contributed no ideas to this article – Robert Wihtol.

This article appeared originally at The Strategist (ASPI).