Russia, Ukraine, and the U.S.: The Monster Is In The House

It is self-evidently true that the United States must act as the “champion and vindicator” of her own liberty even if one supposes that John Quincy Adams was correct to declare that “she goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy”. And it is precisely because the U.S. is the champion and vindicator of her own liberty that the U.S. must provide whatever help Ukraine needs to win her war against the monstrous Russian regime now ravaging her. 

Admittedly, this war does not look much like a war (at least at the moment) because no one is dying. In this sort of war, there is a high probability that no one dies each year and a small probability of millions of deaths. All the risk is in the tails of the casualty distribution. The U.S./Russia War is thus more accurately described as a Tail Risk War, not a Cold War.

The Tail Risk War ends with either: i) regime change in the U.S. which leads to the U.S. abandoning the Postwar order; ii) regime change in Russia which leads to Russia accepting and joining in that Order; or iii) a nuclear exchange.

Winning this war for the U.S. means minimizing the long run cumulative probability of a nuclear attack while not surrendering to an autocratic world order. To do so, the U.S. could opt to play deterrence roulette and hope that Russia undergoes spontaneous regime change before deterrence fails. Alternatively, the U.S. could seek to reduce the long run cumulative probability of nuclear war by inducing regime change in Russia (even if that means increasing the short run risk of a nuclear exchange). To get an idea of whether a regime change strategy makes sense, let us consider some scenarios.

Let us begin with deterrence roulette. Consider a time horizon of 50 years and assume that the annual risk of a deterrence failure leading to a nuclear war is 1% (as the analyses linked to above suggest). Assume further that Russia spontaneously undergoes regime change with an annual probability of 1%. Denote the year by y, with y = 0, 1,…,50. The probability of a nuclear exchange in any given year is then the probability that the Russian regime has not changed spontaneously (0.99^y) times the probability of an exchange if the regime has not changed (1%). Over 50 years, the cumulative probability of a nuclear exchange is 33%.

Now suppose that the U.S. can undertake an action that raises the annual probability of regime change in Russia from 1% to 5%. The probability that the regime has not changed by year y is then 0.95^y. Leaving the rest of the deterrence roulette scenario unchanged, the cumulative probability of a nuclear exchange falls from 33% to 16%. 

These scenarios indicate that increasing the probability of regime change in Russia is worth a crisis that carries with it even a significant risk (17% in this example) of nuclear escalation. This result depends upon the risk of a deterrence failure being higher than zero and the probability of spontaneous regime change in Russia being low. Is this plausible?

Since we cannot examine 10,000 alternative universes to see how the Tail Risk war turned out in each one, any estimate of the probability of a deterrence failure must depend upon only our own history. Consequently, any estimate will inevitably be imprecise. But that imprecision cuts both ways: the risks could be higher than 1% as well as lower (which would increase the payoff to regime change). One would have to be very certain that the risk of a deterrence failure was remarkably close to zero to think that the risk of a nuclear exchange with the Putin regime is insignificant. Given the evidence we have, it is (in my view) impossible to honestly claim certainty here. And if you cannot say for certain that the risk of a deterrence failure is 0 (and you can’t), then you must assume that cumulative long run probability of a nuclear exchange with Russia is substantial. It follows that regime change in Russia would lead to a significant reduction in nuclear war risk for the U.S.. 

Taking risks to bring about such a regime change in Russia are only worth it if the regime is not going to change on its own. I don’t think that there is very much evidence to suggest that Putin’s regime in unstable and winning in Ukraine will do nothing to make it so. Consequently, sitting back and waiting for regime change in Russia to happen all by itself will leave the U.S. exposed to a significant risk of a nuclear attack.

So, the U.S. faces a considerable risk of a nuclear attack if the hostile Putin regime remains in power, and that regime is not going to change spontaneously. If the opportunity arises, then, it would be worthwhile for the U.S. to act to increase the probability of regime change even at the cost of a crisis that carries with it a significant risk of nuclear escalation.

And that brings us to Ukraine.

The argument against supporting Ukraine begins with the premise that the fate of Ukraine is not of vital interest to the U.S. but is of vital interest to Russia. Opposing the Russian invasion will therefore inevitably raise the immediate risk of a nuclear war while also costing a non-trivial amount. Consequently, while the U.S. should deplore Russia’s invasion on ethical grounds, actively opposing it is simply not worth either the risk or the cost that doing so would necessarily involve. Tucker Carlson, Marjorie Taylor Green, and John Mearsheimer are prominent advocates of this position. French efforts to force a settlement on favorable terms to Russia show that this option has its supporters. 

The flaw in this argument is that it implicitly and incorrectly assumes that the cumulative long run probability of a nuclear war with Russia is minimal if the U.S. does not intervene in Ukraine. Arguing against U.S. intervention in Ukraine because of escalation risk is therefore analogous to telling a person dying of a heart condition to avoid surgery because surgery is dangerous. Such advice is not wrong because surgery is not dangerous, it is wrong because surgery is less dangerous than doing nothing. 

So, the question for U.S. is not: will doing what it takes to ensure that Ukraine wins create risks? Such a policy will obviously create risks. The question is: are the risks the U.S. must run to ensure a Ukrainian victory worth taking?

From this perspective, Russia’s invasion creates an opportunity to shatter the foundations of the Putin regime. A Ukrainian victory will, to quote Eva-Marie Liimets (the Foreign Minister of Estonia), weaken Russia to the point that it “can no longer attack Ukraine or other neighbors” and creates the possibility of “democracy [coming] back to Russia like we saw in the 1990s”. This is what victory in Ukraine looks like for the U.S.. 

Putin’s regime rests on two pillars. The first pillar is the idea that Russia is a Great Power that by right (as the world goes) exercises suzerainty over (at least) the states that were formerly members of the USSR and Warsaw Pact. Russia supports its Great Power ambitions by economically exploiting the West, with strategic corruption playing a key role in making that exploitation possible. The second pillar is the alliance of equals with China that Russia’s Great Power status makes possible, with this alliance aimed at creating a new international order safe for autocracies.

Ukraine—with U.S. and Western support—can deliver a decisive defeat to Russia’s military. Such a defeat will show that Russia’s claims to suzerainty over its near-abroad are delusional. A full trade embargo by the West to complement this military support will devastate the Russian economy. Military defeat and economic catastrophe will indisputably demonstrate that the Putin regime is not restoring Russia’s Great Power status.

After such a defeat, it will be impossible for Russia to pretend that the alliance with China is an alliance of equals. If Russia persists in its hostility to the West, then it will be destined to become little more than China’s Belarus. 

This is not what Putin has promised Russia. Facing such a destiny and the tensions that would arise from military defeat and economic hardship, the probability of regime change in Russia will increase. Russia could renounce its imperial ambitions and choose instead to build upon its cultural and scientific prowess to become a normal, successful, and prosperous country. But to get there, as the Deputy Prime Minister of Latvia Artis Pabriks put it, “Ukrainians must win [and] the Russians must lose”.

It is worth running significant risks to get this outcome.

Any hostile regime with nuclear weapons aimed at the U.S. is at war with the U.S.. Russia under Putin is such a regime, and to win this war the U.S. must induce a regime change in Russia. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine opens a critical front in this war. A Russian victory will strengthen the regime and pose a direct threat to U.S. allies who stand in Putin’s path as he pursues his insane ambition to reconstruct the Russian empire. A decisive Russian defeat could shatter Putin’s regime and so create the possibility of Russia becoming normal country. By doing what it takes to ensure that Ukraine triumphs over Russia in her struggle for liberty, then, the U.S. can destroy a monster that threatens her own.

Kevin R. James is an economist in the Systemic Risk Centre at the London School of Economics. He tweets at @kevinrogerjames.