The Primacy of Nuclear Deterrence

The United States now faces the bleakest prospects for peace since 1945. Russia, China, and North Korea are all revanchist states seeking to overthrow the American-led world order created after the defeat of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan in 1945. This threat offers an opportunity for Americans to reflect on the lessons of the Cold War as the nation charts a course for the future.

Remarkably, the same basic set of options available then are available today. It is perhaps worth reexamining those early options as the nation considers how to chart a course through the years ahead.

Bernard Brodie and many of his contemporaries quickly realized that nuclear weapons would play a primary role in advancing American vital interests in the years ahead. Preventing great-power war, deterring nuclear attack, and defending American economic interests abroad were all among the nation’s most important interests early in the Atomic era. Little has changed in the seven decades since.

The five points offered below were considered in Brodie’s 1946 classic. Despite the addition of China and North Korea as nuclear adversaries, the decisions made by the United States then are still valid today.

First, the United States can rely on conventional forces, rather than nuclear, to deter adversaries, win wars, and advance the nation’s vital interests. The “shock and awe” campaign employed to defeat Iraq was an exemplar of American conventional might.

However, both world wars are instances of the failure of conventional deterrence. Unfortunately, neither conventional deterrence (Germany twice), nor economic sanctions (Japan) was sufficient to prevent world wars that took the lives of almost one-hundred million people.

Absent nuclear weapons, the Cold War may have turned out very differently. The fear of devastation wrought by a nuclear war is sufficient to prevent great powers from fighting one another.

Second, the United States can rely on defenses to prevent or repel aggression. Even in 1946, Brodie realized that the American homeland would soon be vulnerable to Soviet bombers and sought a defensive solution. President Reagan later launched the Strategic Defense Initiative to defend the nation against ballistic missile attack.

In both instances, defense proved technically challenging and prohibitively expensive. Only nuclear deterrence and an assured second strike served to guarantee the peace.  

Third, the United States can adopt a policy of preventive war. The American military has the capability needed to launch a preemptive attack on any adversary believed to be a direct threat to the nation.

However, this option runs contrary to American morality and is fraught with risks. Given its moral questionability and military risk, the United States chose to reject preventive war as a viable strategy.

Fourth, the United States can unilaterally disarm. It is argued that adversaries understand the risks nuclear weapons pose and will follow suit. Soon after World War II’s end, advocates of disarmament sought to build a United Nations with the power to direct nuclear disarmament and prevent conflict. This never occurred.

Instead, the great powers went in the opposite direction and sought security in nuclear arsenals and the deterrence that results. Today, the future of disarmament looks bleaker than ever as nuclear arsenals grow in size and capability around the globe. As Keith Payne argues, relying on nuclear disarmament instead of nuclear deterrence is a “grand illusion.” His view is certainly shared by Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, and Kim Jung Un.

Fifth, a survivable nuclear arsenal is required in order to deter adversaries from launching an existential attack against the United States or threatening the nation’s vital interests. The United States chose and continues to choose this option because the psychological effect achieved through the threatened use of nuclear weapons continues to prove the best option for preventing great-power war.

The options Bernard Brodie posited in 1946 are still relevant today. The addition of a peer China and a nuclear-armed North Korea do not fundamentally alter the options facing the United States. They certainly do not suggest that the nation’s decision to choose nuclear deterrence was incorrect. If anything, the future may suggest nuclear weapons are more relevant than ever and more important for the United States than when Brodie was considering options almost eight decades ago.

Dr. Jonathan Trexel is a faculty member with Missouri State University’s defense and strategic studies graduate program.

Dr. Adam Lowther is Vice President for Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and the host of ANWA DC’s Nuclecast.

The views expressed in this article are the authors' own.