Hypersonic Weapons – A Threat to National Security

As evidenced by numerous media accounts and Department of Defense (DoD) senior leaders’ comments, the impact and challenges posed by hypersonic missile systems are a growing and extremely complex threat to our national interests.  Hypersonic weapons are highly maneuverable, travel many times the speed of sound, and allow for the destruction of targets anywhere in the world in less than an hour.  Potential targets range from leaders of terrorist organizations to a nation’s critical command and control facilities.  In March 2018, General John Hyten, commander of U.S. Strategic Command stated before the Senate Armed Services Committee, “We [U.S.] don’t have any defense that could deny the employment of such a weapon [hypersonic missiles] against us.”

During a recent Hypersonics Senior Leader Executive Forum, Dr. Michael Griffin, Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering further stated…“In the last year, China has tested more hypersonic weapons than we have in a decade…If Russia were to invade Estonia or China were to attack Taiwan tomorrow, it would be difficult to defend against their strike assets”.  The recently released Missile Defense Review acknowledges the threat associated with hypersonic technology and highlights the need for a space sensor layer to track weapons through all phases of flight.  Currently, 23 Nations have demonstrated varying degrees of expertise in hypersonic technology…a number that continues to grow daily. 

Current Activities

Hypersonic Imperatives

1. The need for a "space sensor layer," now known as the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS), is viewed by many as one of the most immediate and critical requirements to address hypersonic threats.  Given the limitations of line-of-sight terrestrial sensors, defense department leaders have frequently lamented the challenges of tracking threat vehicles through all phases of flight.  Currently, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and other organizations are actively engaged in HBTSS's concept design phase to detect and track emerging (and evolving) threats using persistent infrared sensors. On-orbit sensor options, like HBTSS, will significantly enhance our engagement opportunities and probabilities of success.  Additionally, future architectures must include the integration of both space-based and terrestrial sensors to permit on-orbit track processing, while reducing reliance on ground stations and the associated time implications.  Finally, the timely "reseeding" of on-orbit assets will be critical to achieving the necessary levels of resilience and redundancy.
2. Our current fleet of joint interceptors are limited in range, altitude, and the ability to defeat evolving threat systems.  In fact, the majority of our current interceptors are primarily focused on the terminal phase of flight.  Only the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Interceptor (GBI) and to a limited degree, the AEGIS Standard Missile interceptor provide mid-course defense opportunities.  Although a “universal interceptor” may be cost prohibitive or currently technologically unfeasible, two or three interceptor classes could be upgraded to cover potential gaps as an interim solution.  In addition, DOD must leverage promising kinetic and non-kinetic options to address the ever-creasing advances in hypersonic technology.  For example, the linking or “talking” of future interceptors to on-orbit sensors (and other interceptors) will significantly enhance our ability to defeat new and sophisticated threat systems.  This expanded capability will also assist in addressing many of the services’ multi-domain challenges.
3. The development of an effective and responsive Battle Management Command, Control, and Communication and Intelligence (BMC3I) system has long been the goal of the air and missile defense community.  BMC3I allows the warfighter to plan, execute, control, and sustain combat operations, especially in response to complex environments (e.g., raids of threat missile systems).  Given the speed, maneuverability, and the unpredictable nature of hypersonic weapons, current BMC3I systems are likely to be quickly overwhelmed.  In response to these challenges, changes are required to shorten response times by exploiting autonomous BMC3I activities.  Again, our BMC3I systems must be capable of processing and directing engagements more quickly than our current C2 ground station construct.  Ideally, the goal is to achieve an effective layered defense while minimizing gaps in coverage and providing opportunities for re-tasking of incoming targets (e.g., Shoot, Assess, Shoot).
4. Related to BMC3I is the issue of integration or the assimilation of sensors and shooters to optimize the capabilities of individual AMD systems. The introduction of hypersonic weapons further accentuates the need to fully exploit the capabilities of our current and future missile defense systems.  Any discussion of integration must also include non-kinetic options like directed energy (DE), cyber, and electronic warfare (EW) that expand our ability to attack threat systems in all phases of flight, especially during the boost phase.  In addition to potential cost savings, non-kinetic options have been successfully tested at White Sands Missile Range against unmanned aerial vehicles and indirect fire munitions.  The Navy has incorporated DE capabilities in its ship defense operations.  In addition to extreme speeds and maneuverability, hypersonic weapons operate in a wide spectrum of altitude regimes, ranging from very low to exo-atmospheric.  As mentioned, the lack of a “universal” interceptor capable of operating in multiple altitude regimes and over extended ranges, both at sea and over land, highlights the need for integrated missile defense.  Unfortunately, many of our AMD systems were developed without stringent (and enforced) standards to fully integrate with other systems.  Future efforts must address this lack of oversight.
5. As we all know, there are many claimants for finite DoD resources. The continuing challenge for the department is to balance readiness requirements with the need to   The challenge is further exacerbated when dealing with highly complex weapon systems and the issue of obsolescence.  The introduction of hypersonics from both an offensive and defensive perspective, stresses the importance of modernization and the development of new technologies in response to emerging threats.  For AMD operations, the cost-per-intercept continues to be an area of concern, especially when dealing with threats requiring multiple interceptors to achieve an acceptable probability of success (e.g., probability of kill).  In response to this dilemma, senior leaders are appropriately considering both doctrinal and technology solutions.  From left of launch discussions to materiel solutions addressing all phases of flight, DoD is evaluating many options to address the threat of hypersonic weapons.  Bottom line: future AMD systems must provide warfighters with responsive, flexible, and integrated systems in a sustainable manner.

Way Ahead