Nuclear Deterrent Choices

The United States Congress has 465 House and Senate members up for election in November 2026 with a predicted  60 new members promised just from current retirements and other open seats. The new Congress will face having to assess and pass a defense budget as well as implicitly approve a national security strategy embedded in such a budget. Of critical importance will be the nuclear deterrent direction the new Congress decides to take as there will probably be very starkly different choices on the table.

That United States POC, given the subsequent Russian and Chinese nuclear expansions, has been modified with additional programs, with significant additions now approved by this current Congress which largely followed the recommendations of the Strategic Posture Commission of the United States October 2023 report.

All the modern nuclear force will cost $25 billion in the FY2026 defense budget, with an additional increase of $5.9 billion in the NNSA budget, out of a total $58-60 billion investment for both modernization and legacy force maintenance.

Both House and Senate members, including Senators Sanders, (I-Vt), Warren (D-MA), Markey (D-MA) and Representative Garamendi, (D-Ca) have introduced legislation to unilaterally curtail the planned POR, including major elements of the U.S. nuclear deterrent and the Golden Dome missile defense. Their proposals would pursue a strange hybrid combination of unilateral restraint and outright abolition, giving the U.S. the smallest deterrent in 75 years, a nearly absent regional extended nuclear deterrent, and a relatively minimalist missile defense capability. Despite that the current U.S. nuclear forces have already been in service between 43-63 years, making the U.S. nuclear forces the oldest in U.S. deterrent history.

First their proposals would eliminate all space-based elements of missile defense, which would discard the very backbone of the new and advanced missile defense technology now being developed.

Second, they would eliminate 250 of the 400 Minuteman III missiles, eliminate the new Sentinel ICBM altogether, ensuring that after the next two decades the U.S. would largely be out of the nuclear deterrent ICBM business as the legacy Minuteman missiles, now 55 years in service, will have to be taken down having reached obsolescence.

Third, the new Columbia class submarine acquisition would be reduced to as low as four subs, from the 12-15  planned submarines, that even with a 50% at sea deployment rate would allow the U.S. to field only one submarine per each of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, with 32 missiles and roughly 246 warheads having to hold at risk a target set many times larger.

Fourth, the plan envisioned by Senators Sanders and Markey would eliminate all strategic bombers from the U.S. nuclear deterrent, leaving the U.S. with 152 combined ICBM silos and submarine bases, and over time a Monad of just two Navy bases with two submarines at sea or only 4 targets/assets that if eliminated would put the U.S. out of the nuclear business. Eventually, Russia and China combined would have one thousand strategic, long—range warheads for every U.S. nuclear launch asset, compared to 6 to 1 today.

However, the Congressional abolition crowd wants to go even further. The proposals would eliminate the extended nuclear deterrent capability the U.S. has in Europe, consisting of gravity bombs aboard theater aircraft, as well as eliminating any funding for additional theater systems including cruise missiles aboard aircraft and submarines, such as the nuclear armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N.)

As for pit production, a joint House-Senate bill would eliminate the current objective of securing 80 pits per year and reduce that number to no more than 30 and achieve the capability no earlier than 2050.

In the face of a joint China-Russia deployed force projected at 4500 strategic, long-range nuclear warheads by 2035, the U.S. would have a mini-deterrent of a combined 214 ICBM and SLBM missiles and at most 950 warheads---if the MMIII legacy force of 150 missiles each had three warheads and the remaining D-5 missiles each had eight warheads per missile, both the maximum capability. This of course gives the U.S. no upload or surge capability.

Even worse, with the eventual and relatively near-term phasing out of the MMIII due to age/obsolescence, the U.S. strategic, long-range nuclear deterrent would be limited to 512 warheads, of which roughly 33-50% would be on alert and at sea at any one time, but outgunned by China and Russia by a 9 to 1 margin, to say nothing of a regional, theater nuclear capability outgunned as well but by a 5000 to zero warhead balance.

The U.S. has never deliberately built a minimalist nuclear deterrent, one only a fraction as large of that of its enemy. Even more worrisome, these proposals would leave our enemies, each with nuclear forces multiple times larger and more capable than such a planned U.S. nuclear deterrent force, while also diminishing a missile defense capable of dealing with accidental, unauthorized, or coercive nuclear threats.

A change in the makeup of the U.S. Congress is a choice on the ballot in November. Depending on the choice made, with it could come putting in charge of Congress and its key committees those who seek the near virtual nuclear disarmament of the United States.

Peter R. Huessy is President of Geo-Strategic Analysis and Senior Fellow, National Institute for Deterrent Studies.