Operational Misconceptions: A Response to Operational Incompetence 2030

Generals Boomer and Conway’s June 15, 2024, article critiquing the Marine Corps Force Design plans was a step forward in the dialogue. While the title was unfortunate (but catchy), the tone was less shrill than what we’ve seen from some of our retired generals.

The root of the problem is that their experiences are from a different era. The character of warfare has shifted. Their generation appears unable to comprehend the nature of today’s fight. First, that the deadliest and most important fight may be getting to the fight and, second, that modern technology has greatly diminished the value of legacy formations and equipment. To be clear, these are smart men. But individual experiences can make for stubborn anchors to change. The paradigm of warfare has shifted while they haven’t.

Throughout the 1990s, the Navy voiced their concerns with the proliferation of sophisticated A2AD systems and pressured the Marine Corps to evolve its approaches to projecting power ashore. As their hopes in the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (a high water-speed craft that was ultimately canceled) floundered, Marines tried launching their ancient amphibious assault vehicles from farther out than the traditional 5,000 yards. An hour of bobbing ashore in a fume-filled aluminum container turned into hours. The Marines couldn’t survive the trip and be combat-effective once ashore.[ii] When that didn’t work, the Marines tried to cajole the Navy into remaining close to shore, exposing an entire ship and contents to lethal attack by anti-ship missiles. These unproductive interactions were obscured by the concurrent insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan with which the Marine Corps was absorbed.

Underlying their preoccupation and sometimes acrimonious resistance was a reality that the previous generation refused to face. The days of uncontested sailing were over. U.S. Forces, Marines in particular, must be prepared to fight their way to the objective area and onto the objective. Our enemies now all have modern, lethal, inexpensive weapons that can hurt us well before we get to the objective area. Imagine the impact of a $2B amphibious landing dock (LPD) going down with several hundred Marines, sailors, and equipment. The psychological cost alone could put the mission at risk and cause a national apoplexy.

The reality is that the massive power projection capabilities that the generals reminisce of were always supported by a foundation of sea control. The U.S. Navy’s first priority must, and will always be, to control the seas. Sea Control requires attack submarines and surface combatants, as well as aircraft carriers and patrol aircraft. In context, having thirty-one amphibious ships seems a good deal. General Conway asserted that, “the previous Commandant (Gen Berger) arbitrarily reduced the requirement to 31 ships.” This was not arbitrary at all. In fact, on General Conway’s watch, he set the requirement at 38, with tacit agreement for 31 operational ships at a given time. The Navy (obviously) took the number as 31. Marines have been struggling ever since to get enough of those 31 ships to be operational enough to support basic commitments, let alone go to war. This sad situation is not the fault of General Conway or any one Commandant. It is part of a broad decline in naval capabilities, to include maritime prepositioning.[iii]

As for those 31 ships. They are exquisite. Too exquisite. An allocation of fewer ships over time induced the Marine Corps to demand bigger, more expensive ships to pack with people and equipment. With minimal defensive capabilities, these ships are $2-5B sitting ducks. Conversely, the Landing Ship Medium that the Generals impugn for its slow speed and lack of armament (which mirrors current amphibs), distributes capabilities across several platforms, can operate in more restricted waters, costs far less, and is a less lucrative target than an LHA/D (General Purpose Amphibious Assault Ship) or LPD. Marines should be open to an amphibious task force that combines legacy and new platforms to offer more options and better survivability.

The Operational Incompetence article attacked the competence of recent Marine leaders; that their operational experiences were in counterinsurgency, thus making them incapable of understanding the need for combined arms and fixated on operating from fixed bases. A counteraccusation would ask who taught these Marines to live in “fixed bases” (i.e., forward operating bases, or FOBs) and to view warfare through a narrow land warfare lens? Personal biases and ad hominem attacks aside, a simple review of the equipment modernization that the Corps is fielding, especially in infantry battalions and in unmanned systems, demonstrates the hollowness of their argument. Their fixed bases affront equates Iraqi FOBs with the newly conceptualized Expeditionary Advanced Bases (EAB). This analogy is incorrect. FOBs were designed not to move while a central tenet of EABs is their ability to rapidly emplace, operate and displace to new locations.

The authors and their colleagues all take umbrage that the Corps has shifted (even if only partially) from a capabilities-based force to a threat-based one. What they are really saying is that they prefer to be a second land army that merely rides ships as opposed to a truly naval force.[iv] What they fail to see is that the stand-in forces and capabilities they disparage are designed to offset threats that are far more capable of disrupting maritime operations than anything we have ever faced. Prevention through a viable stand-in force is preferrable to battling to take land and restricted waters back. This is especially important if you happen to be a U.S. ally.

The Generals who critique Force Design all think these new capabilities are something outside of the Marne Corps traditional missions. They are not. Before the establishment of the Fleet Marine Force and development of amphibious doctrine in the 1930’s, the Marine Corps invested much of its structure as an Advanced Base Force. The original orders for this force were signed by General Lejeune in 1921.[v] Bottom line: The stand-in force’s mission is relevant, it’s critical and it’s in line with Marine Corps traditions. The Marine Corps continues to have forces for power projection. We can all agree that there are never enough of these forces to satisfy requirements. Hard choices are being made. And, yes, mistakes are being made too. Change is never perfect on the first try. But for those who are watching, those errors are being reviewed and addressed in real time.

Until recently, every Commandant had the explicit trust of his predecessors for stewardship of our Corps. They had confidence that a sitting Commandant had the best understanding of what the Nation needed from her Marines. Every Commandant has enough on his plate already with the challenges of organizing, training, and equipping the Corps to meet current needs and future threats. Let this one do his job.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and not the U.S. Marine Corps or Department of Defense.

[i] UK Ministry of Defence, “Operations in Iraq: Lessons for the Future” (London: UK Ministry of Defence, 2003), 12. British forces, supported by U.S. Navy SEALS and the 15^th Marine Expeditionary Unit did conduct an assault from the sea on the Al Faw Peninsula in March 2003. This attack was conducted almost exclusively using helicopters, supported by fixed and rotary wing fire support. However, UK armor was diverted through Kuwait due to extensive mining on the landing beaches.

[ii] Our ship-to-shore technology has not changed much. The Corps’ new amphibious combat vehicle has the same 4-5 knot water speed as its predecessor.

[iii] The latter started with the deactivation of Maritime Prepositioning Squadron One (MPSRON-1) in 2012. General Berger arguably committed a major error by expressing doubt as to the efficacy of maritime prepositioning ships (MPS) in his 2018 planning guidance. The Navy was quick to reallocate resources from MPS to other priorities.

[iv] Every Commandant faces this institutionally strategic dilemma. In times of war, the Marine Corps will always fight alongside the U.S. Army; often at (temporary) expense to its naval character. Outside of war, the Marine Corps justifies its existence as a Naval force.

[v] https://www.usmcu.edu/Research/Marine-Corps-History-Division/Frequently-Requested-Topics/Historical-Documents-Orders-and-Speeches/Establishing-the-Advanced-Base-Force/. “Marine Corps organizations available for overseas service with the fleet shall be known as “The Advanced Base Force, U.S. Marine Corps.””