
With Russia, Try Try Again
Published Dec. 14, 2017 • Read time: 6m
Ambassador Huntsman continues to face a daunting portfolio as he hits his stride managing a strained relationship with Moscow - sophisticated interference in democratic elections, global information operations, probing cyber-attacks, support to the Assad regime in Syria, clear culpability in the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17, military aggression in their near-abroad, the murder of regime critics under questionable circumstances, and general spoiling of international attempts within the United Nations to address global issues. Furthermore, there has not been a corresponding period since the end of the Cold War in which there appears to be a strong bipartisan consensus in the United States hostile to Russia. Weakening his hand further is the ongoing investigation of Special Prosecutor Mueller. Despite this deplorable state of affairs, a responsible step to improve U.S.-Russia relations would be to negotiate recognition of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and eliminate related sanctions in exchange for a series of small wins that benefit the U.S., Russia, and the global order. For lack of a better description, seek “reset v2.0” in the bilateral relationship.
Crimea has been an area of Russian strategic interest, and struggles, dating to the reign of Peter the Great in the early 18th Century. By the mid-18th Century, Catherine the Great firmly established rule over the peninsula and it has been a hub for Russian naval forces since. To this day, it is the Russian navy’s only warm water port with access through the Bosporus Straights to the Mediterranean and ultimately the Atlantic. One needs only a layman’s familiarity of Russian art or literature to appreciate Ivan Aivazovsky’s brilliant panoramas or Tolstoy’s tomes and thus fully comprehend the deep and strong cultural bonds between Russia, the Russian navy in particular, and Crimea.
Premier Khrushchev administratively gifted Crimea to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in the 1950’s. It remained part of Ukraine with the break-up of the Soviet Union and the ensuing treaty to repatriate legacy Soviet missiles back to Russia proper. At the time the treaty was negotiated and signed in the 1990’s, Russia was backed into a corner with its economy and social fabric in tatters, and its leaders distracted with a great crisis. Thus, Crimea remained within the Ukrainian state despite its truly Russian roots. It is inconceivable that any Russian government will ever again voluntarily cede Crimea and the home base of their Black Sea Fleet back to a nation with ambitions to join NATO, an organization they perceive as postured against their interests. To think otherwise dooms the American bilateral relationship with Russia to perpetual conflict and keeps Russia outside the periphery of a stable world order.
Russia poses an existential threat to the United States and its allies only through their nuclear weapons arsenal. The threat of stumbling into a conflict that leads to their use only increases in a Russia isolated by sanctions with the resultant social, economic, and political instability that sanctions and hostile relations can engender. Assuming the United States strengthens its electoral system, cyber defenses, and counters to information operations then even if a second reset does not result in improved relations, it does not substantially change the strategic dynamic - any potential conventional military exchange must conclude with a negotiated settlement or end in nuclear disaster. However, it does compel Russian leadership to address dislocation in their own society as a function of Russian decisions and not western interference, it continues to expose the Russian productive classes to western cultural norms through commercial and cultural interactions, and it has the potential to drive the relationship towards a better future.
There are certainly costs associated with any negotiated settlement with Russia. Primarily, it weakens the West's moral clarity on a rules-based global order and puts a crack in the inviolability of international borders. Therefore, any negotiated settlement must include strong public assurances to NATO allies and other close partners in the region, resolution of the continued unrest in eastern Ukraine, and economic or technical assistance to the Ukrainian government. The U.S. must reaffirm its commitment to the concept of inviolable borders excepting the unique circumstances in this case. The negotiations must also include concurrence of mutually beneficial outcomes and pathways to achieve them in Syria and North Korea at a minimum, and in other restless regions if able.
Recognition that Crimea is a part of Russia simply accepts the de facto reality of the situation. The international order can survive this shock given the complexities of how Crimea became part of Ukraine and Russia’s strong strategic interest in preventing a potential NATO takeover of its navy base. Although highly unlikely, let’s assume that the current state of affairs and perhaps even stronger sanctions in the future ultimately achieve the goal of a Russian withdrawal from Crimea. The result is an angry and humiliated declining power with a first rate military, a competent intelligence service, and nuclear weapons indefinitely playing a spoiling roll in the international system. That can hardly be considered a success.
It may seem an inopportune time to attempt another reset given domestic political realities in the United States and the potential that Russian actions are not a response to perceived slights, but a result of a strategic attempt to discredit a rules-based global order. However, the costs of attempting a reset now are low since an attempt to reset could hardly result in a worse relationship. Ambassador Huntsman is a highly experienced diplomat having managed complex strategic relationships as an ambassador under both Republican and Democratic administrations. He is the right leader to put a complex agreement in place and to shepherd it through a skeptical Congress. He also recognizes that disagreement over the Russian intervention in Ukraine marks the breaking point in recent U.S.-Russia relations.
Sanctimonious adherence to continued sanctions and hostile relations may feel morally just, but attempt to elicit some actions that Russians will never accept. Continuation of the status quo will drive the bilateral relationship towards ever increasing tensions and increase strategic threats to national security. Perhaps a demonstration of goodwill can elicit reciprocal goodwill, enable cooperation in areas of mutual interest, and minimize conflict in areas of friction. If it does not, and the United States takes necessary steps to protect domestic systems from interference, the strategic dynamic that exists today does not change. Crimea is not Sudetenland; it is time to attempt another reset.
CDR Michael Nordeen is a National Security Affairs Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and former Olmsted Scholar in Saint Petersburg, Russia. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the position of the United States Navy or Department of Defense.

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