It’s clear from the increasingly bellicose actions of the People’s Republic of China that the PRC seeks to return to its self-appointed role as the “Middle Kingdom” at the center of the world. To do this it must supplant the United States, both economically and militarily, by becoming the preeminent power on the world stage—at which point it will be able to rewrite the rules of the existing world order established by America after World War II.

For decades, Taipei’s security has leaned on three pillars: its relationship with the United States, the Taiwanese armed forces, and the island’s renowned ‘silicon shield.’ However, as the global order shifts, the reliability of these safeguards is becoming increasingly uncertain. Decades after Taiwan ended its clandestine nuclear weapons program in 1988, the changing geopolitical environment raises questions on whether Taipei should reconsider nuclear deterrence.

The growing uncertainty surrounding U.S.-Taiwan relations is a clear warning sign for Taipei. Unlike South Korea and Japan, Taiwan lacks a formalized military alliance with Washington. Instead, U.S. policy toward Taiwan has traditionally rested on the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 and a policy of strategic ambiguity. For Taipei this policy has been a double-edged sword, on the one hand serving as a potent deterrent by forcing China to weigh the high risk of a U.S. kinetic intervention without knowing the exact threshold or scale of that response, but simultaneously creating uncertainty for Taiwan’s strategic planning.