
Competition – Our Advantage – Essential to Defending America
Last updated 05:59 AM EST • Read time: 6m
American thought leaders as diverse as Nancy Pearcey, President Herbert Hoover, and General Peter J. Schoomaker have extolled the virtues of competition.
Drawing from their various works and statements, several themes emerge: Competition is always a good thing. It forces us to do our best. It protects the consumer, and it is an incentive to progress. The absence of competition renders us complacent and satisfied with mediocrity, and complacency is the biggest killer on the modern battlefield.
This is a bit of paraphrasing, but the concepts are as relevant to the development and acquisition of major weapon systems as it is in competitive sports and business. The complexity of today's battlefield demands the Department of Defense consider a variety of approaches to provide the warfighter advanced capabilities and challenge industry to demonstrate these capabilities in a competitive environment.
Competition in the development of weapon systems drives research and innovation. When coupled with a competitive demonstration of capabilities, it offers the Department of Defense (the consumer) a relative level of assurance that the requirements are attainable and future investment is appropriate. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and some of the Services, in varying respects, seem to be embracing the spirit and benefits of competition.
"Fly-before-you buy" rolls off the tongue of program managers, but this strategy is rarely applied in the early phases of major acquisition programs. The Army's Lower Tier Air & Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS) and Precision Strike Missile, and the Air Force's F-22 are noteworthy exceptions. These programs are prime examples of programs borne of competition in development and which concluded in a successful, competitive demonstration of capabilities on a test range. The competitors for each contract brought their proto-types to the range and demonstrated their capabilities, which informed the down-selection process and enabled advancement to the next phase of development.
All three programs are examples of successful acquisition programs. The F-22 is unmatched on the battlefield today, and the Precision Strike Missile and LTAMDS are on a fast track to deliver advanced capabilities to the warfighter in the very near term.
The Missile Defense Agency's Next Generation Interceptor (NGI), a key element in upgrading the U.S. Homeland's Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, is another program embracing a competitive developmental approach but only in a limited fashion. MDA has said it would like to carry NGI's competition through the Critical Design Review phase of development, but as a cost and schedule saving technique, MDA has only funded competition through the Preliminary Design Review phase. This means that, at best, the competing contractors will have only demonstrated capabilities to the component level, not the system level.
Before Critical Design Review, only subsystem tests are conducted. This means competitors will have proven that their individual components work, but not their interceptors. Instead, a flight test, even one without a target, would provide MDA - 1) a greater level of assurance that the components function in the anticipated operating environment as an integrated system and 2) key insights into the competitors' designs, to inform the down-selection process and further investment. A flight test increases confidence, and a series of flight tests would prove capability and greatly decrease risk.
Some may recommend curtailing competition and an early down-selection in a program's lifecycle as a cost-savings measure. Certainly, it costs money to keep two competitors on contract. But in the end, concluding the competition too early in the development process could prove more costly than not keeping both on contract through a flight test.
The Air Force’s KC-46 and F-35 programs, where early down-select decisions were made, offer case studies of acquisition cost overruns and estimates of annual sustainment costs that are billions over the original budgets. A 2021 report found the KC-46 has exceeded $5 billion in cost overruns on its initial $4.9 billion contract, and the F-35 ‘s excessive sustainment cost estimate may drive a reduction in the number of aircraft procured.
The KC-46 acquisition approach was to integrate proven, aerial refueling component-level technology onto an FAA-certified 767 commercial airframe. The approach, in theory, offered great savings. But 10 years after the early down-selection, the KC-46 still struggles with subsystem performance, and a Department of Defense Inspector General's report cited inadequate testing and demonstration of capability. Certainly, subsystem capability – the kind demonstrated at the Critical Design Review stage – did not lead to successful overall performance in the case of the KC-46.
GMD has been more of a "buy-before-you-fly" program and, in many respects, has demonstrated the challenges and shortcomings of that acquisition approach. NGI follows on the heels of two canceled efforts to upgrade GMD's ground-based interceptors, and it is scheduled for fielding in 2028. But there is also discussion among some policymakers of accelerating this timeline.
Let us not repeat the sins of the past and rush to field a missile defense system before there is a firm level of assurance of its capabilities and reliability. Applying lessons learned from GMD's past struggles, the Department of Defense and Congress should extend NGI's competition to validate each interceptor's capabilities. While it might cost several hundred million more dollars to take two competing interceptors through Critical Design Review, it would certainly reduce risk and potentially save billions in the life of the program.
Congress appears to be on the right path. The FY22 NDAA authorizes MDA to develop a highly reliable GMD interceptor and a plan for conducting annual reliability testing for the Next-Generation Interceptor. The bill language also ensures at least one test a year in an operational setting for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system.
The Pentagon should leverage the NDAA's language and funding. Congress should support modifying the NGI acquisition strategy to extend competition beyond Critical Design Review and add a competitive interceptor flight test, i.e., a true fly-off, to the down-selection process.
Mustering the political will to prolong the NGI competition is essential. Policymakers must ask themselves: Is it not better to invest test funding on the future interceptor than the fleet it will replace? In this case, the risk that developmental testing "buys down" is not simply program risk, it is the risk to our nation's existence.
MG Francis G. Mahon (U.S. Army, Ret.) is an independent aerospace defense contractor and an adviser for Stellar Solutions. He previously served as Director for Strategy, Policy and Plans at North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command; Director for Test at the Missile Defense Agency; and Director for Materiel on the Army Staff.
Brig Gen John Shapland (U.S. Air Force, Ret.) is the Senior Director for Innovation, Operations and Exercises for Stellar Solutions, and an independent contractor conducting developmental flight test instruction at British and French test pilot schools. He previously served as Director of Air and Space Operations for Air Force Material Command.

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