Ukraine Negotiations: Widen the Aperture

Is someone in the Trump administration seeing China as the ends, with Ukraine and a deal being the ways and means, in the current negotiations with Russia on Ukraine taking place in Saudi Arabia?

Widening the aperture to a global geopolitical perspective, another parallel could be President F.D. Roosevelt’s recognition of the USSR in November 1933, ending 16 years of non-recognition. While there were many factors contributing to that recognition, the President’s decision would have been influenced by Imperial Japanese inroads on the Asian mainland and the National Socialist (Nazi) Party’s becoming the largest single party in the Reichstag that year. At that time, the U.S.’s full diplomatic recognition could help the U.S.’s depression-era economic situation but also would potentially align the USSR as an actor that geographically separated the two potential future enemies.

Similarly, President Nixon’s and Secretary of State Kissinger’s decoupling of the Soviet Union and China — the perceived communist monolith — to help extricate the U.S. from the Vietnam War is another comparable move to separate aligned enemies.

China is a near-term threat to the U.S. and a recognized long-term threat to Russia. A U.S.-Russia deal, good, bad or indifferent for Ukraine, could benefit both the U.S. and Russia. Should Russia exact security guarantees along its western boarders, along with economic benefits from the negotiations, but accept recognition of Ukraine’s sovereignty, it could focus on the threat to the east, China. In turn, the U.S. would benefit by being able to focus on a singular peer competitor in China, while simply monitoring Russian compliance as Europe reinvigorates its own deterrent capability.

U.S. credibility will suffer a blow from pulling away from the Russia threat in Europe, but hopefully only temporarily. In the context of great power competition, the major players are undeniably the U.S. and China, with Russia a close third. NATO, the EU or Europe are seldom included. The Russo-Ukrainian war, often mischaracterized as a three-year war despite Russia’s 2014 invasion, accentuates the ineffectiveness of many of the aforementioned entities to find a solution to the crisis.

The Minsk Agreements have had a minimal impact on the war other than a brief cessation of hostilities. Personally, having 16 years of NATO experience, in uniform and as a civilian, NATO is primarily a political body. A quickly negotiated end to hostilities in Ukraine will likely be counter-productive to President Trump’s call for increased defense spending amongst NATO members.

Similar demands during Trump’s first term in office failed. Member’s defense spending did increase as a result of the renewed Russian assault in 2022, but a ceasefire agreement would likely disincentivize increased or continued levels of defense spending.  Percentages of GDP for defense spending are quantifiable political goals and potential political victories, but a more meaningful metric would be the synergistic effectiveness of collective combat-power generation rather than individual national-focused acquisition.

A stronger, U.S.-involved NATO, with an aligned-by-necessity Russia would be a more effective balance to, or power over, China.  A stronger, U.S.-involved NATO also benefits Europe and for the U.S. it maintains the U.S.-European partnership rather than create a future competitor.

If this is indeed the unspoken U.S. objective of the U.S.-Russia negotiations, it would appear to make sense. No single entity would control Mackinder’s “Heartland,” a degree of stability would be achieved in a bi-polar world, and the U.S. would retain the necessary degree of power.

When Britian no longer ruled the waves, the U.S. was positioned to assume its position post-WWII as the leader of the Rules-Based International Order; today there is no such nation positioned to assume that responsibility should the U.S. relinquish it.

While issue may be taken with Thucydides ‘the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must,’ a negotiated peace based on the above would alleviate the suffering, foster stability, and enable redirection towards the common threat posed by China.

Public announcements are neither policy, nor the basis of negotiations. Russia has long excelled at maskirovka and reflexive control; maybe, just maybe, the U.S. is playing that game.

Mike Kelly is a currently and associate professor at the U.S. War College. A retired U.S. Marine infantry officer, Mike has sixteen years of experience in NATO, last service as the senior intelligence analyst/SOSA at the operational/joint force command level.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and not that of the U.S. War College or other institution.

Notes:

[i] Battleground-Ukraine; #254, 13 Feb 2025