Addressing U.S. Army Pacific's Urgent Watercraft Problem

The Army is considering canceling its new logistics ship, the Maneuver Support Vessel-Light (MSV-L), as part of a service overhaul, according to reporting from last month. The report follows testimony from the former commander of U.S. Army Pacific, General Charles A. Flynn, in May in which he warned Congress that “the threat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is no longer distant or theoretical.”

To be clear, the goal is not for the U.S. Army to conduct large-scale contested amphibious invasions in the Pacific. Rather, a watercraft fleet of sufficient size and readiness can help enable the mobility of Army combat forces in the Pacific to facilitate survival and lethality.

MDTFs are tailored units designed to provide a wide range of capabilities and need to move quickly over vast stretches of ocean and on difficult terrain. But lacking large-scale organic transportation and sustainment capabilities, MDTFs are reliant on already stretched air and maritime resources, including Army watercraft.

Despite this fact, the size of the Army’s watercraft fleet has shrunk dramatically even as the need for them has grown. In 1971, the service had over 2,000 vessels, according to an October 2024 GAO report. By 2018, that number had shrunk to 134. Last year, that number was 70, GAO says.

To make matters worse, the service has struggled to maintain the readiness of the remaining fleet. The Army’s fully mission capable readiness rate goal is 90 percent, but for watercraft, the actual rate dropped from “75 percent in 2020 to less than 40 percent” late last year.

Poor maintenance capabilities are exacerbated by the high demand for these platforms. Between fiscal years 2023 and 2025, demand for watercraft increased by 56 percent, according to GAO. Considering those requirements were for peacetime operations, readiness rates would likely plummet further during large-scale combat operations, as modern warfare involves contested logistics and high attrition rates.

Given the likely cancelation of the MSV-L program, it is important that the service adopt four lines of effort to ensure it has sufficient watercraft capacity and readiness.

First, the service should fully implement the recommended improvements to maintenance procedures that GAO outlined. These include basic reforms such as addressing inefficiencies in the Army Watercraft Governance Board and switching from handwritten records to the online Army-wide data enterprise system.

Second, and most importantly, Congress should ensure the Army has sufficient readiness and capacity for its Landing Craft Utility (LCU) fleet. These transport platforms can carry multiple Abrams tanks, Stryker armored fighting vehicles, HIMARS multiple rocket launchers, or shipping containers. However, the current LCU fleet is aging rapidly, and despite attempts to lengthen their service life, maintenance levels have not been able to keep pace with the increase in demand. 

As the GAO report made clear, the Army needs help maintaining the LCUs it already has. That will require more manpower, equipment, and forward-stationed maintenance capabilities to sufficiently maintain and sustain the current fleet in addition to the Army’s own internal efficiency reforms. Effectively maintaining the current LCU fleet is the most effective way to address the watercraft shortfall. Congress should also work with the Pentagon to assess the current size of the Army’s watercraft fleet to determine whether it is sufficient to meet operational requirements.

But these efforts will take time. Third, in the meantime, the Army should explore innovative options for transportation and logistics, including unmanned watercraft and contract commercial transport. By incentivizing creative manufacturers to design and produce unmanned vessels that can transport troops, vehicles, and other equipment around the island chains, the Army can pursue innovative options to increase its watercraft capacity, readiness, and survivability in the future. Innovative options could include 3D printing and advanced manufacturing to enable units to create parts and repair watercraft on location more quickly. Additionally, the Army should work to incorporate local commercial transport options, including commercially available offshore support vessels for surge capacity. But the service should ask tough questions about whether commercial contractors will be able or willing to perform necessary tasks once a war starts.

Last, the Army should work to establish maintenance capabilities in shipyards in forward areas of the theater. The U.S. Navy already utilizes local shipyards for their mid-deployment refitting and other repairs in ports all across the world. If the Army accomplished this for its intra-theater transport fleet, it would ensure the rapid repair and refitting of these vessels without returning to distant U.S. ports.

The Trump administration is right to emphasize the importance of lethality and the role of the U.S. Army in the Pacific, particularly when it comes to long-range precision fires. But if these forward-positioned forces are to survive and continue to present a lethal threat to PLA planners and forces, soldiers and their units in the Pacific must be mobile. And in the maritime-dominated domain of the Pacific, that means the Army needs watercraft. That makes the poor condition of the Army’s watercraft fleet a serious problem that requires urgent attention.

Cameron McMillan is a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Center on Military and Political Power, where Bradley Bowman is senior director and Logan Rolleigh is an intern.