Focus on Qatar: Armies Upgrading on the Double

Even though Sunni countries claim to form a brotherhood, relationships between them can sometimes see sharp spikes in tension, as Qatar painfully experienced in 2017, when it fell victim to a blockade enforced by most of its neighbors in the Arabian peninsula. As Defense minister Khalid bin Mohamed Al Attiyah had then stated:

. . . His statements, moreover, highlighted how these tensions, usually of the cold type, were intrinsic to Qatar’s relations to its neighbors.

Now that this dispute seems put to rest, it is now the turn of Iran - who had, at the time, provided food to Qatar, sensing a diplomatic opportunity - to be the source of concern. Qatar is by no means the only country in the region to be buying large amounts of high-grade conventional military equipment: Iran grows more capable every year and is already acting upon this newly founded power. 

Iran’s desire to be the regional power is news to no one: this ambition was at the core of the Iraq-Iran war in the 1980s. But with Tehran closing the technical and technological gap which separates it from regional domination, potential ramifications of Iran’s power may go well beyond the immediate Iraqi neighbor and nemesis, in the future.

This interference goes all the way to military support to rebel groups in Yemen, indicating that Iranian influence and prevalence is growing in all directions. No doubt has the dramatic development of Iranian drone technology both permitted and encouraged this new offensive phase. Analyst Diego Laje writes:

“Iran commands an arsenal of unmanned aerial devices that it developed using a wide variety of tactics, combining engineering, reverse engineering and sheer shrewdness. [...] With extra resources, the military set up a network of companies and research centers to acquire, develop, deploy, and evolve these weapons.” 

Until recently, virtually all nations in the area had similar defense strategies to guarantee their general security. Purchasing equipment from Western powers was simultaneously a way to secure good quality platforms and reinforce diplomatic ties with the selling country - quite frequently the United States. Western equipment would then not only enable the buying country to ensure the first tier of its own security, but also increase the chances of Western assistance if self-defense means were to prove insufficient.

But Western powers tend to turn their eyes towards the East, once more, and therefore away from the Middle East - a prospect which can further push Iran to consider itself free to operate and roam the region. Additionally, Qatar is showing awareness of the finite nature of its oil-driven economic power, which is bound to run dry eventually. When it does, Qatar knows it needs to have achieved a robust and diversified economy and severed itself from its passive-income to maintain its status beyond the windfall. In his inaugural speech in 2013, Emir Al Thani had stated:

“We  will  continue,  dear  Brothers,  our  keenness  on  advancing  the  national economy,  developing  services,  constructing  public  facilities,  and  upgrading youth and sports sector. Also we will give an attentive care to our investment for future generations, and diversify  the  sources  of  income  of  the  State  of Qatar . . .” 

One of the ways to address this challenge is to morph its existing defense ecosystem from a buyer’s market to an industrial one - partially at least, at the beginning. Doha seeks to acquire the engineering and industrial capacity to address needs and design programs (a tall order if there was one). The conversion lies in shifting from buying on-the-shelf equipment, whatever the cost may be, from foreign suppliers, to understanding integration requirements and the complexities and pitfalls of complex industrial programs - such as those which Qatar acquires on a regular basis. 

Despite its modest geographic and demographic size, Doha is considered one of the most potent military forces in the area, both on paper and increasingly in reality, thanks to a well-funded and well-managed procurement policy. 

In the past decade, Qatar has purchased the latest generation of AH-64E attack helicopters (with AGM and Stinger missiles) and C17 Globemaster aircrafts, to address the entire spectrum of threats, domestic and foreign, and extend its reach in the region. The C17 transport aircraft can transport nearly 80 tons of payload at a higher speed (Mach .75) and to a longer range (over 2000 nautical miles) than its prop-driven counterparts. It is currently used as a main transport aircraft by the US Air force. The AH-64 is, despite the age of its design, one of the world’s most advanced attack helicopters thanks to its permanent upgrade. This force is completed with latest-generation NH90 helicopters and 2 billion euros worth of Raytheon Patriot missile systems. 

Qatar is currently working on several new acquisition projects, such as the order to Italian Fincantieri for four multi-purpose surface vessels (with production and delivery underway, the third ship was delivered in December of 2022). Doha has also been considering the acquisition of several hundred infantry fighting vehicles, a military capacity it currently lacks to guarantee the coherence of its armed mechanized units - something the war in Ukraine is highlighting as vital, as Land forces chief Major General H E Saeed Hussain Al Khayarin is bound to be aware of. The Germans wish to push their Boxer IFV, in a move to position themselves as exclusive suppliers of land forces, but the French VBCI option is still under consideration. Both platforms are of recent and high-quality design, but the VBCI has the double advantage of being thoroughly combat-proven and offering the CTA40 turret option in its latest version. The brainchild of Anglo-French joint engineering, CTA40 weapons offer the dual advantage of excellent anti-armor penetration and potency against drones, which are widespread in Ukraine and also increasingly in the Arabian peninsula.  

Qatar is already working on building its new domestic production capacity. Qatari agency Barzan has been in charge, so far, of selecting the best equipment for its military forces, and dealing with supplier interactions. Defense Here writes:

“Barzan Holdings is responsible for empowering the military capabilities of the Qatari Armed Forces. The company achieves this by partnering with leading international companies and organizations in the defense field and acts as a commercial gateway for the defense industry in Qatar.”  

France may help in achieving the next industrial stage, focusing on procurement program management. Doha has already been in touch with France’s main industrial military firms, from Nexter to Dassault or Naval Group, regarding its many military acquisition programs. Both countries are currently exploring a further step with the support of France’s defence procurement agency, the Direction Générale de l’Armement (DGA). The Délégation Générale de l’Armement is in charge of coordinating and integrating all producers involved in defense programs and ensures a successful industrial outcome. If called upon, it could help Qatar start building on program-management skills and assist in Qatar’s industrial transition. 

Donald Ramsay is an Independent organizational consultant. Specializing in Defense and Security sectors, by passion and by profession.